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1

ARGUMENT
Level 3's Brief of the Appellant ("Brief in Support") explains why the Public
Service Commission ("Commission") erred in applying Sections 251 and 252 of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C.A. § 251, et seq. (the "ACT" or the "FTA"),
and the Commission's own Decision and Order in the Arbitration Docket1 to "interpret"
the interconnection agreement ("ICA") between Qwest Corporation ("Qwest") and Level
3 Communications, LLC ("Level 3") ("Old Agreement"). The Commission erroneously
applied federal law when the Old Agreement should have been interpreted under the
principles of state contract law.
Upon receiving Level 3's Notice of Appeal, Qwest removed this appeal to the
United States District Court and argued that, in interpreting the Old Agreement, the
Commission's Decision relied on a provision in the federal Act for its conclusion that
rates for interconnection facilities must be "just and reasonable." Opp'n to Mot. to
Remand at 3 (attached as Exhibit J of the Addendum to Level 3's Brief of the Appellant).
Qwest contended that the issue on appeal raised questions of federal law. The District
Court disagreed and remanded the appeal to the Utah Supreme Court, holding that "the
resolution of this dispute depends upon state contract law" Order Remanding Action to
Utah Supreme Court, Case No. 2:06cvl32K (D. Utah, May 30, 2006) ("Federal Court's
Remand Order") at 2 (emphasis added) (attached as Exhibit A in the Addendum herein).
1

In the Matter of Level 3 Communications, LLC for Arbitration Pursuant to Section
252(b) of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 with Qwest Corporation Regarding Rates,
Terms and Conditions for Interconnection, (Utah PSC, Docket No. 02-2266-02)
(hereinafter "Arbitration Docket").
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In Qwest's Brief of Appellee ("Qwest Brief), Qwest does not defend the
Commission's Order in this matter on the grounds upon which it was decided. Qwest
does not argue that the Commission's Order was properly based on federal law, or that
this Court should uphold the Commission's reasons for reaching its decision. Instead,
Qwest proposes an entirely new theory of the case on appeal and contends that the
Commission's Order can be upheld on grounds of state law. Qwest Brief at 21-22.
Qwest argues that the Commission's decision somehow "interpreted" the Relative Use
Factor ("RUF") clause of the Old Agreement consistent with state law. In doing so,
Qwest attributes to the Commission a rationale that has no basis in the facts of the case or
in the Commission's Order. Qwest's arguments should be rejected.
A.

The Court Should Vacate the Commission's Decision and Order,

1.

Qwest Does Not Contest that the Commission Incorrectly Applied
Federal Law.

Level 3's Brief in Support argues that the Commission erred in applying a just and
reasonable standard under the Act to interpret the Parties' Old Agreement. Brief in
Support at 21-27. In support of its position, Level 3 explained that the Commission
incorrectly applied the federal standards for arbitrating ICAs to the present case, which
instead requires interpretation and enforcement of an ICA. Brief in Support at 27. Level
3 demonstrated that the interpretation and enforcement of the RUF clause in the Parties'
Old Agreement required the application of state contract law, rather than federal law.
Brief in Support at 1, 27-31. The Federal District Court agreed that the interpretation of
the RUF clause is purely a matter of state contract law. Federal Court's Remand Order
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at 2. Qwest has not attempted to respond to Level 3's argument that the Commission
erred in applying federal law to resolve this dispute.
2.

Qwest Does Not Contest that the Commission Incorrectly Relied on the
ISP Remand Order and the Commission's 2004 Order.

In its Brief in Support, Level 3 raised the issue of whether the Utah Commission
also erred in relying on the Federal Communications Commission's ("FCC") ISP
Remand Order and its own order from the Arbitration Docket to interpret the RUF clause
in the Old Agreement. Brief in Support at 2 (statement of third issue), 31-35 (argument).
Level 3 explained that the Commission's reliance on the ISP Remand Order was error
because the Parties agreed that it was not directly applicable, and because the ISP
Remand Order itself states that it does not apply to contracts entered into before the
effective date of the Order. Id. at 32-35. Level 3 also explained that the Commission
erred in relying on its order in the Arbitration Docket for its rationale about what the
parties' financial obligations should be. Instead, the Commission should have enforced
the plain language of the Parties' contract using principles of state contract law.
Id. at 35-39.
Qwest has not addressed Level 3's third issue. Instead, it attempts to introduce a
new issue, which it contends "roughly correspond[s]" to Level 3's third issue, but which
it claims is "more appropriately" stated as follows: "(w]hether the Commission's
interpretation of the Old Agreement was erroneous under state law, and if so whether any
error substantially prejudiced Level 3." Qwest Brief at 2. Qwest's issue does not even
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"roughly" correspond either to the issue that Level 3 has raised with the Court, or to the
Commission's Order.
Qwest's attempt to redefine the issue on appeal should not be allowed. Even
though Qwest's Brief states that it "accepts Level 3's statement of the preservation" of
Level 3's third issue, id, Qwest in fact, has raised an entirely different issue: whether the
Commission's decision was erroneous under state law and the error substantially
prejudiced Level 3. Id Therefore, Qwest must show that its own issue was properly
preserved for appeal. In fact, Qwest's issue, as stated, did not even arise because the
Commission did not interpret the Agreement under state law. Rather, the Commission
applied federal law, which was the error that prompted this appeal.

Because the

Commission did not interpret the Old Agreement under state law, the issue of whether it
correctly or erroneously interpreted the Old Agreement under state law never arose.
Qwest's issue was not preserved for appeal, and thus must be rejected. Gibson v. Bd. of
Review of Indus. Comm'n of Utah, 707 P.2d 675, 677 (Utah 1985) ("Issues not raised
before the administrative agency are waived on appeal.").
The Commission's Order should be vacated because it erroneously imposed
standards developed under a complex federal statutory regime to a simple question of
interpreting the plain language of the RUF clause under state contract law. The federal
court has made it clear that there is no federal question to be resolved in this dispute. The
decision of the federal court effectively resolves the entire matter by placing the focus of
the issue on appeal squarely on the actual language of the RUF clause of the Parties'
contract.

892619.15
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Commission's reached its decision. Therefore, for the reasons stated in Level 3's Brief in
Support, the Court should vacate the Commission's Order.
B.

As Matter of Law, the Plain Language of the RUF Clause Does Not
Exclude ISP-Bound Traffic from the Relative Use Calculation.

Although Level 3 disagrees with Qwest's statement of the issue, it agrees, to some
extent, with Qwest's position that this Court can interpret the plain language at issue as a
matter of law and resolve this case. "Questions of contract interpretation not requiring
resort to extrinsic evidence are matters of law, and on such questions we accord the trial
court's interpretation no presumption of correctness." Zions First Nat'l Bank, N.A. v.
National Am. Title Ins. Co., 749 P.2d 651, 653 (Utah 1988). Thus, this Court may
interpret the meaning of the plain language and rule as a matter of law.
The plain language of the provision at issue can be interpreted by simply reading
the RUF clause, Section 5.1.2.4. It provides:
If the Parties' elect to establish two-way direct trunks, the
compensation for such jointly used 'shared' facilities shall be
adjusted as follows. . . . The actual rate paid to the provider of
the direct trunk facility shall be reduced to reflect the
provider's use of that facility. The adjustment in the direct
trunk transport rate shall be a percentage that reflect the
provider's relative use (i.e. originating minutes of use) of the
facility in the busy hour.
R. 28, at 4 T| 9; R. 58, at 3-4.2 As demonstrated in Level 3's Brief in Support, the plain
meaning of this language is that the relative use of facilities must reflect the originating

2

The Commission ruled: "This section contains the Old Agreement's only mention of a
relative use factor ("RUF") respecting the rates to be paid for direct trunk transport." R.
58, at 4.
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minutes of use on the direct trunk facilities ("direct trunk transport" or " D T P facilities).
See Brief in Support at 39-42. It is undisputed that Qwest end users originated all the
traffic carried over the DTT facilities during the dispute period. R. 58, at 5, 10. Because
"use" is defined in section 5.1.2.4 as "originating minutes of use," Qwest, as the sole user
of the DTT facilities, therefore, bears all of the cost.
The plain language of the RUF clause is unambiguous. It does not include any
exception for Internet Service Provider ("ISP") traffic, and cannot reasonably be read to
impose one. Therefore, by relying on what has already been settled, that is, that this
clause applies to the traffic exchanged between the Parties on the DTT facilities, this
Court can resolve this issue and rule as a matter of law that the RUF clause does not
exclude ISP-bound traffic from the relative use calculation.
C.

Qwest's Proposed Interpretation of the "Plain Language" of the RUF
Clause Should be Rejected.

The Court may "not consider on appeal issues which were not submitted to the
trial court and concerning which the trial court did not have the opportunity to make any
findings of fact or law." Zions, 749 P.2d at 657. Even when an issue raised for the first
time on appeal is a matter of law, an appellate court should not consider it because
"[ajlthough [the appellate court] may not defer to a trial court's conclusion on a legal
question, [it] certainly may derive great benefit from the trial judge's views on the issue
and may be persuaded by those views." Id. at 654.
Qwest's argument that the Court may interpret the plain language of the RUF is, in
fact, not based on the plain language, but on a document that is not in the record,
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numerous assertions of fact that were never put before the Commission, and on legal
arguments made for the first time on appeal. Qwest Brief at 23-31. The Court should
therefore disregard Qwest's argument that the Court may affirm the Commission's
Decision by interpreting the "plain language" of the RUF.
1.

In Interpreting the Plain Language of the RUF Clause, the Court
Should Not Consider the Entire Old Agreement.

In its Brief, Qwest states: "The plain-language purpose and concept of section
5.1.2.4 of Attachment 1 to the Old Agreement is not difficult to discern." Qwest Brief at
23. Rather than analyzing the language of Section 5.1.2.4, however, Qwest proceeds to
argue that the "broader scope," and other sections of the Old Agreement, mean that
Section 5.1.2.4 should be interpreted as being limited to "local" traffic only. Qwest Brief
at 23. It cites a number of provisions in the Old Agreement to argue its point, and adds
its own view about the intent of the Old Agreement ("[T]he specific language in the Old
Agreement providing for DTT facilities only contemplated transport for local calls"). IdL
at 26. Qwest's assertion that the Court can interpret "the broader scope of the Old
Agreement" is incorrect.

The Old Agreement is not in the record and cannot be

introduced on appeal.
There have been no findings as to the intent of the Old Agreement or the meaning
of "local" traffic. The Commission has had the opportunity to review only Attachment 1
3

Qwest scolded Level 3 for choosing only to submit "limited sections of the Old
Agreement for the Commission's review." Qwest Brief at 34. Nevertheless, despite the
fact that Qwest counterclaimed below asking the Commission to issue an order "pursuant
to the Old Agreement" (R. 24, at 10 ^f A), Qwest never placed the Old Agreement into the
record.
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of the Old Agreement, which is in the Record at 44. Its Order in this case makes it clear
that it never considered any other language of the Old Agreement except the provision
that was in controversy, the RUF clause. R. 58, at 3-4.
Level 3 disagrees with Qwest's characterization and interpretation of the Old
Agreement, and specifically disputes that it can be used to establish that the ISP-bound
DTT traffic is not subject to the RUF clause. Accordingly, as more fully explained in
Level 3's Motion to Strike and supporting Memorandum (filed concurrently herewith),
the Court should disregard the Old Agreement, all references to it, and argument based on
it, other than those provisions contained in Attachment 1 (R. 44).
2.

In Interpreting the Plain Language of the RUF Clause, the Court
Should Not Consider Qwest's Argument that the RUF Clause Does Not
Apply to the Traffic Exchanged Between the Parties on the DTT
Facilities.

Relying on material outside the record, Qwest contends that the RUF, and the
whole ICA, apply to "local" traffic only. It then attempts to argue that the DTT traffic at
issue is not "local" traffic because the ISPs to which it is ultimately directed may not be
"local." Relying again on its own assertions of fact and the purported Old Agreement,
Qwest argues for the first time on appeal that the traffic carried over the DTTs is "long
distance" traffic because it spans more than one local calling area. Qwest Brief at 26.
"Long distance traffic," it claims, is not within the scope of the Old Agreement at all. It
"is merely referenced in the Old Agreement as being covered under the applicable Qwest
Switched Access Tariff." Id. at 26-27. Qwest concludes, therefore that the traffic carried
on the DTT facilities "is not subject to the relative use offset in section 5.1.2.4." Id. The
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Court should reject Qwest's argument because, as discussed above, it is based on portions
of the purported Old Agreement attached to its Brief that are not contained in the record,
and on a series of unfounded assertions, also raised for the first time on appeal, about
what constitutes "local" traffic.4
Qwest's argument that ISP-bound traffic carried on the DTT facilities is not
subject to the RUF clause should also be rejected because the parties have agreed to the
contrary. In both in the Arbitration Docket involving the New Agreement and in the
present case involving Section 5.1.2.4 of the Old Agreement, the Parties agreed that ISPbound traffic would be exchanged pursuant to the New and Old interconnection
agreements, including Section 5.1.2.4, which is the RUF pricing provision for the DTT
facilities at issue in this case. The doctrine of collateral estoppel bars Qwest from relitigating the issue of whether Section 5.1.2.4 applies to the traffic that the Parties
exchanged over DTT facilities because that issue was decided in the Arbitration Docket.
Even if the issue had not been previously decided, the issue of whether the Old
Agreement applies to ISP-bound traffic was not raised before the Commission or
preserved for appeal in the present case, and therefore, Qwest cannot raise it for the first
time on this appeal.
4

See Level 3's Motion to Strike and Memorandum in Support of Motion to Strike filed
concurrently herewith. Qwest's Brief makes assertions of fact that the Commission never
considered below, for example, "if the call terminates in the different LCA then the one
where it originated, it is not a local call." Qwest Brief at 25; "in other words, long
distance traffic is traffic that spans more than one LCA." Id. at 26; "Level 3's VNXX
ISP traffic at issue in this case not only spans more than one LCA, it spans more than one
state." Id. These are only a few of the un-cited assertions of fact that Qwest relies upon
in its allegation that the DTT traffic was not "local."

orv»/r t n i f
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a.

Qwest Is Barred from Asserting that the RUF Clause Does Not
Apply to the Traffic at Issue in this Case Because the Question was
Finally Resolved in the Arbitration Docket.

Res judicata refers to the "binding effect of a previous adjudication on a current
adjudication." Culbertson v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 44 P.3d 642 (Utah 2001). "Res
judicata has two branches: claim preclusion and issue preclusion."

Murdock v.

Springville Mun. Corp. (In re Gen. Determination of the Rights to the Use of All the
Water), 982 P.2d 65 (Utah 1999). "[C]laim preclusion bars a party from prosecuting in a
subsequent action a claim that has been fully litigated previously." Culbertson, 44. P.3d
at 642. Issue preclusion, also referred to as collateral estoppel, bars "parties or their
privies from re-litigating issues which were once adjudicated on the merits and have
resulted in a final judgment." Murdock, 989 P.2d at 65. The Utah court has set out four
requirements for demonstrating issue preclusion:
[1] [T]he party against whom issue preclusion is asserted
must have been a party to or in privity with a party to the
prior adjudication; [2] the issue decided in the prior
adjudication must be identical to the one presented in the
instant action; [3] the issue in the first action must have been
completely, fully, and fairly litigated; and [4] the first suit
must have resulted in a final judgment on the merits.
Brigham Young Univ. v. Tremco Consultants, Inc., 110 P.3d 678, 686 (Utah 2005)
(citing Murdock, 982 P.2d 65). All of those requirements have been met in the present
case.
The issue of whether ISP-bound traffic is subject to the ICA generally and to the
RUF clause in particular was part of the litigation before the Commission in the prior
proceeding in which it arbitrated the RUF clause of the New Agreement. R. 6 (Report
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and Order, Docket No. 02-2266-02 ("2004 Order" or "Arbitration Order")).

In the

Arbitration Docket, the parties brought Section 5.1.2.4 (the RUF clause) of the New
Agreement before the Commission to determine whether it should include language
excepting ISP-bound traffic from the RUF calculation. Id. at 1. Qwest contended that
the RUF clause should include an express exclusion for ISP-bound traffic; Level 3
contended it should not. But, both Parties agreed that the traffic carried on the DTT
facilities was subject to the RUF clause, hence the request for the Commission to
arbitrate the proposed exclusion.
The Commission stated in the Arbitration Docket as follows:
The facts are undisputed. ... The interconnection agreement
provision at issue in this matter deals with the financial
responsibility of each party for direct trunk transport facilities
("DTTs") and related entrance facilities used to transport and
exchange traffic between the companies. Level 3 and Qwest
have agreed that when traffic reaches a certain level DTTs
will be used to carry the traffic. They have further agreed
that the cost of those facilities will be based on the "relative
use" of the facilities. The parties disagree, however, on
whether ISP-bound traffic should be excluded from the
relative use calculations.
Id. (emphasis added). The Commission accepted the Parties' representations and its
ruling was based in part on the "undisputed fact" that the RUF clause applied to
determine the financial responsibility of each party for the use of the DTT facilities.
Similarly, in the Order in the present docket, the Commission, referring to the
Arbitration Docket, observed that "the sole provision at issue in [the Arbitration Docket]
was Section 5.1.2.4 of Attachment 1, the same provision" that the Commission was asked
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to interpret in the present docket. The Commission further observed that, just as in the
Arbitration Docket:
Level 3 and Qwest agreed that when traffic reached a certain
level, DTTs would be used to carry the traffic. They further
agreed that the cost of those facilities would be based on the
"relative use" of the facilities, with Level 3 being billed for
all of the cost of the interconnection facilities at issue but
Qwest issuing Level 3 a credit for its portion of the relative
use of the facilities.
R. 58, at 4-5. Having thus found that the parties agreed that Section 5.1.2.4 applied to the
traffic exchanged on the DTT facilities, the Commission stated the sole issue before it in
the present case: "The parties disagreed, however, on whether ISP-bound traffic should
be excluded from the relative use calculations." Id. at 5.
There can be no question that the issue that Qwest seeks to raise, i.e., whether the
RUF clause applies to traffic carried on the DTT facilities, is identical in the present
proceeding to that issue as it was determined in the Arbitration Docket. Likewise, there
can be no question that, just as in the Arbitration Docket, an essential predicate for the
Commission's decision, and even the reason for the existence of the ultimate issue, was
the Commission's finding, as an undisputed fact, that the RUF clause applied to traffic
carried over the DTT facilities. Arbitration Order at 1.
The parties in the Arbitration Docket were the same parties as in the present case.
As set forth above, the issue of whether DTT traffic is subject to the RUF clause in the
Arbitration Docket was the same as the issue Qwest seeks to re-litigate in the present
case.

The parties had the opportunity to fully, fairly and completely litigate the

applicability of the RUF to the DTT facilities in the Arbitration Docket.
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The

applicability of the RUF to the DTT facilities was an agreed-upon, essential finding
underlying the Commission's Arbitration Order. The Arbitration dispute went to final
judgment on February 20, 2004. Neither party appealed the Arbitration Order. R. 6. The
doctrine of collateral estoppel thus bars Qwest from re-litigating in the current case the
issue of whether the RUF clause applies to the traffic in question.
b.

The Issue of Whether the RUF Clause Applies to the Exchange of
ISP-bound Traffic Was Not Preserved for the Present Appeal.

In addition to the bar imposed by the doctrine of collateral estoppel, Qwest should
be foreclosed from arguing that the RUF does not apply to the DTT facilities because it
failed to raise the issue before the Commission.
"[I]n order to preserve an issue for appeal the issue must be raised in such a way
that the trial court has an opportunity to rule on that issue." Brookside Mobile Home
Park, Ltd. v. Peebles, 43 P.3d 968, 972 (Utah 2002). Factors that may be considered in
determining whether the trial court had such an opportunity include whether the issue
was raised "in a timely fashion," whether it was "specifically raised," and whether the
party introduced "supporting evidence or relevant legal authority." Id. at 972 (citing
Badger v. Brooklyn Canal Co., 966 P.2d 844, 847 (Utah 1998)). The same principle
governs matters brought before the State's administrative agencies. See Gibson v. Bd. of
Review of Indus. Comm'n of Utah, 707 P.2d 675, 677 (Utah 1985) ("Issues not raised
before the administrative agency are waived on appeal").
Qwest's argument that the RUF does not apply to the traffic that was exchanged
over the Parties' interconnection facilities was not timely or specifically raised with the

Commission. R. 42, at 9-10; R. 55, at p. 18-19; Qwest Brief at 23-27 (first raising the
issue). Qwest argued (both in the Arbitration Docket and the present case), that the RUF
clause does apply, but in a way that should exclude ISP-bound traffic from the
calculation, despite the fact there is no contractual language to support that position.
R. 42, at 4-5, 9-10. Now, Qwest goes to great lengths to assert "facts" for the first time
that might support its theory that the DTT facilities carried "non-local" traffic and that the
RUF clause therefore does not apply at all. Those alleged facts, however, and any facts
that Level 3 might have presented to controvert them, are not in the record because Qwest
only raised the issue on appeal. See Mem. in Support of Mot. to Strike. Accordingly, the
Court should not consider Qwest5 s argument that the RUF clause does not apply to the
DTT traffic.
3-

The SPOP Amendment Does Not Affect the Plain Meaning of the RUF
Clause.

Qwest contends that the SPOP amendment, R. 34-35, 45, when read together with
the RUF clause and other "provisions of the Old Agreement, . . . supports] the exclusion
of non-local traffic from the relative use offset of Section 5.2.1.4." Qwest Brief at 27. It
relies on Section 1.3.3 of the SPOP amendment which provides that "[a] separate trunk
group to the Qwest access tandem is necessary for the exchange of non-local Exchange
Access (intraLATA toll non-IXC) traffic and jointly Provided Switched Access
(interLATA and intraLATA IXC)." Id. at 27 (citing R. 36 § 1.3.3). Qwest also cites a
provision of the SPOP amendment that Qwest claims provides that "DTT trunks 'will
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carry exchange service EAS/local traffic only."' Id. at 27 (quoting Attachment 1 to
SPOP Amendment, R. 36 § 1.3.2).
Qwest's argument asserting that the SPOP supports the notion that DTTs will
carry "local" traffic only begs the question by assuming that the traffic carried on the
DTT trunks is not "local" traffic as defined by Qwest. As discussed above, that issue is
res judicata, has not been preserved for appeal, and is without support based on the
evidence of record. The Court, therefore, should not consider Qwest's argument that the
SPOP amendment affects the plain meaning of the RUF clause.
4,

In Interpreting the Plain Language of the RUF Clause, the Decisions of
Courts and Regulators Cited by Qwest are Not Applicable.

Qwest contends that its interpretation of the "plain meaning" of the RUF clause is
consistent with courts and regulators that have "considered attempts by CLECs such as
Level 3 to game the system through the use of VNXX traffic." Qwest Brief at 29. There
is no mention of "VNXX" anywhere in the record in this case and thus no evidence to
support a finding that the traffic exchanged by the parties can be considered "VNXX."
The same is true for Qwest's references to "interexchange" or "long distance" calling, or
"bootstrapping VNXX." Id. As explained above, the record demonstrates that Qwest
and Level 3 agreed that these facilities were to be provided under the ICA and subject to
the RUF. Qwest is barred, therefore, from asserting that the RUF does not apply to the
DTT traffic originated by Qwest's end users. Whether it may be considered "local"
traffic or "non-local" traffic has never been addressed by the Commission, and there are
no findings in the record to support any of Qwest's assertions. For the same reason, the
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cases decided by courts and regulators cited by Qwest are not applicable to the issue
before the Commission and this Court. Therefore, this Court should disregard Qwest's
arguments on this point when interpreting the plain language of the RUF clause.
5.

The Court Should Reject Qwest's Interpretation of the Plain Language
of the RUF Clause.

The interpretation of the "plain language" of the RUF that Qwest urges is based
entirely on references outside the record, extrinsic evidence in support of Qwest's
interpretation, new theories about federal law, and questions of fact, "which may not be
determined on appeal." Zions, 749 P.2d at 654. Qwest has raised issues that were "not
submitted to the [Commission] and concerning which the [Commission] did not have the
opportunity to make any findings of fact or law." Id. For the Court to accept Qwest's
concept of "interpreting the plain language" it would have to ignore the plain language
of Section 5.1.2.4 itself. Qwest also asks the Court to disregard the Commission's
uncontroverted findings that the RUF clause applied to the traffic exchanged by the
Parties over the DTT facilities and Qwest's own position statements to that effect, while
accepting as fact the assertions of counsel made for the first time in Qwest's Brief in
order to affirm the Commission on factual and legal grounds that the Commission never
considered.
The Court should reject Qwest's interpretation of the plain language of the RUF
clause.
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D.

The Court Should Not Consider or Resolve Any Ambiguity Even if
One Were to Exist

Qwest argues that "even if the Court determines there is an ambiguity [in the RUF
clause], the Commission still reached the correct result in this case." Qwest Brief at 31.
Qwest claims that "if the Court finds ambiguity, it may look to broader considerations in
assessing party intent." Id. at 33. If this Court were to determine that the language of
Section 5.1.2.4 is ambiguous, Level 3 agrees, the trier of fact can then look to extrinsic
evidence to make a determination as to the intent of the parties. Qwest Brief at 32. But,
because the case would then turn on extrinsic evidence, it must be remanded to the
Commission. This Court is not the trier of fact. Zions, 749 P.2d at 654. (questions of
fact "may not be determined on appeal").
1.

The Commission's Decision Cannot be Affirmed on the Basis that it
Correctly Interpreted the RUF Clause According to Utah Law,

Qwest's Brief offers argument and extrinsic evidence in support of its contention
that the RUF clause, if ambiguous, should be interpreted in its favor. Qwest Brief at 3143. The Court should not consider any of the argument contained at pages 31-43 in
Qwest's Brief because it is offered to resolve ambiguity in the RUF, assuming arguendo
there is one. Nevertheless, because that portion of Qwest's Brief contains some argument
in rebuttal to Level 3's Brief in Support, Level 3 responds as follows to those points.
a.

Qwest Does Not Have a Right to Just and Reasonable Compensation
for Its Own Use of DTT Facilities.

Qwest argues that the Commission did not err in interpreting the RUF to require
just and reasonable compensation for Qwest because, it claims, Qwest did not negotiate
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away its "right to just and reasonable compensation under Section 251 (c) of the Act."
Qwest Brief at 35.
The record shows that Qwest stated to the Commission that the RUF was
negotiated. R. 71, at 13.5 Even if the facts were as Qwest now urges, that the clause was
arbitrated rather than negotiated, which Level 3 denies and contends is not supported by
the record, that would only affect the standard by which the Old Agreement would have
been approved. This does not change the fact that interpretation and enforcement of the
RUF clause is governed by state contract law, not by federal law of any kind. See Level
3's Brief in Support at 27-31; Federal Court's Remand Order at 2. Qwest, like the
Commission, has confused the standard applicable to approving ICAs with the law
applicable to interpreting and enforcing them. Thus, Qwest's suggestion that the law at
the time the Parties entered into the agreement required the RUF to be just and reasonable
is simply wrong. Qwest never had a right to have the RUF clause interpreted in a way
that required just and reasonable compensation for Qwest.6

5

Qwest's argument to the contrary is based, in part, on the "testimony" of counsel about
how AT&T and Qwest arrived at the language in the clause. Qwest Brief at 34-35.
Level 3 has moved to strike that alleged "fact" and others upon which Qwest's argument
is based. See Mot. to Strike and supporting Memorandum filed concurrently herewith.
There is no testimony that the RUF was the product of arbitration, or that the language
was "ordered" by the Commission. The discussion about what the bold typeface means
is not helpful to know whether the parties negotiated the crucial words or what it means
to say that such language "corresponds to language included to comply with
Commission's Orders." Qwest Brief at 35. Furthermore, no witnesses were presented by
Qwest to testify about the origin of the RUF.
6
Qwest argues later in its Brief that the Commission's Utah statutes impose a "just and
reasonable" requirement. That argument is also incorrect as discussed below.
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b.

Even Though Qwest's Alleged "Other Surrounding Circumstances"
Actually Favor Level 3's Interpretation, Any Ambiguity Should Not
Be Decided by this Court.

Qwest argues that the Commission could have drawn no implication in favor of
Level 3's interpretation from other surrounding circumstances, including the fact that the
parties did not renegotiate the RUF in response to the ISP Remand Order, Qwest Brief at
36. Qwest points out, correctly, that the ISP Remand Order was inapplicable to the RUF
clause. Id. At the same time, it claims the ISP Remand Order clarifies federal policy by
preventing "arbitrage." Id. at 37. Thus, Qwest contends, the fact that the Parties did not
negotiate the RUF does not mean that the state of the law prior to the issuance of the ISP
Remand Order supported Level 3's argument that internet traffic was included in the
RUF." Id.
The only established facts that need be considered in this case are that the DTT
traffic was subject to the RUF clause, and that the RUF clause was never amended by
Qwest during the term of the contract.7 Speculating about Qwest's intent or actions that
were not reduced to writing in the Parties' contract is not appropriate or necessary.
Further, Qwest is overly selective in its reliance on the ISP Remand Order, The
Order itself states that parties with contracts requiring reciprocal compensation for ISPbound traffic were to amend them, or abide by them until they expired. ISP Remand
Order at % 82. Thus, if the ISP Remand Order is invoked to clarify federal policy, it must

7

The term of the Old Agreement included the release of the FCC's ISP Remand Order
and the Parties' adoption of an amendment to the contract based upon that Order. Id. at
37-38.
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be concluded that at the time the parties contracted, ISP-bound traffic was to be included
in the RUF, and was to remain in the calculation until the contract was amended or
expired. Qwest's slurs about arbitrage and gaming the system ignore the fact that the
regulatory system for the exchange of ISP-bound traffic depended on the parties to make,
maintain, and stand by their own contracts, including the reciprocal compensation terms
and relative use clauses.
c.

The Law in Effect at the Time the RUF Was Agreed Upon Requires
Enforcement of the Contract as Written.

Qwest contends that "when approving the Old Agreement in the first instance (in
the AT&T arbitration) the Commission was required to ensure that the agreement be just
and reasonable, in the public interest, and non-discriminatory." Qwest Brief at 39 (citing
47 U.S.C. §§ 252(c), (d)). Hence, Qwest contends, there "is no basis" for Level 3 to
claim that the Commission should interpret it inconsistent with the requirements by
which it was approved. Qwest Brief at 39.
As Level 3 explained in its Brief in Support, the standard for approving
interconnection agreements is different from the standard for interpreting and enforcing
them. Brief in Support at 27. Federal law applied to approve the RUF (47 U.S.C.
§ 252(e)(1)), but state law applies to interpret it. Federal Court's Remand Order at 2.
Any other circumstances surrounding the RUF clause are relevant only if the clause is
ambiguous and cannot be interpreted from its plain language.

In that case, such

circumstances should be considered by the Commission, not the Court.
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E.

The Enforcement of the Contract as Written is in the Public Interest

The FTA was enacted to create "a new regime designed to foster competition in
local telephone markets," in response to the naturally monopolistic system that had
developed as a consequence of state-granted exclusive franchises. Verizon Maryland v.
Pub. Serv. Comm'n. 535 U.S. 635, 638 (2002); AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd.. 525 U.S.
366, 371 (1999). It was designed to "foster rapid development of telecommunications
competition in local markets" served by the incumbent monopoly providers. GTE Nw.,
Inc. v. Nelson, 969 F. Supp. 654, 656 (W.D. Wash. 1997). To facilitate and promote
competition between incumbent telephone carriers and new entrants into the market, the
Act allows carriers to arrive at "detailed technological and monetary provisions" through
voluntary negotiation of competitive terms of their contracts. TCG Milwaukee, Inc. v.
Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 980 F. Supp. 992, 995 (W.D. Wis. 1997). The Act allows parties to
agree to competitive terms free of the regulations that traditionally required rates to be
just and reasonable. 47 U.S.C. § 252(a)(1); see also Alenco Commc'ns, Inc. v. FCC, 201
F.3d 608, 620 (5th Cir. 2000) (Act intended to introduce competition; it "does not
guarantee all local telephone service providers a sufficient return on investment"); Brief
in Support at 22-25.
While the ISP Remand Order is not directly applicable to the RUF clause, it does
reflect the FCC's policy regarding ISP-bound traffic. The ISP Remand Order ultimately
adjusted reciprocal compensation requirements to address the "market distortions under
the current intercarrier compensation regimes for ISP bound traffic." ISP Remand Order
at \ 77. The FCC stated, however, "At the same time, we believe it prudent to avoid a
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"flash cut" to a new compensation regime that would upset the legitimate business
expectations of carriers and their customers." Id- The FCC thus established an "interim
regime," to apply "as carriers renegotiate expired or expiring interconnection
agreements." Id. at 82. Thus, the public interest in preventing market distortions does
not extend to abrogating existing contracts. A number of courts have recently held that
carriers who did not exclude or specify unique reciprocal compensation rates for ISPbound traffic in their previous ICAs or in subsequent amendments, are required to pay the
reciprocal compensation as agreed upon in their contracts, despite the current policy. ISP
Remand Order at % 77-83, 82; see also Verizon Del., Inc. v. AT&T Commc'ns of Del,
LLC, 326 F. Supp. 2d 574, 587-88 (D. Del. 2004) (despite FCC policy against treating
ISP-bound traffic as local for purpose of reciprocal compensation, ILEC required to pay
reciprocal compensation for ISP-bound traffic where ICA did not specifically except ISPbound calls); S. New England Tele. Co. v. Conn. Dept. of Pub. Util., 285 F. Supp. 2d
252, 260 (D. Conn. 2003) (ICA that included reciprocal compensation for ISP-bound
traffic was enforceable and did not violate FTA). The "market distortion" that Qwest
complains about was a consequence of the Act's primary goal to give competition a
foothold in the telecommunications industry. While the FCC eventually addressed the
problem as it related to reciprocal compensation, nevertheless, the public interest requires
that contracts remain enforceable until amended or expired in accordance with
established contract law.
Finally, Qwest also contends that under state law, the Commission has a duty to
ensure that charges demanded or received by public utilities must be "just and
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reasonable." Qwest Brief at 44 (citing Utah Code Ann. § 54-3-1; 54-8b-16). It further
contends that "in all of its actions" the Commission must consider and act consistently
with the public interest. Qwest Brief at 45. Thus, Qwest reasons, the Commission
should interpret the RUF clause in a way that would allow Qwest to avoid paying for its
use of the DTT facilities. Id. at 45-46.
Qwest's argument is based upon the application of Utah's public utility statutes.
Utah Code, Title 54. Qwest suggests that the Court and the Commission should disregard
Utah contract law, and instead apply the Utah public utility statutes in a way that would
defeat the policy objectives of the Act. The Act contemplated that the absence of federal
regulation for competitive contract terms would stimulate a competitive environment.
The application of Utah regulation to protect Qwest from the consequences of the RUF
clause would defeat the competitive purposes of the Act by artificially guaranteeing the
monopolist's profits while undermining a fundamental principle of contract law in the
process.

Qwest's argument, rather than expressing the real public interest, urges,

contrary to the Act and the ISP Remand Order, that it is more important that Qwest be
spared from paying the cost of the DTT facilities, than it is for competition to develop
across the industry. The public interest is best served by enforcing the RUF in the Old
Agreement by applying Utah contract law as the federal court ordered, rather than
interpreting the public utility statutes to protect Qwest from the competitive terms of its
own contract. Federal Court's Remand Order at 2; ISP Remand Order at % 77-83, 82;
Verizon Del., 326 F. Supp. 2d at 588.
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CONCLUSION
Level 3 filed its Petition with the Commission, seeking enforcement of the plain
language of the RUF clause in the Old Agreement to prevent Qwest from billing and
collecting improper charges for DTT facilities during the Dispute Period. The Petition
required only that the Commission review and enforce the plain language of the RUF
clause, which does not provide any exception for ISP-bound traffic.
The Commission erred in interpreting the Old Agreement by applying the FTA,
and in relying on its Arbitration Order to produce "just and reasonable compensation for
Qwest." R. 58, at 10. Section 252(d)(1) of the Act, relied on by the Commission as
support for its proposition that it must help Qwest achieve a "just and reasonable" result,
is not applicable. Likewise, because the Arbitration Order arose under the portion of the
Act governing arbitration, it was inapplicable to the interpretation of the RUF. As the
federal court concluded, this case must be decided under Utah contract law. For that
reason the Court should vacate the Commission's Order.
Even though this Court may not engage in fact finding, it can interpret the RUF
clause, as a matter of law, by giving it its plain meaning. While this would result in
Qwest bearing the cost of the DTT facilities rather than Level 3, Utah contract law does
not allow the reformation of the RUF clause, and the public interest does not compel a
different result.
For the foregoing reasons, Level 3 respectfully requests that the Court vacate the
Order of the Commission and either rule on the plain language of Section 5.1.2.4 that the
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RUF calculation does not exclude ISP-bound traffic, or remand this case to the
Commission for reconsideration.
DATED this /& "day of October, 2006.

WILLIAM J. W A N ? (5276)
VICKI M. BALDWIN (8532)
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER
Attorneys for Petitioner & Appellant
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH
CENTRAL DIVISION

LEVEL 3 COMMUNICATIONS, LLC

I

Plaintiff,
ORDER REMANDING ACTION TO
UTAH SUPREME COURT

vs.
PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF
UTAH and QWEST CORPORATION
Defendants.

Case No. 2:06CV132K
|

This matter is before the court on Level 3 Communications, LLC's ("Level 3") Motion to
Remand A hearing on the motion was held on May 17, 2006 At the hearing, Level 3 was
represented by Gregory L Rogers and William J Evans Defendant Qwest Corporation
("Qwest") was represented by David L Elmont Before the hearing, the court considered
carefully the memoranda and other materials submitted by the parties Since taking the motion
under advisement, the court has further considered the law and facts relating to this motion
Now being fully advised, the court renders the following Order
Level 3 has requested that this court remand this case back to the Utah Supreme Court
Level 3 had previously appealed to the Utah Supreme Court the Public Service Commission's
decision regarding an agreement Level 3 had with Qwest Qwest removed that appeal to this
court Level 3 argues that this court does not have subject matter jurisdiction over this appeal
from the Commission's Report and Order because Level 3's Petition before the Commission did
not raise a question of federal law, its causes of action were not created by federal law, and there
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Document 12
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is no issue in this case that turns on a substantial question of federal law. Instead, Level 3
argues, the resolution of this matter requires only the application of state law principles of
contract interpretation. Qwest, on the other hand, claims that this court has jurisdiction because
the appeal involves the interpretation of federal law.
District courts have "original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the
Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 1331. "A case arises under
federal law if its well-pleaded complaint establishes either that federal law creates the cause of
action or that the plaintiffs right to relief necessarily depends on resolution of a substantial
question of federal law. Nicodemus v. Union Pacific Corp., 440 F.3d 1227, 1232 (10th Cir. 2006)
(internal quotations and citations omitted). Thus, "even though a plaintiff asserts only claims
under state law, federal-question jurisdiction may be appropriate if the state-law claims implicate
significant federal issues." Id.
The court finds that there is no federal question on the face of Level 3fs Petition, its
claims were not created by federal law, and also that Level 3!s right to relief does not depend on
resolution of a substantial question of federal law. Rather, the resolution of this dispute depends
upon state contract law. For the reasons stated in Level 3's memorandum in support and in its
reply memorandum, the court agrees that it does not have subject matter jurisdiction over this
action.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, and good cause appearing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that
Level 3fs Motions to Remand [Docket No. 4] is GRANTED. The Clerk of the Court is directed
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to remand this action back to the Utah Supreme Court.
DATED this 26,h day of May, 2006.
BY THE COURT:

>al rf,
DALE A. KIMBAL
United States District Judge
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Attachment 1

RATES and CHARGES
1.

General Principles

1.1

All rates provided under this Agreement shall remain in effect for the term of this Agreement
unless they are not in accordance with all applicable provisions of the Act, the rules and
regulations of the FCC, or the Commission's rules and regulations.
1.2

2.

Except as otherwise specified in this Agreement, as approved or ordered by the
Commission, or as agreed to by the Parties through good faith negotiations, nothing in
this Agreement shall prevent a Party through the dispute resolution process described in
this Agreement from seeking to recover the costs and expenses, if any, it may incur in (a)
complying with and implementing its obligations under this Agreement, the Act, and the
rules, regulations and orders of the FCC and the Commission, and (b) the development,
modification, technical installation and maintenance of any systems or other infrastructure
which it requires to comply with and to continue complying with its responsibilities and
obligations under this Agreement

Resale Rates and Charges
U S WEST shall make its retail Telecommunications Services available to CO-PROVIDER
for resale at the interim wholesale rates specified in Appendix A to this Attachment 1.

1

2.2

[Intentionally left blank for numbering consistency]

2.3

If the resold services are purchased pursuant to tariffs and the tariff rates change,
charges billed to CO-PROVIDER for such services will be based upon the new tariff rates
less the applicable wholesale discount as agreed to herein. The new rate will be effective
upon the tariff effective date.

2.4

A Subscriber Line Charge (SLC) will continue to be paid by CO-PROVIDER without
discount for each local exchange line resold under this Agreement. All federal and state
rules and regulations associated with SLC or as found in the applicable tariffs also apply.

2.5

CO-PROVIDER will pay to U S WEST the PIC change charge without discount
associated with CO-PROVIDER end user changes of inter-exchange or intraLATA
carriers.

2.6

CO-PROVIDER agrees to pay U S WEST at the wholesale discount rate when its end
user activates any services or features that are billed on a per use or per activation basis
(e.g., continuous redial, last call return, call back calling, call trace, etc.). U S WEST shall
provide CO-PROVIDER with detailed billing information per applicable OBF standards
unless otherwise agreed to by the Parties as necessary to permit CO-PROVIDER to bill
its end users such charges.

2.7

[Intentionally left blank for numbering consistency]

2.8

Nonrecurring charges will be billed as approved by the Commission.

2.9

[Intentionally left blank for numbering consistency]

At&t Order, pg. 2, "Resale Restrictions" paragraph 1
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2.10

[Intentionally left blank for numbering consistency]

2.11

Resale prices shall be wholesale rates determined on the basis of retail rates charged to
subscribers for the Telecommunications Servfce requested, excluding the portion thereof
attributable to any marketing, billing, collection and other costs that will be avoided by
U S WEST, as specified in the Act, by the FCC and/or the Commission. U S WEST shall
be obligated to offer its volume and term discount service plans to CO-PROVIDER
provided that CO-PROVIDER complies with the volume and term requirements
contained therein. If selected by CO-PROVIDER, an appropriate wholesale
discount shall also be applied to such plans. With the exception of the preceding,
CO-PROVIDER shall not be required to agree to volume or term commitments as a
2

condition for obtaining Local Service.
2.12

U S WEST shall bill CO-PROVIDER and CO-PROVIDER is responsible for all applicable
charges for Resale Services. CO-PROVIDER shall be responsible for all charges
associated with services that CO-PROVIDER resells to an end user.

3. Construction and Implementation Costs

2
3

3.1

U S WEST shall perform construction for CO-PROVIDER for the services provided
hereunder pursuant to and in accordance with the terms of U S WESTs retail and
wholesale construction charge tariffs, as appropriate for the type of service
provided. Such construction charge tariffs shall be imposed only if U S WEST
assesses its own end users such charges for similar construction and also
demonstrates to the Commission that it is customary industry practice to charge
end users for similar costs. If another CLEC or U S WEST receives a benefit from
the construction or other activity for which CO-PROVIDER is charged, COPROVIDER is entitled to recover contribution from the CLEC, or, if applicable,
U S WEST as a beneficiary, for a share of the costs.

3.2

[Intentionally left blank for numbering consistency]

3.3

[Intentionally left blank for numbering consistency]

3.4

A quote for the CO-PROVIDER portion of a specific job will be provided to COPROVIDER. The quote will be in writing and will be binding for ninety (90) days after the
issue date. When accepted, CO-PROVIDER will be billed the quoted price and
construction will commence after receipt of payment. If CO-PROVIDER chooses not to
have U S WEST construct the facilities, U S WEST reserves the right to bill COPROVIDER for the expense incurred for producing the engineered job design.

3.5

CO-PROVIDER shall make payment of fifty percent (50%) of the nonrecurring charges
and fees upon acceptance of the quotation with the remainder due upon completion of the
construction. In the event that CO-PROVIDER disputes the amount of U S WESTs
proposed construction costs, CO-PROVIDER shall deposit fifty percent (50%) of the
quoted construction costs into an interest bearing escrow account prior to the
commencement of construction. The remainder of the quoted construction costs shall be
deposited into the escrow account upon completion of the construction. Upon resolution
of the dispute, the escrow agent shall distribute amounts in the account in accordance

Final Arbitration Order at pg. 30
Final Arbitration Order at pg 34
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with the resolution of such dispute, and any interest that has accrued with respect to
amounts in the account shall be distributed proportionately to the Parties The pendency
of any such dispute shall not affect the obligation of U S WEST to complete the requested
construction
Unbundled Loops - Conditioning Charge
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4
5

Final Arbitration Order at pg 35
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5.1.1.1.1

The Parties agree that call termination rates as
described in Appendix A to this Attachment 1 will
apply reciprocally for the termination of EAS/Local
traffic per minute of use.
If the exchange of
EAS/Local traffic between the Parties is within +/- 5%
of balance (as measured monthly), the Parties agree
that their respective call termination charges will
offset one another, and no compensation will be
paid. The Parties agree to perform monthly joint
traffic audits, based upon mutually agreeable
measurement criteria and auditing standards. In the
event that the exchange of traffic is not in balance as
described above, the call termination charges in
Appendix A will apply.

51112

For traffic terminated at an U S WEST or COPROVIDER end office, the end office call termination
rate in Appendix A shall apply.

51113

For traffic terminated at a U S WEST or COPROVIDER tandem switch, the tandem switched rate
and the tandem transport rate in Appendix A shall
apply in addition to the end office call termination
rate described above.

Attachment 1

5.1.2

5.1.3

5.1.1.4

Switching shall be purchased on a per line basis with all
functionality and features of such switch including, but not
limited to call routing.

5.1.1.5

All other unbundled network elements may be purchased
separately or in combination on the basis outlined in Appendix
A.

Transport
5.1.2.1

If the Parties elect to each provision their own one-way
trunks to the other Party's end office for the termination of
local traffic, each Party will be responsible for its own
expenses associated with the trunks and no transport
charges will apply.

5.1.2.2

If one Party desires to purchase direct trunk transport from
the other Party, the following rate elements will apply.
Transport rate elements include the direct trunk transport
facilities between the POI and the terminating party's
tandem or end office switches. The applicable rates are
described in Appendix A.

5.1.2.3

Direct-trunked transport facilities are provided as dedicated
DS3 or DS1 facilities without the tandem switching
functions, for the use of either Party between the Point of
Interconnection and the terminating end office or tandem
switch.

5.1.2.4

If the Parties elect to establish two-way direct trunks, the
compensation for such jointly used 'shared' facilities shall
be adjusted as follows. The nominal compensation shall be
pursuant to the rates for direct trunk transport in Appendix
A. The actual rate paid to the provider of the direct trunk
facility shall be reduced to reflect the provider's use of that
facility. The adjustment in the direct trunk transport rate
shall be a percentage that reflects the provider's relative use
(i.e., originating minutes of use) of the facility in the busy
hour.

5.1.2.5

Multiplexing options are available at rates described in
Appendix A.

Toll Traffic.
Applicable Switched Access Tariff rates, terms, and conditions apply to toll
traffic routed to an access tandem, or directly to an end office.

5.1.4

Transit Traffic.
Applicable switched access, Type 2 or LIS transport rates apply for the use
of U S WEST'S network to transport transit traffic. For transiting local
traffic, the applicable local transit rate applies to the originating Party per
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Appendix A. For transiting toll traffic, the Parties will charge the applicable
Switched Access rates to the responsible carrier. For terminating transiting
wireless traffic, the Parties will charge their applicable rates to the wireless
provider. For transiting wireless traffic, the Parties will charge each other
the applicable local transit rate.
6.

Number Portability
6.1

7.

CO-PROVIDER may request U S WEST to provide CO-PROVIDER call detail records
identifying each IXC which are sufficient to allow CO-PROVIDER to render bills to IXCs for
calls IXCs place to ported numbers in the U S WEST network which U S WEST forwards
to CO-PROVIDER for termination. To the extent U S WEST is unable to provide billing
detail information within a reasonable time frame, the Parties may agree on_an interim
method to share access revenues pursuant to a mutually agreed upon surrogate
approach.

Rate Structure
The prices set forth in Appendix A to this Attachment 1 which are designated as interim in nature
are subject to true-up upon establishment of permanent rates by the Commission in Docket 94999-01. The prices set forth in Appendices A and B to this Attachment 1 which are designated as
final in nature are subject to change if the Commission so orders in its pricing dockets.
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Single Point of Presence (SPOP) Amendment
To the Interconnection Agreement
Between
Level 3 Communications, LLC
And Qwest Corporation
For the State of Utah
This Amendment ("Amendment") is made and entered into by and between Level 3
Communications, LLC ("CLEC") and Qwest Corporation ("Qwest").
WHEREAS, CLEC and Qwest entered into an Interconnection Agreement ("the
Agreement") for service in the state of Utah that was approved by the Public Service
Commission of Utah ("Commission") on January 10, 2001; and
WHEREAS, CLEC and Qwest desire to amend the Agreement by adding the terms and
conditions contained herein.

AGREEMENT
NOW THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual terms, covenants and conditions
contained in this Amendment and other good and valuable consideration, the receipt and
sufficiency of which is hereby acknowledged, the Parties agree as follows:
1. Amendment Terms.
This Amendment is made in order to add terms, and conditions for Single Point of
Presence ("SPOP") in the LATA as set forth in Attachment 1 and Exhibit A attached
hereto and incorporated herein.
Neither Party shall lose any of its rights from the original contract by entering into this
Amendment for SPOP.
2. Effective Date.
This Amendment shall be deemed effective upon approval by the Commission;
however, the Parties may agree to implement the provisions of this Amendment
upon execution. To accommodate this need, CLEC must generate, if necessary, an
updated Customer Questionnaire. In addition to the Questionnaire, all system
updates will need to be completed by Qwest. CLEC will be notified when all system
changes have been made. Actual order processing may begin once these
requirements have been met.
3. Further Amendments.
Except as modified herein, the provisions of the Agreement shall remain in full force
and effect. Neither the Agreement nor this Amendment may be further amended or
altered except by written instrument executed by an authorized representative of
both Parties. This Amendment shall constitute the entire agreement between the
Parties, and supersedes all previous agreements and amendments entered into
between the Parties with respect to the subject matter of this Amendment.
June 20, 2002/lhd/Leve! 3 SPOP Amend UT.doc
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The Parties intending to be legally bound have executed this Amendment as of the
dates set forth below, in multiple counterparts, each of which is deemed an original,
but all of which shall constitute one and the same instrument

Level 3 Communications, LLC

Qwest Corporation

Authorized Signature

Authorized Signature

Name Printed/Typed

L. T. Christensen
Name Printed/Typed

Title

Director - Business Policy
Title

^ W ^k.^CCVDate
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Attachment 1
Single Point of Presence (SPOP) in the LATA is a Local Interconnection Service (LIS)
Interconnection trunking option that allows CLEC to establish one physical point of presence in
the LATA in Qwest's territory. Qwest and CLEC may then exchange traffic at the SPOP
utilizing trunking as described following.
1.1

By utilizing SPOP in the LATA, CLEC can deliver both Exchange Access (IntraLATA
Toll Non-IXC) and Jointly Provided Switched Access (InterLATA and IntraLATA IXC)
traffic and Exchange Service EAS/Local traffic at Qwest's Access Tandem Switches.
CLEC can also utilize Qwest's behind the tandem infrastructure to terminate traffic to
specific end offices. The SPOP istiefined as the CLECs physical point of presence.

1.2

SPOP in the LATA includes an Entrance Facility (EF), Expanded Interconnect Channel
Termination (EICT), or Mid Span Meet POI and Direct Trunked Transport (DTT)
options available at both a DS1 and DS3 capacity.

1.3

Where there is a Qwest local tandem serving an end office that CLEC intends to
terminate traffic, the following conditions apply:
1.3.1

The Parties shall terminate Exchange Access Service (EAS/Local) traffic on
tandem or end office switches. When there is a DS1 level of traffic (512
BHCCS) between CLECs switch and a Qwest End Office Switch, Qwest may
request CLEC to order a direct trunk group to the Qwest End Office Switch.
CLEC shall comply with that request unless it can demonstrate that such
compliance will impose upon it a material adverse economic or operations
impact. Furthermore, Qwest may propose to provide Interconnection facilities
to the local tandems or end offices served by the access tandem at the same
cost to CLEC as Interconnection at the access tandem. If CLEC provides a
written statement of its objections to a Qwest cost-equivalency proposal, Qwest
may require it only: (a) upon demonstrating that a failure to do so will have a
material adverse affect on the operation of its network and (b) upon a finding
that doing so will have no material adverse impact on the operation of CLEC, as
compared with Interconnection at such access tandem.

1.3.1.1 When CLEC has an NXX that subtends a local tandem, but the anticipated
traffic to and from the NXX is less than 1 DS1s (512 CCS) worth of traffic,
CLEC may choose to use the access tandem for local traffic in the
circumstances described above in 1.3.1. CLEC will be required to submit
an electronic letter on CLEC letterhead to Qwest stating at which local
tandems they will not interconnect. This letter should include, the local
tandem CLLI(s) and the CLEC specific NPA-NXXs for the local tandems. In
addition, CLEC will provide a revised electronic letter to Qwest of any
changes in the network configuration or addition/deletions of NPA-NXXs of
the aforementioned local tandems.
1.3.2

Connections to a Qwest local tandem may be two-way or one-way trunks.
These trunks will carry Exchange Service EAS/Local traffic only.

1.3.3

A separate trunk group to the Qwest access tandem is necessary for the
exchange of non-local Exchange Access (IntraLATA Toll Non-IXC) traffic and
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jointly Provided Switched Access (InterLATA and IntraLATA IXC) traffic.
1.4

Where there is no Qwest local tandem serving a Qwest end office, CLEC may choose
from one of the following options:
1.4.1

A two-way CLEC LIS trunk group to the Qwest access tandem for CLEC traffic
terminating to, originating from, or passing through the Qwest network that
combines Exchange Service EAS/ Local, Exchange Access (IntraUVTA Toll
Non-IXC) and Jointly Provided Switched Access (InterLATA and IntraLATA
IXC) traffic.

1.4.2

A two-way CLEC LIS trunk group to the Qwest access tandem for CLEC Jointly
Provided Switched Access (InterLATA and IntraLATA IXC) traffic terminating to
and originating from the IXC Feature Group (FG) A/B/D network through the
Qwest network and an additional two-way trunk group to the Qwest access
tandem for the combined Exchange Service EAS/ Local and Exchange Access
(IntraLATA Tod Non-IXC) traffic terminating to, originating from, and transiting
the Qwest network.
1.4.2.1 If CLEC uses two way trunking, Qwest will send all Exchange Service
EAS/Local, Exchange Access (IntraLATA Toll Non-IXC) and Jointly
Provided Switched Access (InterLATA and IntraLATA IXC) traffic
delivered to the Qwest access tandem on the same combined trunk.

14.3

A one-way terminating CLEC LIS trunk group to the Qwest access tandem for
CLEC traffic destined to or through the Qwest network that combines Exchange
Service EAS/Local, Exchange Access (Intra LATA Toll Non-IXC) and Jointly
Provided Switched Access (InterLATA and IntraLATA IXC) traffic.

1.4.4

CLEC may utilize a one-way LIS trunk group to the Qwest access tandem for
Jointly Provided Switched Access (InterLATA and IntraLATA IXC) traffic
terminating to the IXC FG A/B/D network through the Qwest network, and an
additional one-way trunk group to the Qwest access tandem for the combined
Exchange Service EAS/ Local, Exchange Access (IntraLATA Toll Non-IXC)
traffic terminating to, originating from, and transiting the Qwest network.
1.4.4.1 If CLEC orders either of the above one-way trunk options, Qwest will
return the traffic via one combined Exchange Service EAS/ Local, and
Exchange Access (IntraLATA Toll Non-IXC) trunk group.

1.4.5

1.5

To the extent Qwest combines Exchange Service (EAS/Local), Exchange
Access (IntraLATA Toll carried solely by Local Exchange Carriers), and Jointly
Provided Switched Access (InterLATA and IntraLATA calls exchanged with a
third-party IXC) traffic on a single LIS trunk group, Qwest, at CLECs request,
will declare a percent local use factor (PLU).
Such PLU(s) will be verifiable
with either call summary records utilizing Calling Party Number information for
jurisdictionalization or call detail samples. CLEC should apportion per minute of
use (MOU) charges appropriately.

CLEC must have SS7 functionality to use SPOP in the LATA.
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1.6

Qwest assumes CLEC will be originating traffic destined for end users served by each
Qwest access tandem in the LATA, therefore, CLEC must order LIS trunking to each
Qwest access tandem in the LATA to accommodate routing of this traffic. Additionally,
when there is more than one Qwest access tandem within the LATA boundary, the
CLEC must order LIS trunking to each Qwest access tandem that serves its end-user
customers1 traffic to avoid call blocking. Alternatively, should the CLEC accept the
conditions as outlined in the SPOP Waiver (Exhibit A), trunking will not be required to
each
Qwest
access
tandem
in
a
multi-access
tandem
LATA.
Should CLEC not be utilizing the option of interconnecting at the access tandem for
local, due to low volume of local traffic under the circumstances described in 1.3.1,
CLEC needs trunking only to each local tandem where they have a customer base.
The 512 CCS rule and other direct trunking requirements will apply for direct trunking
to Qwest end offices.

1J

If Direct Trunked Transport is greater than 50 miles in length, and existing facilities are
not available in either Party's network, and the Parties cannot agree a s i o which Party
will provide the facility, the Parties will construct facilities to a mid-point ofcthe spaa

1.8

CLEC will provide notification to all Co-Providers in the local calling areas of CLECs
change in routing when the CLEC chooses to route its traffic in accordance with
Qwest's SPOP interconnection trunking.

1.9

Ordering
1.9.1

SPOP in a LATA will be ordered based upon the standard ordering process for
the type of facility chosen. See the Qwest Interconnection and Resale
Resource Guide for further ordering information.

1.9.2

CLEC will issue ASRs to disconnect/new connect existing access tandem trunk
groups to convert them to SPOP trunk groups.

1.9.3

In addition, the ASR ordering SPOP trunks will include SPOP Remarks "Single
POP in LATA tt and the SPEC Field must carry "SPOLATA :
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EXHIBIT A
SINGLE POINT OF PRESENCE WAIVER
Qwest will waive the requirement for CLEC to connect to each Qwest Access Tandem in the
LATA with this waiver amendment.
CLEC certifies that it will not originate any traffic destined for subtending offices of Qwest's
Access Tandems for which CLEC seeks a waiver. Or, if CLEC does originate such traffic, that
CLEC will route such traffic to a Non-Qwest network. In addition, CLEC certifies that it has no
end users in the serving area of the Qwest Access Tandem for which CLEC seeks a waiver.
CLEC will send an electronic letter to Qwest indicating the Qwest access-tandems subject to
this waiver at the time of ordering trunks required to implement SPQP in the LATA. In
addition, CLEC will provide a revised electronic letter to Qwest advising o f any changes in the
network configuration of the aforementioned access tandems. Should CLEC desire to begin
serving end users in the serving area of a Qwest access tandem currently under this waiver,
CLEC must first establish trunking to the Qwest access tandem. Additionally, should CLEC
desire to originate traffic destined to a Qwest end office subtending a Qwest access tandem
currently under this waiver, CLEC must first establish trunking to the Qwest access tandem.
Under this waiver any CLEC originated traffic destined for an end office subtending a Qwest
tandem under this waiver will be billed separately, by Qwest to CLEC, via a manual bill.
Misrouted usage under this waiver will be billed, a penalty of $.21 per MOU.
Additionally, a manual handling fee of $100 or 10% of total billing, whichever is greater, will be
charged for each such manual bill rendered.
Late Payment charges will apply as outlined in the existing Interconnection Agreement
currently in effect between the Parties.
Should this traffic occur, the Parties agree to meet within forty-five (45) days of Qwest's
identification of such misrouted traffic to discuss methods for avoiding future misrouting on that
trunk group or groups. CLEC will then have thirty (30) days from the date of meeting to correct
such misrouting on that trunk group or groups. If further misrouting occurs or continues after
that date on the same trunk group or groups as the original misrouting identified, the Parties
agree to meet again within thirty (30) days of Qwest's identification of such misrouted traffic to
discuss methods for avoiding future misrouting on that trunk group or groups. CLEC will then
have thirty (30) days from the date of meeting to correct such misrouting. If further misrouting
occurs or continues after that date on the same trunk group or groups, Qwest will consider this
waiver null and void and all requirements in Attachment 1 or in the existing Interconnection
Agreement currently in effect between the Parties will be reinstated. If the parties disagree
about whether the traffic identified by Qwest was actually misrouted, the Parties agree to avail
themselves of the dispute resolution provision of their interconnection agreement. Nothing in
this provision affects or alters in any way CLECs obligation to pay the rates, the manual
handling fee, and the late payment charges specified above for misrouted traffic.
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- BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF UTAH -

In the Matter of Level 3 Communications,
LLC for Arbitration Pursuant to Section 252
(b) of the Telecommunications Act of 1996
with Qwest Corporation Regarding Rates,
Terms, and Conditions for Interconnection

)
)
)
)
)

DOCKET NO. 02-2266-02
REPORT AND ORDER

ISSUED: February 20. 2004
By The Commission:

BACKGROUND
This matter was commenced by a petition of Level 3 Communications, LLC ("Level 3") for arbitration
under §251(b)(1) of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. §151 etseq. (the "Act"). This
petition presents one major issue for decision that the parties could not reach agreement on with respect
to an interconnection agreement between Level 3 and Qwest Corporation ("Qwest"). The parties
represented, and we find, that they have made good faith efforts to reach agreement on the terms of
interconnection. Hearings were held, and both parties fully briefed the issue. In addition, subsequent to
the hearing both parties have submitted numerous motions for leave to file additional authority, with
decisions from other jurisdictions attached.
The facts are undisputed. Level 3 is a Competitive Local Exchange Carrier that provides service
exclusively, at this time, to Internet Service Providers. Qwest is an incumbent local exchange carrier.
The interconnection agreement provision^ issue in this matter deals with the financial responsibility of
each party for direct trunk transport facilities ("DTTs") and related entrance facilities used to transport
and exchange traffic between the companies. Level 3 and Qwest have agreed that when traffic reaches a
certain level, DTTs will be used to carry the traffic. They have further agreed that the cost of those
facilities will be based on the "relative use" of the facilities. The parties disagree, however, on whether
ISP-bound traffic should be excluded from the relative use calculations.
As stated, Level 3's current business in Utah consists exclusively of servicing ISPs. Level 3 has a single
point of interconnection ("POI") with Qwest servicing the entire state. The interconnection facilities in
question are all on Qwest1 s side of the POI. Level 3 provides its ISP customers with local telephone
numbers in various parts of the state. For example, a Qwest customer in Cedar City may call a local
Cedar City number to reach an ISP serviced by Level 3. That call is then transported to the point of
interconnection in Salt Lake and there delivered to Level 3. Unlike if this were a voice call to a Level 3
customer, there is no return traffic to Cedar City, in this example. The call is terminated at the ISP's
facilities in Salt Lake or elsewhere and no return traffic to Cedar City will occur.
Since at the current time all traffic to Level 3 is ISP traffic, a decision on the issue of how relative use of
he facilities should be calculated will determine who pays all of the costs of the interconnection
facilities. If ISP traffic is included in the calculation of relative use, Qwest will pay 100% of the costs
because its customers originate all of the traffic to the ISPfs served by Level 3. If ISP traffic is not
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included in relative use, Level 3 will pay all of the costs of these interconnection facilities.^
Accordingly, Qwest proposes language that excludes ISP traffic from the calculation, and Level 3's
proposes language including ISP traffic.
PARTY POSITIONS
Qwest argues that its language and position should be adopted for five reasons:
1. Adopting Level 3's position would result in Level 3 obtaining interconnection trunks for free. Such a
result would violate requirements of the Telecommunications Act that Qwest receive just and reasonable
compensation for providing interconnection to CLECs.
2. The ISPJlemand Order^ determined that ISP traffic is interstate and not subject to reciprocal
compensation under section 251(b)(5) of the Act. Level 3's argument that it should obtain
interconnection trunks without cost rests on reciprocal compensation rules. Qwest argues that for the
same reason Internet traffic is excluded from reciprocal compensation, it should be excluded from
relative use calculations for interconnection facilities.
3. The ISP Remand Order determined that since Internet traffic is interstate, treatment of Internet traffic
is exclusively within the jurisdiction of section 201 of the Act. Qwest therefore argues that this
Commission is without authority to order the parties to include Internet traffic in relative use
calculations.
4. Qwest argues that including Internet traffic in relative use calculations would violate the same policy
considerations that caused the FCC to reject payment of reciprocal compensation for Internet traffic.
Qwest argues that including Internet traffic would (a) lead to improper subsidies and uneconomic
pricing signals; (b) give Level 3 and other CLECs distorted incentives to serve ISP customers to the
exclusion of other customers, and (c) improperly ignore the ability of Level 3 and other CLECs to
collect the interconnection costs from their ISP customers.
5. Qwest argues that this issue has already been addressed in the Statement of Generally Available
Terms and Conditions, or SCAT, proceeding in which its proposed language was adopted, nothing has
changed since that time, and the language should therefore be adopted here.
In favor of the adoption of its language Level 3 argues:
1. The ISP Remand Order did not address the issue in dispute here.
2. FCC "rules of the road" permit Level 3 to interconnect with Qwest at a single point per LATA and
require Qwest to deliver its traffic to that interconnection point. Qwest is therefore obligated to deliver
all traffic, voiGe and Internet, to the POI at no cost to Level 3. Terminating compensation issues are
separate, and Qwest's position attempts to confuse the issues of interconnection rights and obligations
with terminating compensation issues. Qwest also ignores the plain language of FCC rules.
3. Qwesfs argument that the adoption in the SGAT proceeding of the language Qwest proposes in this
action should be rejected. Level 3 argues that no party challenged Qwest's SGAT language, and
therefore this is the first opportunity for the Commission to address this issue.
DISCUSSION

This issue has been addressed in many other states, with conflicting results. Both parties have submitted
decisions from various jurisdictions supporting their positions. The best that can be said is that this is not
a settled issue. There is no definite FCC pronouncement on this issue at this time. We are left to
determine which arguments are more persuasive and which outcome better promotes the public interest
in Utah.
SGAT language: Qwest argues at some length that in the SGAT proceeding this Commission has
already accepted the language proposed by Qwest in this docket. Qwest argues that nothing has changed
since approval of the SGAT language, and therefore the Commission should adopt the same language
here.
Level 3 states that this argument is meritless. Level 3 argues that the negotiation and arbitration process
is distinguishable from the SGAT process, and that this Commission has the jurisdiction to arbitrate
interconnection disputes. Level 3 argues that the SGAT is like a tariff that it or other carriers may adopt,
but that it is still entitled to negotiate and arbitrate its own interconnection agreement based on its
individual situation and priorites. Level 3 also argues that the Commission has not considered the
lawfulness of Qwest's proposed language because in the SGAT proceeding no CLEC advocated that the
language be changed.
We agree that the presence of Qwest's proposed language in its SGAT is not determinative. As Level 3
states, such a result "would make the negotiation and arbitration provisions superfluous." The issue is
properly before the Commission for resolution at this time and based on the record in this proceeding,
and that is how it will be decided.
FCC Jurisdiction: Qwest argues that in the ISP Remand Order the FCC ruled Internet traffic is within its
exclusive jurisdiction. As a result, Qwest argues, state commissions are without authority to include
Internet traffic in relative use calculations, including in this matter.
Level 3 makes a related, but more involved argument. Level 3 argues that there are two different
obligations under the Telecommunications Act: the obligation to interconnect under Section 251(c)(2),
and the obligation to pay terminating compensation under Section 251(b)(5). Level 3 argues that Qwest's
interconnection obligation is to route and deliver traffic from Qwest customers to the POI, and absorb all
costs in doing so. Level 3 further argues that the ISP Remand Order only modified compensation
obligations, and not "other obligation[s]fl such as interconnection. Level 3 therefore argues that unless
the Commission decides that the costs at issue are an "interconnection" obligation not changed by the
ISP Remand Order then this Commission lacks jurisdiction to resolve this dispute. In other words, Level
3 states that if this Commission does not agree with Level 3's position, it does not have jurisdiction to
render any other decision.
The issue presented in this arbitration is the calculation of "relative use" for transportation facilities. We
do not read the FCCs pronouncements about its jurisdiction over Internet traffic as barring this
Commission from addressing that issue. The issue here is the calculation of charges for transportation
facilities based on relative use, an issue that has not been addressed by the FCC. We will proceed to
address that issue.
Obligations under the Telecommunications Act: Having dealt with the parties1 jurisdictional and
precedential arguments, we now turn to the merits. Section 251(d)(1) of the Act requires that rates for
interconnection facilities be "just and reasonable" and based on the cost of providing the
interconnection. An incumbent LEC is to recoup the interconnection costs from the competing carriers
making the request Iowa Utilities Board v. FCC, 120 F.3d 753, 810 (8 th Cir. 1997), affd in part, reVd

in part, remanded AT&T Corp, V. Iowa Utils Bd, 525 U.S. 366 (1999).
Level 3fs proposed language would result in Qwest bearing all of the costs of the interconnection
facilities. We agree with Qwest1 s assertion that such a result would violate the requirements under the
Act; that ILECs receive just and reasonable compensation for interconnection. Level 3 paying nothing
toward the interconnection facilities is not a just and reasonable rate.
In the ISP Remand Order decision, Internet-bound traffic was determined to be interstate access. As a
result, the FCC has excluded Internet traffic from the reciprocal compensation requirements of section
251(b)(5). Level 3fs argument relies on Rule 51.703(b), adopted pursuant to section 251(b)(5) and
dealing with reciprocal compensation, and the TSR Wireless^ decision applying that rule. That reliance
is misplaced. The FCC has clearly stated on numerous occasions that the reciprocal compensation
obligations of section 251(b)(5) do not apply to Internet traffic. The TSR Wireless decision, likewise, is
not applicable. That decision dealt with local calls to one-way paging providers and the costs of facilities
to carry those calls. The claims of TSR Wireless only dealt with local calls. The decision is not
applicable to Internet-bound traffic. We agree with the reasoning of the U.S. District court in Level 3
Communications, LLC vs. Public Utilities Commission of Colorado, Civil Action No. Ol-N-2455 (CBS),
Colorado District, U.S. District Court, December 11, 2003, that 47 C.F.R. § 51.703(b) does not apply.
Many of the same policy considerations used in the reciprocal compensation are applicable to the issue
presented here. In the ISP Remand Order the FCC found that the payment of reciprocal compensation
for Internet traffic caused uneconomic subsidies and improperly created incentives for CLECs to
specialize in serving ISPs to the exclusion of other customers.^ The FCC noted that these improper
incentives and market distortions are most apparent in Internet traffic because of the one-way nature of
the traffic. The same considerations apply to the issue at hand. If Internet-bound traffic is not excluded
from the relative use calculations, Level 3 would be allowed to shift all of the costs of the
interconnection trunks to Qwest. Level 3 would then have strong incentive to continue to focus on
serving ISPs to the exclusion of other customers. Just as these considerations caused the FCC to declare
that Internet traffic is not subject to reciprocal compensation payments, they strongly favor the exclusion
of ISP traffic from the relative use calculations at issue in this matter.
We will order the use of the language proposed by Qwest for the calculation of the relative use of the
interconnection facilities.
Sub-issues: There are two related sub-issues raised by Level 3 in this arbitration. The first is the relative
use factor to be used for the initial quarterly billing period. The contract provides for a relative use factor
of 50% to be used until a new factor is agreed upon by the parties. Qwest proposes that when a new
factor is established that bills should be retroactively adjusted for the initial billing quarter. Level 3
argues that any new relative use factor should be used prospectively only. We will adopt Level 3's
position and order that the contract language be modified so that no true up will be made and new
relative use factors will apply prospectively only.
The second sub-issue is whether the relative use factor should be used to apportion the nonrecurring
installation charges for the transportation and interconnection facilities at issue. Qwest's proposal would
cause Level 3 to pay all of the installation charges. Level 3 proposes that the charges be apportioned
according to relative use. Qwest did not address this issue in its brief. As a matter of policy, however,
the just and reasonable approach to these costs would be to apportion them using the relative use factor.
We will therefore require that the contract language be modified accordingly.
ORDER

NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, that
1. All motions for leave to file additional authority are granted.
2. Qwest's proposed language regarding the calculation of relative use is adopted. The contract language
regarding the two sub-issues shall be modified as set forth above.
3. The interconnection agreement, as modified herein, between Qwest Corporation and Level 3
Communications, LLC, is approved.
4. The parties shall submit an interconnection agreement reflecting the determinations in this order
within 30 days.
Dated at Salt Lake City, Utah, this 20 th day of February, 2004.
/s/ Doug Tingey
Administrative Law Judge
Approved and Confirmed this 20 th day of February, 2004, as the Report and Order of the Public Service
Commission of Utah.
Isi Ric Campbell Chairman
/s/ Constance B. White, Commissioner
/s/ Ted Boyer, Commissioner
Attest:
/s/ Julie Orchard
Commission Secretary
G#37166

1. The contract terms call for Level 3 to be billed for all of the cost of the interconnection facilities at
issue, and for Qwest to issue Level 3 a credit for its portion of the relative use of the facilities.
Therefore, if Internet-bound traffic is excluded from the calculation of relative use, Level 3 will receive
no credit and will be responsible for the full cost of the facilities.
2. In the Matter of Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in the Telecommunications Act
of 1996, Intercarrier Compensation for ISP-Bound Traffic, CC Dkt. Nos. 96-98 & 99-68, FCC 01-131,
2001 FCC LEXIS 2340 (rel. Apr. 27, 2001), remanded, WorldCom, Inc. V. FCC, 288 F.3d 429 ID.C.
Cir. 2002).
3. TSR Wireless, LLC, v. US West Communications, Inc., 15 FCC Red 11166,1f 3.
4. JSP Remand Order, flf 67-76.
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SYNOPSIS
The Commission concludes the method of calculation of the relative use factor for
direct trunk transport facilities under the parties' previous interconnection agreement for the
period in dispute properly excludes Internet Service Provider-bound traffic. The Commission
denies the Petition of Level 3 Communications, LLC, and grants Qwest Corporation's
counterclaim while making no finding regarding the amount owed by Level 3 to Qwest.

By The Commission:
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On June 23, 2005, Level 3 Communications, LLC ("Level 3"), filed a Petition for
Enforcement of the Interconnection Agreement Between Qwest and Level 3 and Motion for
Expedited Relief seeking Commission order finding that Level 3 is current in all payments owed
to Qwest Corporation ("Qwest") for the period July 2002 through February 2004 (the "Dispute
Period") and enjoining Qwest from taking various actions concerning Level 3fs accounts. This
petition was generated by Level 3fs receipt of a letter from Qwest dated June 13, 2005, in which
Qwest claimed Level 3 was in default of $563,616.79 in payments on its account and demanded
payment on or before June 27, 2005. If payment was not received by this date, Qwest would take
certain action with respect to Level 3's accounts, without further notice, including but not limited
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-2to the suspension of all service order activity and eventual disconnection of services.
On June 24, 2004, pursuant to Utah Code Annotatedf 54-8b-17, the Commission
issued a Notice of Prehearing Conference setting said conference for June 30, 2005. However,
by agreement of the parties, the Commission canceled this conference by Notice issued on June
29, 2005, and issued a Scheduling Order on June 30, 2005, setting a hearing date of July 26,
2005.
On July 6, 2005, Qwest filed its Response to Level 3fs Petition for Enforcement of
Interconnection Agreement and Motion for Expedited Relief and Counterclaim Against Level 3
for Enforcement of Interconnection Agreement. By its Counterclaim, Qwest seeks Commission
order declaring that, pursuant to the terms of the previous interconnection agreement between the
parties, Level 3 owes Qwest the sum of $563,616.79, plus interest, for the provision of direct
trunk transport ("DTT") facilities during the Dispute Period.
On July 14, 2005, Level 3 filed its Reply to Qwest Corporation's Counterclaim in
which Level 3 denied Qwest's claim that the principal amount Level 3 might owe to Qwest for
the use of DTT facilities during the Dispute Period is $563,616.99.
On July 15, 2005, Level 3 and Qwest submitted Position Statements in support of
their competing claims. In its Position Statement, Qwest indicated that Level 3's Reply of July
14,2005, was the first time that Level 3 had challenged the rate in Qwest's DTT facility billings
as improper.
This matter was heard by the Administrative Law Judge on July 26, 2005. At
hearing, Level 3 was represented by Gregory L. Rogers and William J. Evans. Qwest was
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-3represented by Ted Smith and Robert Brown. Due to the nature of the parties' dispute, hearing
was limited to oral argument, no evidence or testimony being offered by either party.

BACKGROUND
Level 3 is a certificated competitive local exchange carrier providing service
primarily to Internet Service Providers ("ISPs") in Utah. Qwest is an incumbent local exchange
carrier. On September 7, 2000, Level 3 and Qwest, pursuant to the Telecommunications Act of
1996 (the "Act"), entered into an interconnection agreement ("Old Agreement") which was
approved by the Commission in Docket No. 00-049-88 on January 10, 2001. The record in that
docket indicates the parties entered into this Old Agreement by virtue of Level 3 opting into an
interconnection agreement between Qwest predecessor U.S. West Communications, Inc., and
AT&T Communications of the Mountain States, Inc., approved by the Commission in Docket
No. 96-087-03 on March 25, 1997.
To provide its services, Level 3 established a single Point of Interconnection
("POP') with Qwest in Salt Lake City, obtained local telephone numbers throughout the State of
Utah through the North American Numbering Plan Administrator, and provided these numbers to
its ISP customers. The ISP customers then provided these numbers to their dial-up customers
(who were also Qwest local exchange service customers) so those customers could access the
Internet. These locally dialed calls were then routed over Qwest's DTT facilities to Level 3fs POI
for delivery to Level 3!s ISP customers.
Section 5.1.2.4 of Attachment 1 to the Old Agreement states:
If the Parties5 elect to establish two-way direct trunks, the
compensation for such jointly used 'shared' facilities shall be
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the rates for direct trunk transport in Appendix A. The actual rate
paid to the provider of the direct trunk facility shall be reduced to
reflect the provider's use of that facility. The adjustment in the direct
trunk transport rate shall be a percentage that reflects the provider's
relative use (i.e. originating minutes of use) of the facility in the busy
hour.
This section contains the Old Agreement's only mention of a relative use fad or ("RUF")
respecting the rates to be paid for direct trunk transport. The term of the Old Agreement was as
follows:
This Agreement shall be effective upon Commission approval and
shall remain in effect until June 26,2001 and thereafter shall continue
in force and effect unless and until a new agreement addressing all of
the terms of this Agreement, becomes effective between the Parties.
Either Party may request resolution of open issues in accordance with
the provisions of Section 27 of this Part A of this Agreement, Dispute
Resolution, beginning nine (9) months prior to the expiration of this
Agreement. Any disputes regarding the terms and conditions of the
new interconnection agreement shall be resolved in accordance with
said Section 27 and the resulting agreement shall be submitted to the
Commission. This Agreement shall remain in effect ^until a new
interconnection agreement approved by the Commission has become
effective.

When the Old Agreement expired on June 26, 2001, Level 3 arid Qwest had not
yet finalized negotiations on a new agreement ("New Agreement") so the parties' relationship
continued to be governed by the terms of the Old Agreement. On August 7, 2002, in Docket No.
02-2266-02, Level 3 petitioned the Commission for arbitration of the New Agreement.
The sole provision at issue in that arbitration was Section 5.1.2.4 of Attachment 1,
the same provision in the Old Agreement referred to supra. Level 3 and Qwest agreed that when
traffic reached a certain level, DTTs would be used to carry the traffic. They further agreed that
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being billed for all of the cost of the interconnection facilities at issue but Qwest issuing Level 3
a credit for its portion of the relative use of the facilities. The parties disagreed, however, on
whether ISP-bound traffic should be excluded from the relative use calculations. In its Order in
Docket No. 02-2266-02 ("2004 Order"), the Commission noted:
Level 3fs current business in Utah consists exclusively of servicing
ISPs. Level 3 has a single point of interconnection ("POI") with
Qwest servicing the entire state. The interconnection facilities in
question are all on Qwest's side of the POI. Level 3 provides its ISP
customers with local telephone numbers in various parts of the state.
For example, a Qwest customer in Cedar City may call a local Cedar
City number to reach an ISP serviced by Level 3. That call is then
transported to the point of interconnection in Salt Lake and there
delivered to Level 3. Unlike if this were a voice call to a Level 3
customer, there is no return traffic to Cedar City, in this example.
The call is terminated at the ISP's facilities in Salt Lake or elsewhere
and no return traffic to Cedar City will occur.
Since at the current time all traffic to Level 3 is ISP traffic, a decision
on the issue of how relative use of the facilities should be calculated
will determine who pays all of the costs of the interconnection
facilities. If ISP traffic is included in the calculation of relative use,
Qwest will pay 100% of the costs because its customers originate all
of the traffic to the ISP's served by Level 3. If ISP traffic is not
included in relative use, Level 3 will pay all of the costs of these
interconnection facilities. Accordingly, Qwest proposes language that
excludes ISP traffic from the calculation, and Level 3fs [sic] proposes
language including ISP traffic.1
The Commission ultimately resolved this issue in Qwest's favor, noting:

2004 Order at 2-3 (footnote omitted).
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costs of the interconnection facilities. We agree with Qwest's
assertion that such a result would violate the requirements under the
[Telecommunications Act of 1996,47 U.S.C. '151 etseq] that ILECs
receive just and reasonable compensation for interconnection. Level
3 paying nothing toward the interconnection facilities is not a just and
reasonable rate.2
Thus, while the Old Agreement was silent on the issue of whether ISP-bound traffic was
included in the calculation of the relative use factor for DTT billing, the New Agreement
specifically excludes such traffic from this calculation. Qwest, citing the 2004 Order, now seeks
to exclude ISP-bound traffic from relative use calculations during the Dispute Period.3
DISCUSSION
A. Level 3fs Position
Level 3 argues that the Commission's decision in Docket No. 02-2266-02 may not
be applied retroactively to modify the relative use calculations provided for under the Old

Id at 7. A sub-issue in Docket No. 02-2266-02 which Level 3 cites in support of its current position
concerned which RUF should be used for the initial quarterly billing period under the New Agreement. Qwest
proposed that when a new factor was established bills should be retroactively adjusted for the initial billing quarter.
Level 3 argued that any new RUF should be used prospectively only. The Commission adopted Level 3's position,
ordering language prohibiting true up and mandating that new relative use factors apply prospectively only.
In October 2002, the parties reached a global settlement of a number of past billing issues for all amounts in dispute
between the parties through June 30, 2002. Hence, the Dispute Period begins on July 1, 2002, and continues through February
2004 to the effective date of the New Agreement.
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02-2266-02 that the new RUF calculated following the first quarter of activity under the New
Agreement would not be applied retroactively to that quarter, ievel 3 reads this decision as a
determination that the method of calculating the RUF adopted in the New Agreement should
only be applied prospectively.
Level 3 also argues that the Old Agreement is a contract, that the plain language
of Section 5.L2.4 of Attachment 1 to that contract makes no mention of excluding ISP-bound
traffic from RUF calculations, and that it would now be improper for the Commission to add
such exclusionary terms to this provision. In Level 3's view, the plain meaning of this section is
that the calculation of relative use under the Old Agreement was to reflect all of the originating
minutes of use on the trunks without exception. Because Qwest end-users originated all of the
traffic in question and because the Old Agreement provided for no exclusion of ISP-bound
traffic, Qwest has no basis under the Old Agreement to charge Level 3 for DTT facilities.
B. Qwest's Position
Qwest, on the other hand, relies on the Commission's conclusion in Docket No.
02-2266-02 that including ISP-bound traffic in RUF calculations would violate the requirements
of the Act by precluding Qwest from receiving just and reasonable compensation for
interconnection. Qwest argues the Commission must apply this same reasoning to the provision
of DTT facilities during the Dispute Period; that to do otherwise would contradict the
Commission's own conclusions in Docket No. 02-2266-02 and violate the Act by requiring
Qwest to provide DTT facilities to Level 3 at its own expense.
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facilities for Level 3 by arguing that Qwest customers who place local calls on Qwest's network
in order to connect to their ISP are not placing those calls as Qwest customers but as ISP
customers and, by extension, Level 3 customers. Viewed in this light, the traffic on the DTT
facility is attributable to Level 3 for purposes of relative use factor calculation, resulting in the
payments Qwest seeks in its counterclaim.
Finally, Qwest notes the parties amended the Old Agreement several times,
including the Single Point of Presence ("SPOP") Amendment approved August 21, 2002, which
allowed Level 3 to connect to Qwest as a single POI in Salt Lake City, and the Internet Service
Provider Amendment approved January 8, 2003, which was intended to deal with reciprocal
compensation for ISP traffic after the FCC issued its ISP Remand Order4 on that issue.
Paragraph 1.3.1 of the SPOP Amendment required Level 3 to order one or more direct trunk
groups from Qwest when traffic volume reached a certain level Level 3, having placed such
orders, Qwest began billing Level 3 on a monthly basis for the cost of these DTT facilities,
resulting in the disputed bills at issue in this docket.
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
We do not agree with Level 3's characterization that it would be improper for this
Commission to "add language" to the Old Agreement by excluding ISP-bound traffic from the
RUF calculation. This Commission is routinely asked to interpret disputed terms between parties

Order on Remand, In the Matter of Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in the Telecommunications
Act of1996, Intercarner Compensation for ISP-Bound Traffic, 16FCCR9151 (2001)

DOCKET NOS. 05-2266-01
-9in order to produce a just and reasonable result in accordance with applicable law and regulation.
This case is no different.
In Docket No. 02-2266-02, we recognized the applicability to the issue of relative
use of the FCC's reasoning in its ISP Remand Order regarding reciprocal compensation:
Many of the same policy considerations used in the reciprocal
compensation [sic] are applicable to the issue presented here. In the
ISP Remand Order the FCC found that the payment of reciprocal
compensation for Internet traffic caused uneconomic subsidies and
improperly created incentives for CLECs to specialize in serving ISPs
to the exclusion of other customers. The FCC noted that these
improper incentives and market distortions are most apparent in
Internet traffic because of the one-way nature of the traffic. The same
considerations apply to the issue at hand. If Internet-bound traffic is
not excluded from the relative use calculations, Level 3 would be
allowed to shift all of the costs of the interconnection trunks to
Qwest. Level 3 would then have strong incentive to continue to focus
on serving ISPs to the exclusion of other customers. Just as these
considerations caused the FCC to declare that Internet traffic is not
subject to reciprocal compensation payments, they strongly favor the
exclusion of ISP traffic from the relative use calculations at issue in
this matter.5
We do not look to Docket No. 02-2266-02 as controlling precedent in deciding the matter now
before us, but we do recognize that the rationale behind our 2004 Order is equally applicable to
the parties' current dispute both because the issue now before us is identical to the issue in
Docket No. 02-2266-02 and because the release of the ISP Remand Order predates the start of
the Dispute Period by more than a year. We view the ISP Remand Order as illuminating the

5

2004 Order at p. 8 (citing ISP Remand Order, && 67-76)
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unreasonable for this Commission to ignore such guidance in rendering a decision.
As we recognized in Docket No. 02-2266-02, any interpretation of Section 5.1.2.4
of Attachment 1, whether in the New Agreement or in the Old Agreement, must accord with the
Section 251(d)(1) requirement of the Act that rates for interconnection of facilities be just and
reasonable. No one disputes that including ISP-bound traffic in the RUF calculation under the
Old Agreement would result in Qwest bearing all of the cost of the DTT facilities. We cannot
conclude that such a result would equate to just and reasonable compensation for Qwest. We
therefore conclude that the only proper reading of Section 5.1.2.4 of Attachment 1 to the Old
Agreement excludes ISP-bound traffic from the RUF calculation in determining the parties'
respective payment obligations for DTT facilities provided during the Dispute Period.
We note, however, that the issue of how much Level 3 might owe Qwest if ISPbound traffic is excluded from relative use calculations was raised relatively late in these
proceedings. Qwest appears to stand by the figure of $563,616.99 contained in its Counterclaim.
Level 3 disputes this amount but offered no evidence concerning what it believes the correct
amount to be. The Commission therefore makes no finding on this issue.
Therefore, based upon the foregoing information, and for good cause appearing>
the Administrative Law Judge enters the following proposed:
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NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
1.

The Petition of LEVEL 3 COMMUNICATIONS, LLC, is denied. QWEST

CORPORATION'S Counterclaim is granted in part to the extent that the Commission concludes
ISI^bound traffic is properly excluded from calculation of the relative use factor for direct trunk
transport facilities during the Dispute Period. The Commission enters no order respecting the
amount owed to Qwest by Level 3 for direct trunk transport facilities provided by Qwest during
the Dispute Period.
2.

Pursuant to Utah Code Annotated " 63-46b-12 and 54-7-15, agency review or

rehearing of this order may be obtained by filing a request for review or rehearing with the
Commission within 30 days after the issuance of the order. Responses to a request for agency
review or rehearing must be filed within 15 days of the filing of the request for review or
rehearing. If the Commission fails to grant a request for review or rehearing within 20 days after
the filing of a request for review or rehearing, it is deemed denied. Judicial review of the
Commission's final agency action may be obtained by filing a Petition for Review with the Utah
Supreme Court within 30 days after final agency action. Any Petition for Review must comply
with the requirements of Utah Code Annotated " 63-46b-14, 63-46b-16 and the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure.
Dated at Salt Lake City, Utah, this 18th day of August, 2005.

StevefrF. Goodwill
Administrative Law Judge
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Approved and Confirmed this 18th day of August, 2005, as the Report and Order
of the Public Service Commission of-Utah.

Ric Campbeul, Chairman

— = ^ ^ ^ r ^ \
Ted Boyer, Commissioner

Ron Allen, Commissioner

Attest:

JiUie Orchard
Commission Secretary
G#45483
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INTRODUCTION

1.
In this Order, we reconsider the proper treatment for purposes of intercarrier
compensation of telecommunications traffic delivered to Internet service providers (ISPs). We
previously found in the Declaratory Ruling1 that such traffic is interstate traffic subject to the
jurisdiction of the Commission under section 201 of the Act2 and is not,-therefore, subject to the
reciprocal compensation provisions of section 251(b)(5).3 The Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit held on appeal, however, that the Declaratory Ruling failed adequately to
explain why our jurisdictional conclusion was relevant to the applicability of section 251(b)(5) and
1

Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in the Telecommunications Act of 1996; Intercarrier
Compensation for ISP-Bound Traffic, Declaratory Ruling in CC Docket No. 96-98 and Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking in CC Docket No. 99-68,14 FCC Red 3689 (1999) (Declaratory Ruling-ox Intercarrier Compensation
NPRM),
ISee 47 U.S,C. § 201, Communications Act of 1934 (the Act), as amended by the Telecommunications Act of
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat 56 (1996 Act). Hereinafter, all citations to the Act and to the 1996 Act will
be to die relevant section of the United States Code unless otherwise noted.
3

47 U.S.C.§ 251(b)(5).

2
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remanded the issue for further consideration. As explained in more detail below, we modify the
analysis that led to our determination that ISP-bound traffic falls outside the scope of section
251(b)(5) and conclude that Congress excluded from the "telecommunications" traffic subject to
reciprocal compensation the traffic identified in section 251(g), including traffic destined for ISPs.
Having found, although for different reasons than before, that the provisions of section 251(b)(5)
do not extend to ISP-bound traffic, we reaffirm our previous conclusion that traffic delivered to
an ISP is predominantly interstate access traffic subject to section 201 of the Act, and we establish
an appropriate cost recovery mechanism for the exchange of such traffic.
2.
We recognize that the existing intercarrier compensation mechanism for the
delivery of this traffic, in which the originating carrier pays the carrier that serves the ISP, has
created opportunities for regulatory arbitrage and distorted the economic incentives related to
competitive entry into the local exchange and exchange access markets. As we discuss in the
Unified Intercarrier Compensation NPRM, released in tandem with this Order, such market
distortions relate not only to ISP-bound traffic, but may result from any intercarrier compensation
regime that allows a service provider to recover some of its costs from other carriers rather than
from its end-users. Thus, the NPRM initiates a proceeding to consider, among other things,
whether the Commission should replace existing intercarrier compensation schemes with some
form of what has come to be known as "bill and keep." The NPRMdXso considers modifications
to existing payment regimes, in which the calling party's network pays the terminating network,
that might limit the potential for market distortion. The regulatory arbitrage opportunities
associated with intercarrier payments are particularly apparent with respectrto ISP-bound traffic,
however, because ISPs typically generate large volumes of traffic that is virtually all one-way —
that is, delivered to the ISP. Indeed, there is convincing evidence in the record that at least some
carriers have targeted ISPs as customers merely to take advantage of these intercarrier payments.
Accordingly, in this Order we also take interim steps to limit the regulatory arbitrage opportunity
presented by ISP-bound traffic while we consider the broader issues of intercarrier compensation
in the NPRM proceeding.

4

See BellAtL Tel. Cos. v. FCC, 206 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (Bell Atlantic).

5

Developing a Unified Intercarrier Compensation Regime, CC Docket No. 01-92, Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, FCC 01-132 (rel. April 27, 2001) ("Unified Intercarrier Compensation NPRM" or "NPRM").
"Bill and keep" refers to an arrangement in which neither of two interconnecting networks charges the other for
terminating traffic that originates on the other network. Instead, each network recovers torn its own end-users the
cost of both originating traffic that it delivers to the other network and terminating traffic that it receives from the
other network. Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in the Telecommunications Act of 1996;
Interconnection between Local Exchange Carriers and Commercial Mobile Radio Service: Providers, CC Docket
Nos. 96-98, 95-185, First Report and Order, 11 FCC Red 15499, 16045 (1996) (Local Competition Order), affd in
part and vacated in part sub nom. Competitive Telecommunications Ass 7? v. FCC, 117 EI3d l06B:(8th Cir. 1997)
(CompTel), affd in part and vacated in part sub nom. Iowa Utils. Bd v. FCC, 120 F.3d^53 (8th Cir. 1997) (Iowa
Utils. Bd\ affd in part and rev'd in part sub-nom., AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525iJ.S. 366 (1999); Order on
Reconsideration, 11 FCC Red 13042 (1996); Second Order on Reconsideration, 11 FCC Red 19738 (1996); Third
Order on Reconsideration and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 12 FCC Red 12450 (1997); further recon.
pending. Bill and keep does not, however, preclude intercarrier charges for transport of traffic between carriers'
networks. Id.
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3.
As presaged above, we must wrestle with two difficult issues in this Order: first,
whether intercarrier compensation for ISP-bound traffic is governed by section 251 or section
201; and, if the latter, what sort of compensation mechanism should apply. The first question is
difficult because we do not believe it is resolved by the plain language of section 251(b)(5) but,
instead, requires us to consider the relationship of that section to other provisions of the statute.
Moreover, we recognize the legitimate questions raised by the court with respect to the rationales
underlying our regulatory treatment of ISPs and ISP traffic. We seek to respond to those
questions in this Order. Ultimately, however, we conclude that Congress, through section
251(g), expressly limited the reach of section 251(b)(5) to exclude ISP-bound traffic.
Accordingly, we affirm our conclusion in the Declaratory Ruling that ISP-bound traffic is not
subject to the reciprocal compensation obligations of section 251(b)(5).
4.
Because we determine that intercarrier compensation for ISP-bound traffic is
within the jurisdiction of this Commission under section 201 of the Act, it is incumbent upon us to
establish an appropriate cost recovery mechanism for delivery of this traffic. Based upon the
record before us, it appears that the most efficient recovery mechanism for ISP-bound traffic may
be bill and keep, whereby each carrier recovers costs from its own end-users. As we recognize in
the NPRM, intercarrier compensation regimes that require carrier-to-carrier payments are likely to
distort the development of competitive markets by divorcing cost recovery from the ultimate
consumer of services. In a monopoly environment, permitting carriers to recover some of their
costs from interconnecting carriers might serve certain public policy goals. In order to promote
universal service, for example, this Commission historically has capped end-user common line
charges and required local exchange carriers to recover any shortfall through per-minute charges
assessed on interexchange carriers.8 These sorts of implicit subsidies cannot be sustained,
however, in the competitive markets for telecommunications services envisioned by the 1996 Act
In the NPRM, we suggest that, given the opportunity, carriers always will prefer to recover their
costs from other carriers rather than their own end-users in order to gain competitive advantage.
Thus carriers have every incentive to compete, not on basis of quality and efficiency, but on the
basis of their ability to shift costs to other carriers, a troubling distortion that prevents market
forces from distributing limited investment resources to their most efficient uses.
5.
We believe that this situation is particularly acute in the case of carriers delivering
traffic to ISPs because these customers generate extremely high traffic volumes that are entirely
one-directional. Indeed, the weight of the evidence in the current record indicates that precisely
the types of market distortions identified above are taking place with respect to this traffic. For
example,, comments in the record indicate that competitive local exchange carriers (CLECs), on
average, terminate eighteen times more traffic than they originate, resulting in annual CLEC
reciprocal compensation billings of approximately two billion dollars, ninety percent of which is

7

47U.S.d§25i(g).

8

Access Charge Reform, CC Docket No 96-262, First Report and Order, 12 FCC Red 15982, 15998-99 (1997)
{Access Charge Reform Order), qff'd, Southwestern Bell Telephone Co v. FCC, 153 F.3d 523 (8th Cir. 1998).
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for ISP-bound traffic. Moreover, the traffic imbalances for some competitive carriers are in fact
much greater, with several carriers terminating more than forty times more traffic than they
originate.10 There is nothing inherently wrong with carriers having substantial traffic imbalances
arising from a business decision to target specific types of customers. In this case, however, we
believe that such decisions are driven by regulatory opportunities that disconnect costs from enduser market decisions. Thus, under the current carrier-to-carrier recovery mechanism, it is
conceivable that a carrier could serve an ISP free of charge and recover all of its costs from
originating carriers. This result distorts competition by subsidizing one type of service at the
expense of others.
6.
Although we believe this arbitrage opportunity is particularly manifest with respect
to ISP-bound traffic, we suggest in the NPRMthat any compensation regime based on carrier-tocarrier payments may create similar market distortions. Accordingly, we initiate an inquiry as to
whether bill and keep is a more economically efficient compensation scheme than the existing
carrier-to-carrier payment mechanisms. Alternatively, the record developed in that proceeding
may suggest modifications to carrier-to-carrier cost recovery mechanisms that address the
competitive concerns identified above. Based upon the current record, however, bill and keep
appears the preferable cost recovery mechanism for ISP-bound traffic because it eliminates a
substantial opportunity for regulatory arbitrage. We do not fully adopt a bill and keep regime in
this Order, however, because there are specific questions regarding bill and keep that require
further inquiry, and we believe that a more complete record on these issues is desirable before
requiring carriers to recover most of their costs from end-users. Because these questions are
equally relevant to our evaluation of a bill and keep approach for other types of traffic, we will
consider them in the context of the NPRM, Moreover, we believe that there are significant
advantages to a global evaluation of the intercarrier compensation mechanisms applicable to
different types of traffic to ensure a more systematic, symmetrical treatment of these issues.
7.
Because the record indicates a need for immediate action with respect to ISPbound traffic, however, in this Order we will implement an interim recovery scheme that: (i)
"moves aggressively to eliminate arbitrage opportunities presented by the existing recovery
mechanism for ISP-bound by lowering payments and capping growth; and (ii) initiates a 36-month
transition towards a complete bill and keep recovery mechanism while retaining the ability to
-adopt an alternative mechanism based upon a more extensive evaluation in the NPRM proceeding.
Specifically, we adopt a gradually declining cap on the amount that carriers may recover from
^ See, e g, Letter from Robert T. Blau, BellSouth, to Magalie Roman Salas, Secretary, FCC (November 6,2000);
see also Verizon Remand Comments at 2 (Verizon will be billed more than one billion dollars in 2000 for Internetiound calls); Letter from Richard 1 Metzger, Focal, to Deena Shetler, Legal Advisor to_Commissioner Gloria
Tristani, FCC (Jan. 11,2001)(ILECs owed $1.98 billion in reciprocal compensation to CLECs in 2000). On June
^23, 2000, the Commission released a Public Notice seeking comment on the issues raised by the court's remand.
See Comment Sought on Remand of the Commission's Reciprocal Compensation Declaratory Ruling by the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, CC Docket Nos. 96-98,99-68, Public Notice, 15 FCC Red 17311 (2000)
{Public Notice). Comments and reply comments filed in response to the Public Notice_are identified herein as
"Remand Comments" and "Remand Reply Comments," respectively. Comments and replies filed in response the
+999 Intercarrier Compensation NPRM are identified as "Comments" and "Reply Comments," respectively.
See, e.g., Verizon Remand Comments at 11,21.
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other carriers for delivering ISP-bound traffic. We also cap the amount of traffic for which any
such compensation is owed, in order to eliminate incentives to pursue new arbitrage
opportunities. In sum, our goal in this Order is decreased reliance by carriers upon carrier-tocarrier payments and an increased reliance upon recovery of costs from end-users, consistent with
the tentative conclusion in the NPRMthat bill and keep is the appropriate intercarrier
compensation mechanism for ISP-bound traffic. In this regard, we emphasize that the rate caps
we impose are not intended to reflect the costs incurred by each carrier that delivers ISP traffic.
Some carriers' costs may be higher; some are probably lower. Rather, we conclude, based upon
all of the evidence in this record, that these rates are appropriate limits on the amounts recovered
from other carriers and provide a reasonable transition from rates that have (at least until recently)
typically been much higher. Carriers whose costs exceed these rates are (and will continue to be)
able to collect additional amounts from their ISP customers. As we note above, and explain in
more detail below, we believe that such end-user recovery likely is the most efficient mechanism.
8.

The basic structure of this transition is as follows:

*
Beginning on the effective date of this Order, and continuing for six months,
intercarrier compensation for ISP-bound traffic will be capped at a rate of $.0015/minute-ofuse (mou). Starting in the seventh month, and continuing for eighteen months, the rate will be
capped at $.0010/mou. Starting in the twenty-fifth month, and continuing through the thirtysixth month or until further Commission action (whichever is later), the rate will be capped at
$.0007/mou. Any additional costs incurred must be recovered from end-users. These rates
reflect the downward trend in intercarrier compensation rates contained in recently negotiated
interconnection agreements, suggesting that they are sufficient to provide a reasonable
transitionfromdependence on intercarrier payments while ensuring cost recovery.
*
We also impose a cap on total ISP-bound minutes for which a local exchange carrier
(LEC) may receive this compensation. For the year 2001, a LEC may receive compensation,
pursuant to a particular interconnection agreement, for ISP-bound minutes up to a ceiling equal
to, on an annualized basis, the number of ISP-bound minutes for which that LEC was entitled
to compensation under that agreement during thefirstquarter of 2001, plus a ten percent
growth factor. For 2002, a LEC may receive compensation for ISP-bound minutes up to a
ceiling equal to the minutes for which it was entitled to compensation in 2001, plus another ten
percent growth factor. In 2003, a LEC may receive compensation for ISP-bound minutes up
to a ceiling equal to the 2002 ceiling. These caps are consistent with projections of the growth
of dial-up Internet access for thefirsttwo years of the transition and are necessary to ensure
that such growth does not undermine our goal of limiting intercarrier compensation and
beginning a transition toward bill and keep. Growth above these caps should be based on a
carrier's ability to provide efficient service, not on any incentive to collect intercarrier
payments.
*
Because the^ransitional rates are caps on intercarrier compensation, they have no
effect to the extent that states have ordered LECs to exchange ISP-bound traffic either at ratesbelow the caps or on a bill and keep basis (or otherwise have not required payment of
compensation for this traffic). The rate caps are designed to provide a transition toward bill
and keep, and no transition is necessary for carriers already exchanging traffic at rates below
the caps.
6
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*
In order to limit disputes and costly measures to identify ISP-bound traffic, we adopt a
rebuttable presumption that traffic exchanged between LECs that exceeds a 3:1 ratio of
terminating to originating traffic is ISP-bound traffic subject to the compensation mechanism
set forth in this Order. This ratio is consistent with those adopted by state commissions to
identify ISP or other convergent traffic that is subject to lower intercarrier compensation rates.
Carriers that seek to rebut this presumption, by showing that traffic above the ratio is not ISPbound traffic or, conversely, that traffic below the ratio is ISP-bound traffic, may seek
appropriate relieffromtheir state commissions pursuant to section 252 of the Act.
*
Finally, the rate caps for ISP-bound traffic (or such lower rates as have been imposed
by states commissions for the exchange of ISP-bound traffic) apply only if an incumbent LEC
offers to exchange all traffic subject to section 251(b)(5) at the same rate. An incumbent LEC
that does not offer to exchange section 251(b)(5) traffic at these rates must exchange ISPbound traffic at the state-approved or state-negotiated reciprocal compensation rates reflected
in their contracts. The record fails to demonstrate that there are inherent differences between
the costs of delivering a voice call to a local end-user and a data call to an ISP, thus the
"mirroring" rule we adopt here requires that incumbent LECs pay the same rates for ISPbound traffic that they receive for section 251(b)(5) traffic.
IH.

BACKGROUND

9.
In the Declaratory Ruling released on February 26, 1999, we addressed the
regulatory treatment of ISP-bound traffic. In that order, we reached several conclusions
regarding the jurisdictional nature of this traffic, and we proposed several approaches to
intercarrier compensation for ISP-bound traffic in an accompanying Intercarrier Compensation
NPRM. The order, however, was vacated and remanded on appeal. This Order, therefore,
again focuses on the regulatory treatment of ISP-bound traffic and the appropriate intercarrier
compensation regime for carriers that collaborate to deliver traffic to ISPs.
10.
As we noted in the Declaratory Ruling, an ISP's end-user customers typically
access the Internet through an ISP server located in the same local calling area. Customers
generally pay their LEC a flat monthly fee for use of the local exchange network, including
connections to their local ISP. They also generally pay their ISP a flat monthly fee for access to
the Internet. ISPs then combine "computer processing, information storage, protocol

u

See Bell Atlantic, 206 F.3d 1.

12

Declaratory Ruling, 14 FCC Red at369L

13

Declaratory Ruling, 14 FCC Red at 3691.

14

Declaratory Ruling, 14 FCC Red at 3691.
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conversion, and routing with transmission to enable users to access Internet content and
services."
11.
ISPs, one class of enhanced service providers (ESPs), also may utilize LEC
services to provide their customers with access to the Internet. In the MTS/WATS Market
Structure Order, the Commission acknowledged that ESPs were among a variety of users of LEC
interstate access services. Since 1983, however, the Commission has exempted ESPs from the
payment of certain interstate access charges. Consequently ESPs, including ISPs, are treated as
end-users for the purpose of applying access charges and are, therefore, entitled to pay local
business rates for their connections to LEC central offices and the public switched telephone
network (PSTN).19 Thus, despite the Commission's understanding that ISPs use interstate access
services, pursuant to the ESP exemption, the Commission has permitted ISPs to take service
under local tariffs.
12.
The 1996 Act set standards for the introduction of competition into the market for
local telephone service, including requirements for interconnection of competing
telecommunications carriers. As a result of interconnection and growing local competition,
more than one LEC may be involved in the delivery of telecommunications within a local service
15

Declaratory Ruling, 14 FCC Red at 3691 (citing Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service, CC Docket No.
96-45, Report to Congress, 13 FCC Red 1150lr 11531 (1998) {UniversalService Report to Congress)).
16

The Commission defines "enhanced services" as "services, offered over common carrier transmission facilities
used in interstate communications, which employ computer processing applications that act on the format, content,
code, protocol or similar aspects of the subscriber's transmitted information; provide the subscriber additional,
different, or restructured information; or involve subscriber interaction with stored information." 47 C.F.R.
§ 64.702(a). The 1996 Act describes these services as "information services." See 47 U.S.C. § 153(20)
("information service" refers to the "offering of a capability for generating, acquiring, storing, tratnsforming,
processing, retrieving, utilizing, or making available information via telecommunications."). See also Universal
Service Report to Congress, 13PCC Red at 11516<the "1996 Act's definitions of telecommunications service and
information service essentially correspond to the pre-existing categories of basic and enhanced services").
17

MTS and WATS Market Structure, CC Docket No. 78-72, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 97 FCC 2d 682,
711 (\9%Y){MTS/WATS Market Structure Order)(ESPs are "(a]mong the variety of users of access service" and
"obtainQ local exchange services or facilities which are used, in part or in whole, for the purpose of completing
interstate calls which transit [their] location and, commonly, another location,").
18

This policy is known as the "ESP exemption." See MTS/WA TS Market Structure Order, 97 FCC 2d at 715
(ESPs have been paying local business service rates for their interstate access and would experience rate shock that
could affect their viability if full access charges were instead applied); see also Amendments of Part 69 of the
Commission's Rules Relating to Enhanced Service Providers, CC Docket 87-215, Order, 3 FCC Red 2631,2633
(1988) (ESP Exemption Order) ("the imposition of access charges at this time is not appropriate and could cause
such disruption in this industry segment that provision of enhanced services to the pubfic might be impaired");
Access Charge Reform Order, 12 FCC Red at 16133 ("[maintaining the existing pricing structure ... avoids
disrupting the still-evolving information services industry").
19

ESP Exemption Order, 3 FCC Red at 2635 n.8, 2637 n.53. See also Access Charge Reform Order, 12 FCC Red
at 16133-35.
20

47 U.S.C.§§ 251-252.
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area. Section 251(b)(5) of the Act addresses the need for LECs to agree to terms for the mutual
exchange of traffic over their interconnecting networks. It specifically provides that LECs have
the duty to "establish reciprocal compensation arrangements for the transport and termination of
telecommunications." The Commission determined, in the Local Competition Order, that
section 251(b)(5) reciprocal compensation obligations "apply only to traffic that originates and
terminates within a local area," as defined by state commissions.
13.
As a result of this determination, the question arose whether reciprocal
compensation obligations apply to the delivery of calls from one LECs end-user customer to an
ISP in the same local calling area that is served by a competing LEC. The Commission
determined at that time that resolution of this question turned on whether ISP-bound traffic
"originates and terminates within a local area," as set forth in our rule. Many competitive LECs
argued that ISP-bound traffic is local traffic that terminates at the ISP's local server, where a
second, packet-switched "call" then begins. Thus, they argued, the reciprocal compensation
obligations of section 251(b)(5) apply to this traffic. Incumbent LECs, on the other hand, argued
that no reciprocal compensation is due because ISP-bound traffic is interstate telecommunications
traffic that continues through the ISP server and terminates at the remote Internet sites accessed
by ISP customers.
14.
The Commission concluded in the Declaratory Ruling that the jurisdictional nature
of ISP-bound traffic should be determined, consistent with Commission precedent, by the end

21

47 U.S.C.§ 251(b)(5).

See Local Competition Order, 11 FCC Red at 16013 ("With the exception of traffic to or from a CMRS network,
state commissions have the authority to determine what geographic areas should be considered Mocai areas' for the
purpose of applying reciprocal compensation obligations under section 25 l(bX5), consistent with the state
commissions' historical practice of defining local service areas for wireline LECs."); see also 47 C.F.R.
§ 5l.70l(b)(l-2). For CMRS traffic, the Commission determined that reciprocal compensation applies to traffic
that originates and terminates within the same Major Trading Area (MTA). See 47 C.F.R. § 51.701 (b)(2).
See, e.g., Petitions for Reconsideration and Clarification of Action in Rulemaking Proceedings, 61 Fed. Reg.
53922 (1996); Petition for Partial Reconsideration and Clarification of MFS Communications Co., Inc. at 28;
Letter from Richard J. Metzger, ALTS, to Regina M. Keeney, Chief, Common Carrier Bureau, FCC (June 20,
1997); Pleading Cycle Established for Comments on Request by ALTS for Clarification of the Commission's Rules
Regarding Reciprocal Compensation for Information Service Provider Traffic, CCB/CPD 97-30, DA 97-1399 (rel.
July 2, 1997); Letter from Edward D. Young and Thomas J. Tauke, Bell Atlantic, to William E. Kennard,
Chairman, FCC (July I, 1998). The Commission later directed parties wishing to make ex parte presentations
regarding the applicability of reciprocal compensation to ISP-bound traffic temake such filings in CC Docket No.
96-98, the local competition proceeding. See Ex Parte Procedures Regarding:Requests for Clarification of the
Commission's Rules Regarding Reciprocal Compensation for Information Service Provider Traffic, CC Docket No.
96-98, Public Notice, 13 FCC Red. 15568 (1998).
24

Declaratory Ruling, 14 FCCHcd at 3693-94.

25

Declaratory Ruling, 14 FCC Red at 3694.

26

Declaratory Ruling, 14 FCC Red at 3695.
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27

points of the communication. Applying this "end-to-end" analysis, the Commission determined
that Internet communications originate with the ISP's end-user customer and continue beyond the
local ISP server to websites or other servers and routers that are often located outside of the
28

state. The Commission found, therefore, that ISP-bound traffic is not local because it does not
"originatefl and terminatef] within a local area."29 Instead, it is jurisdictional^ mixed and largely
interstate, and, for that reason, the Commission found that the reciprocal compensation
obligations of section 251(b)(5) do not apply to this traffic.30
15.
Despite finding that ISP-bound traffic is largely interstate, the Commission
concluded that it had not yet established a federal rule to govern intercarrier compensation for this
traffic. The Commission found that, in the absence of conflicting federal law, parties could
voluntarily include ISP-bound traffic in their interconnection agreements under sections 251 and
252 of the Act. It also found that, even though section 251 (b)(5) does not require reciprocal
compensation for ISP-bound traffic, nothing in the statute or our rules prohibits state
commissions from determining in their arbitrations that reciprocal compensation for this traffic is
appropriate, so long as there is no conflict with governing federal law. Pending adoption of a
federal rule, therefore, state commissions exercising their authority under section 252 to arbitrate,
interpret, and enforce interconnection agreements would determine whether and how
interconnecting carriers should be compensated for carrying ISP-bound traffic. In the
Intercarrier Compensation NPRM accompanying the Declaratory Ruling, the Commission
requested comment on the most appropriate intercarrier compensation mechanism for ISP-bound
traffic.
16.
On March 24,2000, prior to release of a decision addressing these issues, the court of
appeals vacated certain provisions of the Declaratory Ruling and remanded the matter to the
Declaratory Ruling, 14 FCC Red at 3695-3701; see also Petition for Emergency Relief and Declaratory Ruling
Filed by BellSouth Corporation, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 7 FCC Red 1619 (1992) (BellSouth
MemoryCall), ajf'd, Georgia Pub, Serv. Comm 'n v FCC, 5 F.3d 1499 (11th Cir. 1993)(table), Teleconnect Co v.
Bell Telephone Co. of Penn., E-88-83, 10 FCC Red 1626 (1995) (Teleconnect), ajfdsub nom Southwestern Bell
Tel Co. v. FCC, 116 F.3d 593 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
28

Declaratory Ruling, 14 FCC Red at 3695-97.

29

Declaratory Ruling, 14 FCC Red at 3697.

30

Declaratory Ruling, 14 FCC Red at 3690, 3695-3703.

31

Declaratory Ruling 14 FCC Red at 3703.

32

Declaratory Ruling, 14 FCC Red at 3703.

33

Declaratory Ruling 14 FCC Red at 3706.

34

Declaratory Ruling, 14 FCC Red at 3703-06. The Commission did recognize, however, that its conclusion that
ISP-bound traffic is largely interstate might cause some state commissions to re-examine their conclusions that
reciprocal compensation is due to the extent that those conclusions were based on a finding that this traffic
terminates at the ISP's server. la\ at 3706.
35

Declaratory Ruling, 14 FCC Red at 3707^09.
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Commission,3 The court observed that, although "[tjhere is no dispute that the Commission has
historically been justified in relying on this [end-to-end] method when determining whether a
particular communication is jurisdictional^ interstate, the Commission had not adequately
explained why the jurisdictional analysis was dispositive of, or indeed relevant to, the question
whether a call to an ISP is subject to the reciprocal compensation requirements of section
251(b)(5).38 The court noted that the Commission had not applied its definition o f "termination"
to its analysis of the scope of section 251(b)(5),39 and the court distinguished cases upon which
the Commission relied in its end-to-end analysis because they involve continuous communications
switched by interexchange carriers (IXCs), as opposed to ISPs, the latter of which are not
telecommunications providers. As an "independent reason" to vacate, the court also held that
the Commission had failed to address how its conclusions "fit... within the governing statute."41
In particular, the court found that the Commission had failed to explain why ISP-bound traffic
was not "telephone exchange service," as defined in the Act.2
17.
In a public notice released June 23, 2000, the Commission sought comment on the
issues raised by the court's remand. The Public Notice specifically requested that parties
comment on the jurisdictional nature of ISP-bound traffic, the scope of the reciprocal
compensation requirement of section 251(b)(5), and the relevance of the concepts of
"termination," "telephone exchange service," "exchange access service," and "information
access." It invited parties to update the record by responding to any ex parte presentations filed
after the close of the reply period on April 27, 1999. It also sought comment on any new or
innovative intercarrier compensation arrangements for ISP-bound traffic that parties may have
considered or entered into during the pendency of the proceeding.
IV.
A.

DISCUSSION

Background

18.
The nature and character of communications change over time. Over the last
decade communications services have been radically altered by the advent of the Internet and the
Jb

See Bell Atlantic, 206 FJd 1.

37

Bell Atlantic, 206 FJd at 5.

Bell Atlantic, 206 FJd at 5; see also id. at 8 (the Commission had not "supplied a real explanation for its
decision to treat end-to-end analysis as controlling" with respect to the application of section 251(b)(5)).
39

See Bell Atlantic, 206 FJd at 6-7.

40

See Bell Atlantic, 206 FJd at 6-7.

41

Bell Atlantic, 206 FJd at 8.

42

Bell Atlantic, 206 FJd at 8-9; 47 U.&C. § 153(47) (defining "telephone exchange service").

43

Public Notice, 15 FCC Red 11311.

44

Id; see also 47 U.S.C § 251(g); 47 HS.C § 153(20).
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nature of Internet communications. Indeed, the Internet has given rise to new forms of
communications such as e-mail, instant messaging, and other forms of digital, IP-based services.
Many of these new services and formats have been layered over and integrated with the existing
public telephone systems. Most notably, Internet service providers have come into existence in
order to facilitate mass market access to the Internet. A consumer with access to a standard
phone line is able to communicate with the Internet, because an ISP converts the analog signal to
digital and converts the communication to the IP protocol. This allows the user to access the
global Internet infrastructure and communicate with users and websites throughout the world. In
a narrowband context, the ISP facilitates access to this global network.
19.
The Commission has struggled with how to treat Internet traffic for regulatory
purposes, given the bevy of its rules premised on the architecture and characteristics of the mature
public switched telephone network. For example, Internet consumers may stay on the network
much longer than the design expectations of a network engineered primarily for voice
communications. Additionally, the "bursty" nature of packet-switched communications skews the
traditional assumptions of per minute pricing to which we are all accustomed. The regulatory
challenges have become more acute as Internet usage has exploded.
20.
The issue of intercarrier compensation for Internet-bound traffic with which we are
presently wrestling is a manifestation of this growing challenge. Traditionally, telephone carriers
would interconnect with each other to deliver calls to each other's customers. It was generally
assumed that traffic back and forth on these interconnected networks would be relatively
balanced. Consequently, to compensate interconnecting carriers, mechanisms like reciprocal
compensation were employed, whereby the carrier whose customer initiated the call would pay
the other carrier the costs of using its network.
21.
Internet usage has distorted the traditional assumptions because traffic to an ISP
flows exclusively in one direction, creating an opportunity for regulatory arbitrage and leading to
uneconomical results. Because traffic to ISPs flows one way, so does money in a reciprocal
compensation regime. It was not long before some LECs saw the opportunity to sign up ISPs as
customers and collect, rather than pay, compensation because ISP modems do not generally call
anyone in the exchange. In some instances, this led to classic regulatory arbitrage that had two
troubling effects: (1) it created incentivesdbr inefficient entry of LECs intent on serving ISPs
exclusively and not offering viable local telephone competition, as Congress had intended to
facilitate with theLl996 Act; (2) the large one-way flows of cash made it possible for LECs
serving ISPs to afford to pay their own customers to use their services, potentially driving ISP
rates to consumers to uneconomical levels^ These effects prompted the Commission to consider
the nature of ISP^bound traffic and to examine whether there was any flexibility under the statute
to modify and address the pricing mechanisms for this traffic, given that there is a federal statutory
provision authorizing reciprocal compensaion.46 In the Declaratory Ruling, the Commission

45

See ^Digital Economy 2000, U.S. Department ofCommerce (June 2000) ("Three hundred million people now use
the Internet, compared to three million in 1994.")

46

47U.S.C.§25i(bX5).
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concluded that Internet-bound traffic was jurisdictional^ interstate and, thus, not subject to
section 251(b)(5).
22.
In Bell Atlantic, the court of appeals vacated the Declaratory Ruling and
remanded the case to the Commission to determine whether ISP-bound traffic is subject to
statutory reciprocal compensation requirements. The court held that the Commission failed to
explain adequately why LECs did not have a duty to pay reciprocal compensation under section
251(b)(5) of the Act and remanded the case to the Commission.
B,

Statutory Analysis

23.
In this section, we reexamine our findings in the Declaratory Ruling and conclude
that ISP-bound traffic is not subject to the reciprocal compensation requirement in section 251(b)
because of tlie carve-out provision in section 251(g), which excludes several enumerated
categories of traffic from the universe of "telecommunications" referred to in section 251(b)(5).
We explain our rationale and the interrelationship between these two statutory provisions in more
detail below. We further conclude that section 25 l(i) affirms the Commission's role in continuing
to develop appropriate pricing and compensation mechanisms for traffic — such as Internet-bound
traffic — that travels over convergent, mixed, and new types of network architectures.
1,

Introduction

24.
In the Local Competition Order, the Commission determined that the reciprocal
compensation provisions of section 251(b)(5) applied only to what it termed "local" traffic rather
than to the transport and termination of interexchange traffic. In the subsequent Declaratory
Ruling, the Commission focused its discussion on whether ISP-bound traffic terminated within a
local calling area such as to be properly considered "local" traffic. To resolve that issue, the
Commission focused predominantly on an end-to-end jurisdictional analysis.
25.
On review, the court accepted (without necessarily endorsing) the Commission's
view that traffic was either "local" or "long distance" but faulted the Commission for failing to
explain adequately why ISP-bound traffic was more properly categorized as long distance, rather
.than local. The Commission had attempted to do so by employing an end-to-end jurisdictional
analysis of ISP traffic, rather than by evaluating the traffic under the statutory definitions of
telephone exchange service" and "exchange access." After acknowledging that the Commission
"has historically been justified in relying on" end-to-end analysis for determining: whether a
communication is jurisdictional^ interstate, the court stated: "But [the Commission] has yet to
provide an explanation of why this inquiry is relevant to discerning whether a call to an ISP
should fit within the local call model of two collaborating LECs or the long-distance model of a
long-distance carrier collaborating with two LECs."48 After reviewing the manner in which the
Commission analyzed the parameters of section 251(b)(5) traffic in the Declaratory Ruling, the

47

Local Competition Order, 11 FCC Red at 16012.

48

Bell Atlantic, 206 F.3d at 5.

t3

Federal Communications Commission

F C C 01-131

court found that the central issue was "whether a call to an ISP is local or long distance.'5
court noted further that "[n]either category fits clearly."50

The

26.
Upon further review, we find that the Commission erred in focusing on the nature
of the service (i.e., local or long distance) and in stating that there were only two forms of
telecommunications services — telephone exchange service and exchange access — for purposes of
interpreting the relevant scope of section 251(b)(5). Those services are the only two expressly
defined by the statute. The court found fault in the Commission's failure to analyze
communications delivered by a LEC to an ISP in terms of these definitions.52 Moreover, it cited
the Commission's own confusing treatment of ISP-bound traffic as local under the ESP
exemption and interstate for jurisdictional purposes.53
27.
Part of the ambiguity identified by the court appears to arise from the ESP
exemption, a long-standing Commission policy that affords one class of entities using interstate
access — information service providers — the option of purchasing interstate access services on a
flat-rated basis from intrastate local business tariffs, rather than from interstate access tariffs used
by IXCs. Typically, information service providers have used this exemption to their advantage by
choosing to pay local business rates, rather than the tariffed interstate access charges that other
users of interstate access are required to pay. In fending off challenges from those who argued
that information service providers must be subject to access charges because they provide
interexchange service, the Commission has often tried to walk the subtle line of arguing that the
service provided by the LEC to the information service provider is an access service, but can
justifiably be treated as akin to local telephone exchange service for purposes of the rates Jthe LEC
may charge. This balancing act reflected the historical view that there were only two kinds of
intercarrier compensation: one for local telephone exchange service, and a second (access
charges) for long distance services. Attempting to describe a hybrid service (the nature being an
access service, but subject to a compensation mechanism historically limited to local service) was
always a bit of mental gymnastics.
28.
The court opinion underscores a tension between the jurisdictional nature of ISPbound traffic, which the Commission has long held to be interstate, and the alternative
compensation mechanism that the ESP exemption has permitted for this traffic. The court seems
to recognize that, if an end-to-end analysis were properly applied to this traffic, this traffic^ would
be predominantly interstate, and consequently "long distance." Yet it also questions whether this
49

Id

50

Id

51

Id at 8.

52

M a t 8-9.

*/<£
54

Significantly, however, the compensation mechanism effected for this predominantly interstate access traffic is
the result of a federal mandate, which requires states to treat ISP-bound traffic for compensation purposeszin a
manner similar to local traffic if ISPs so request- See infra note 105.
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traffic should be considered "local" for purposes of section 251(b)(5) in light of the ESP
exemption, by which the Commission has allowed information service providers at their option to
be treated for compensation purposes (but not for jurisdictional purposes) as end-users.
29.
The court also expresses consternation over what it perceives as an inconsistency
in the Commission's reasoning. On the one hand, the court observes, the Commission has argued
that calls to ISPs are predominantly interstate for jurisdictional purposes because they terminate at
the ultimate destination of the traffic in a distant website or e-mail server {i.e., the "one call
theory"). On the other hand, the court notes, the Commission has defended the ESP exemption
by analogizing an ISP to a high-volume business user, such as a pizza parlor or travel agent, that
has different usage patterns and longer call holding times than the average customer. The court
questioned whether any such differences should not, as some commenters argued, lend support to
treating this traffic as "local" for purposes of section 251(b)(5). As discussed in further detail
below, while we continue to believe that retaining the ESP exemption is important in order to
facilitate growth of Internet services, we conclude in section IV.C.l, infra, that reciprocal
compensation for ISP-bound traffic distorts the development of competitive markets.
30.
We respond to the court's concerns, and seek to resolve these tensions, by
reexamining the grounds for our conclusion that ISP-bound traffic falls outside the scope of
section 251(b)(5). A more comprehensive review of the statute reveals that Congress intended to
exempt certain enumerated categories of service from section 251(b)(5) when the service was
provided to interexchange carriers or information service providers. The exemption focuses not
only on the nature of the service, but on to whom the service is provided. For services that
qualify, compensation is based on rules, regulations, and policies that preceded the 1996 Act and
nof on section 251(b)(5), which was minted by the Act. As we explain more fully below, the
service provided by LECs to deliver traffic to an ISP constitutes, at a minimum, "information
access" under section 251(g) and, thus, compensation for this service is not governed by section
251(b)(5), but instead by the Commission's policies for this traffic and the rules adopted under its
section 201 authority/6

Access Charge Reform Order, 12 FCC Red at 16134 ("Internet^ccess does generate different usage patterns and
longer call holding times than average voice usage.").
Some critics of the Commission's order may contend thatrwe rely here on the same reasoning that the court
rejected in Bell Atlantic. We acknowledge that there is a superficial resemblance between the Commission's
previous order and this one: Here, as before, the Commission finds that ISP-bound traffic falls outside the scope of
section 251(b)(5)'s reciprocal compensation requirement and within the Commission's access charge jurisdiction
under section 201(b). The rationale underlying the two orders, however, differs substantially. Here the
Commission bases its^onclusion that ISP-bound traffic falls outside section 251(bX5) on its construction of ~"
sections 251(g) and (i) - not, as in the previous order, on the theory that section 251(b)(5) applies only to "local"
telecommunications traffic and that ISP-bound traffic is interstate: Furthermore, to the extent the Commission
contmues to characterize ISP-bound traffic as interstate for purposes of its section 201 authority, it has sought in
this Order to address in detail the Bell Atlantic court's concerns.
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Section 251(g) Excludes Certain Categories of Traffic from the Scope
of "Telecommunications" Subject to Section 251(b)(5)
a.

Background

31 •
Section 251(b)(5) imposes a duty on all local exchange carriers to "establish
reciprocal compensation arrangements for the transport and termination of
telecommunications.'
On its face, local exchange carriers are required to establish reciprocal
compensation arrangements for the transport and termination of all "telecommunications" they
exchange with another telecommunications carrier, without exception. The Act separately defines
"telecommunications" as the "transmission, between or among points specified by the user, of
information of the user's choosing, without change in the form or content of the information as
sent and received."5
32.
Unless subject to further limitation, section 251(b)(5) would require reciprocal
compensation for transport and termination of all telecommunications traffic, — />., whenever a
local exchange carrier exchanges telecommunications traffic with another carrier. Farther down in
section 251, however, Congress explicitly exempts certain telecommunications services from the
reciprocal compensation obligations. Section 251(g) provides:
On or after the date of enactment of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, each
local exchange carrier... shall provide exchange access, information access, and
exchange services for such access to interexchange carriers and information service
providers in accordance with the same equal access and nondiscriminatory
interconnection restrictions and obligations (including receipt of compensation)
that apply to such carrier on the date immediately preceding the date of enactment
of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 under any court order, consent decree, or
regulation, order, or policy of the [Federal Communications] Commission, until
such restrictions and obligations are explicitly superseded by regulations prescribed
by the Commission after such date of enactment.
33.
The meaning of section 251(g) is admittedly not transparent. Indeed, section
251(g) clouds any plain reading of section 251(b)(5). Nevertheless, the Commission believes the
two provisions can be read together consistently and in a manner faithful to Congress's intent.60

57

47 U.S.C.§ 251(b)(5).

58

47 U.S.C. § 153(43).

59

47 U.S.C. § 251(g) (emphasis added).

60

See AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Wis. Bd, 525 U.S. 366, 397 (1999)("lt would be a gross understatement to say that the
Telecommunications Act of 1996 is not a model of clarity. It is in many important respects a model of ambiguity
or indeed evea self-contradiction
But Congress is well aware that the ambiguities it choosesito produce in a
statute will be resolved by the implementing agency.... We can only enforce the clear limits that the 1996 Act
contains.").
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Discussion

34.
We conclude that a reasonable reading of the statute is that Congress intended to
exclude the traffic listed in subsection (g) from the reciprocal compensation requirements of
subsection (b)(5). Thus, the statute does not mandate reciprocal compensation for "exchange
access, information access, and exchange services for such access" provided to IXCs and
information service providers. Because we interpret subsection (g) as a carve-out provision, the
focus of our inquiry is on the universe of traffic that falls within subsection (g) and not the
universe of traffic that falls within subsection (b)(5). This analysis differs from our analysis in the
Local Competition Order\ in which we attempted to describe the universe of traffic that falls
within subsection (b)(5) as all "local" traffic. We also refrain from generically describing traffic as
"local" traffic because the term "local," not being a statutorily defined category, is particularly
susceptible to varying meanings and, significantly, is not a term used in section 251(b)(5) or
section 251(g).
35.
We agree with the court that the issue before us requires more than just a
jurisdictional analysis. Indeed, as the court recognized, the 1996 Act changed the historic
relationship between the states and the federal government with respect to pricing matters."
Instead, we focus upon the statutory language of section 251(b) as limited by 251(g). We believe
this approach is not only consistent with the statute, but that it resolves the concerns expressed by
the court in reviewing our previous analysis. Central to our modified analysis is the recognition
that 251(g) is properly viewed as a limitation on the scope of section 251(b)(5) and that ISPbound traffic falls under one or more of the categories set forth in section 251(g). For that
reason, we conclude that ISP-bound traffic is not subject to the reciprocal compensation
provisions of section 251(b)(5). We reach that conclusion regardless of the compensation
mechanism that may be in place for such traffic under the ESP exemption.
36.
We believe that the specific provisions of section 251(g) demonstrate that
Congress did not intend to interfere with the Commission's pre-Act authority over
"nondiscriminatory interconnection... obligations (including receipt of compensation)"63 with
respect to "exchange access, information access, and exchange services for such access" provided
to IXCs or information service providers. We conclude that Congress specifically exempted the
In the Declaratory Ruling, the Commission did not explain the relevance of section 251(g) nor discuss the
categories of traffic exempted from reciprocal compensation by that provisfon, at least until the Commission should
act otherwise. Reflecting this omission in the underlying order, the Bell Atlantic court does not mention the
relationship of sections 251(g) and 251(b)(5), nor-the enumerated categories of services referenced by subsection
(g). Rather, the court focuses its review on the possible categorization of ISP-bound traffic as "local," terminology
we now find inappropriate^ in light of the more express statutoryianguage set forth in section 251(g).
62

Bell Atlantic, 206 F.3d at 6; see also AT&T Corp v Iowa Utils Bd, 525 U.S. at 377-87.

Authority over rates (or "receipt of compensation") is a core feature of "equal access and nondiscriminatoiy
interconnection" obligations. Indeed, one of the Commission's primary goals when_designing an access charge
regime was to ensure that access users were treated in a nondiscriminatory manner when interconnecting with
LEC networks in order to transport interstate communications. See National Ass 7i of Regulatory XJtil Comm 'nrs
v FCC, 737F.2d 1095,1101-1108,1130-3^f(D.C Cir. (984), cert denied, 469 U.S. 1227(l985XiV,4/tf/Cv.
FCC).
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services enumerated under section 251(g) from the newly imposed reciprocal compensation
requirement in order to ensure that section 251(b)(5) is not interpreted to override either existing
or future regulations prescribed by the Commission.64 We also find that ISP-bound traffic falls
within at least one of the three enumerated categories in subsection (g).
37.
This limitation in section 251(g) makes sense when viewed in the overall context
of the statute. All of the services specified in section 251(g) have one thing in common: they are
all access services or services associated with access.65 Before Congress enacted the 1996 Act,
LECs provided access services to IXCs and to information service providers in order to connect
calls that travel to points - both interstate and intrastate - beyond the local exchange. In turn,
both the Commission and the states had in place access regimes applicable to this traffic, which
they have continued to modify over time. It makes sense that Congress did not inlend to disrupt
these pre-existing relationships.66 Accordingly, Congress excluded all such access traffic from the
purview of section 251(b)(5).

This view is consistent with previous Commission orders construing section 251(g). The Commission
recognized in the Advanced Services Remand Order, for example, that section 251(g) preserves the requirements
of the AT&T Consent Decree (see United States v AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982)(hereinafter AT&T
Consent Decree or Modification of Final Judgment ("MFJ"), but that order does not conclude that section 251(g)
preserves only MFJ requirements Deployment of Wireline Services Offering Advanced Telecommunications
Capability, CC Docket No. 98-147 et al, Order on Remand, 15 FCC Red 385,407 (\999)(Advanced Services
Remand Order). Indeed, the ultimate issue addressed in that part of the order was not the status or scope of section
251(g) as a carve-out provision at all, but rather the question — irrelevant for our purposes here -- whether
"information access" is a category of service that is mutually exclusive of "exchange access," as the latter term is
defined in section 3(16) of the Act. See id. at 407-08; see also infra para. 42 & note 76. By contrast, when the
Commission first addressed the scope of the reciprocal compensation obligations of section 251(bX5) in the Local
Competition Order, it expressly cited section 251(g) in support of the decision to exempt from those obligations the
tariffed interstate access services provided by all LECs (not just Bell companies subject to the MFJ) to
interexchange carriers. 11 FCC Red at 16013. The Bell Atlantic court did not take issue with the Commission's
earlier conclusion that section 251(b)(5) is so limited 206 F.3d at 4. The interpretation we adopt here -- that
section 251(g) exempts from section 251(b)(5) information access services provided to information service
providers, as well as access provided to IXCs -thus is fully consistent with the Commission's initial construction
of section 251(g), in: the Local Competition Order, as extending beyond the MFJ to our own access rules and
policies.
65

The term "exchange service" as used in section 251(g) is not defined in the Act or in the MFJ. Rather, the term
"exchange service" is used in the MFJ as part of the definition of the term "exchange access," which the MFJ
defines^ "the provision of exchange services for the purpose of originating or terminating interexchange
telecommunications." United States v AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 228. Thus, the term "exchange service" appears to
mean, m context, the provision of services in connection with wterexchange communications. Consistent with
that, in-5ection-25I(g), the term is used as part of the longer phrase "exchange services for ^ucfr [exchange] access
to interexchange carriers and information service providers." The phrasing fn section 251(g) thus parallels the
MFJ. All of this indicates that the term "exchange service" is closely related to the provision of exchange access
and information access.
66

Although section 251(g) does not itself compel this outcome with respect to intrastate access regimes (because it
expressly preserves only the Commission *s traditional policies and authority over interstate access services)r it
nevertheless highlights an ambiguity in the scope of "telecommunications" subject to section 251(bX5) —
demonstrating that the term must be construed in light of other provisions irt the statute. In this regard, we again
conclude that it is reasonable to interpret section 251(b)(5) to exclude traffic subject to parallel intrastate access
(continued....)
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38.
At least one court has already affirmed the principle that the standards and
obligations set forth in section 251 are not intended automatically to supersede the Commission's
authority over the services enumerated under section 251(g). This question arose in the Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals with respect to the access that LECs provide to IXCs to originate and
terminate interstate long-distance calls. Citing section 251(g), the court concluded that the Act
contemplates that "LECs will continue to provide exchange access to IXCs for long-distance
service, and continue to receive payment, under the pre-Act regulations and rates." In CompTel,
the IXCs had argued that the interstate access services that LECs provide properly fell within the
scope of "interconnection" under section 251(c)(2), and that, notwithstanding the carve-out of
section 251(g), access charges therefore should be governed by the cost-based standard of section
252(d)(1), rather than determined under the Commission's section 201 authority. The Eighth
Circuit rejected that argument, holding that access service does not fall within the scope of section
251(c)(2), and observing that "it is clear from the Act that Congress did not intend all access
charges to move to cost-based pricing, at least not immediately."68 Neither the court nor the
parties in CompTel distinguished between the situation in which one LEC provides access service
(directly linking the end-user to the IXC) and the situation here in which two LECs collaborate to
provide access to either an information service provider or IXC. In both circumstances, by its
underlying rationale, CompTel serves as precedent for establishing that pre-existing regulatory
treatment of the services enumerated under section 251(g) are carved out from the purview of
section 251(b).
39.
Accordingly, unless and until the Commission by regulation should determine
otherwise, Congress preserved the pre-Act regulatory treatment of all the access services
enumerated under section 251(g). These services thus remain subject to Commission jurisdiction
under section 201 (or, to the extent they are intrastate services, they remain subject to the
jurisdiction of state commissions), whether those obligations implicate pricing policies as in
CompTel or reciprocal compensation. This analysis properly applies to the access services that
incumbent LECs provide (either individually or jointly with other local carriers) to connect
subscribers with ISPs for Internet-bound traffic. Section 251(g) expressly preserves the
Commission's rules and policies governing "access . . . to information service providers" in the
same manner as rules and policies governing access to IXCs.70 As we discuss in more detail
(Continued from previous page)
regulations, because "it would be incongruous to conclude that Congress was concerned about the effects of
potential-disruption to the interstate access charge system, but had no such concerns about the effects on analogous
intrastate mechanisms." Local Competition Order, 11 FCC Red at 15869.
CompTel, 117 F.3d at 1073 (emphasis added). The court continued that the Commission would be free under
sectionJZOl to alter its traditional regulatory treatment ofinterstate access service in the future, but that the
standards set out in sections 251 and 252 would not be controlling. Id
CompTel, 117 F.3d at 1072 (emphasis added).
For further discussion of the jurisdictional ly interstate nature of ISP-bound traffic, see infra paras. 55-64. See
also NARUC v. FCCy 737 F.2d at 1136 (determining that traffic to ESPs may properly constitute interstate access
traffic)rAccess Billing Requirements for Joint Service Provision, CC Docket 87-579, Memorandum Opinion and
Order, 4TCC Red 7183 (1989).
The Commission has historically dictated the pricing policies applicable ta services provided by LECs to
information service providers, although those policies differ from those applicable to LEC provision of access
(continued....)
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below, ISP-bound traffic falls under the rubric of "information access/5 a legacy term carried over
from the MFJ.7
40.
By its express terms, of course, section 251(g) permits the Commission to
supersede pre-Act requirements for interstate access services. Therefore the Commission may
make an affirmative determination to adopt rules that subject such traffic to obligations different
than those that existed pre-Act. For example, consistent with that authority, the Commission has
previously made the affirmative determination that certain categories of interstate access traffic
should be subject to section 251(c)(4).72 Similarly, in implementing section 251(c)(3), the
Commission has required incumbent LECs to unbundle certain network elements used in the
provision of xDSL-based services.73 In this instance, however, for the reasons set forth below,74
we decline to modify the restraints imposed by section 251(g) and instead continue to regulate
ISP-bound traffic under section 201.
41.
Some may argue that, although the Commission did not analyze subsection (g) in
the Declaratory Ruling, a passing reference to section 251(g) in one paragraph of the
Commission's brief filed with the court in that proceeding suggests that the argument we make
here has been specifically rejected by the court. We disagree. Because our analysis of subsection
(g) was not raised in the order, the court, under established precedent, probably did not consider
(Continued from previous page)
services to IXCs. Prior to the 1996 Act, it was the Commission that determined that ESPs either may purchase
their interstate access services from interstate tariffs or (at their discretion) pay a combination of local business line
rates, the federal subscriber line charges associated with those business lines, and, where appropriate, the federal
special access surcharge. See note 105, infra. We conclude that section 251(g) preserves our ability to continue to
dictate the pricing policies applicable to this category of traffic. We do not believe, moreover, that section 251(g)
extends only to those specific carriers providing service on February 7,1996. At the very least, subsection (g) is
ambiguous on this point On the one hand, the first sentence of this provision states that its terms apply to "each
local exchange carrier, to the extent that it provides wireline services," without regard to whether it may be a BOC
or a competitive LEC. 47 U.S-.C § 251(g). On the other hand, that same sentence refers to restrictions and
obligations applicable to "such carrier" prior to February 8, 1996. Id. We believe that the most reasonable
interpretation of that sentence, in this context, is that subsection (g) was intended to preserve pre-existing
regulatory treatment for the enumerated categories of carriers, rather than requiring disparate treatment depending
upon whether the LEC involved came into existence before or after February 1996.
71

See UnitedStates v AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 229; Advanced Services Remand Order, 15 FCC Red at 406-08.

72

See Deployment of Wireline Services Offering Advanced Telecommunications Capability, CC Docket No. 98147, Second-Report and Order, 14 FCC Red 19237 (1997), petition for review pending, Ass 'n of Communications
Enterprises v. TCC, D.C. Circuit No. 00-1144. In effect, we have provided for concurrent authority under that
provision andsection 201 by permitting a party to purchase the same service under filed tariffs or to proceed under
interconnection arrangements to secure resale services.

73

See Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in the Telecommunications Act of 1996, CC Docket
No. 96-98, Third Report and Order and Fourth Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 15 FCC Red 3696,3775
(1999). See also Advanced Services Remand Order, 15 FCC Red at 385,386, We emphasize that-these two
examples are illustrative and may not be the only instances^where the Commission chooses to supersede pre-Act
requirements for interstate access services.
74

See infra paras. 67-71.
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the argument when rendering its decision. 5 Indeed, subsection (g) is not mentioned in the court's
opinion.
3.

ISP-Bound Traffic Falls within the Categories Enumerated in Section
251(g)

42.
Having determined that section 251(g) serves as a limitation on the scope of
"telecommunications" embraced by section 251(b)(5), the next step in our inquiry is to determine
whether ISP-bound traffic falls within one or more of the categories specified in section 251(g):
exchange access, information access, and exchange services for such access provided to IXCs and
information service providers. Regardless of whether this traffic falls under the category of
"exchange access" — an issue pending before the D.C. Circuit in a separate proceeding - - we
conclude that this traffic, at a minimum, falls under the rubric of "information access," a legacy
term imported into the 1996 Actfromthe MFJ, but not expressly defined in the Communications
Act,
a.

Background

43.
Section 251(g) by its terms indicates that, in the provision of exchange access,
information access, and exchange services for such access to IXCs and information service
providers, various pre-existing requirements and obligations "including receipt of compensation"
are preserved, whether these obligations stem from "any court order, consent decree, or
regulation, order or policy of the Commission." (Emphasis added.) Similarly, in discussing this
provision, the Joint Explanatory Statement of the Committee of Conference explicitly refers to
preserving the obligations under the "AT&T Consent Decree."77
b.

Discussion

44.
We conclude that Congress's reference to "information access" in section 251(g)
was intended to incorporate the meaning of the phrase "information access" as used in the AT&T
Consent Decree.78 The ISP-bound traffic at issue here falls within that category because it is

See, e.g., SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 88 £1943).
76

See Worldcom, Inc. v. FCC, No. 00-1022 et ah (E£C. Cirr). In that proceeding, the Commission has argued that
the category previously labeled "information access'^underthe MFJ is a subset of those services now failing under
the category "exchange access" as set forth in sectiofr3(16)^>f the Act, 47 U.S.C. 153(16), while incumbent LECs
and others have argued thaHhe two categories are mutually-exclusive. We need not reargue here whether
"information access" is a subset of "exchange access" or whether instead they are mutually exclusive categories.
The only issue relevant to our section 251(g) inquiry^n this=case is whether ISP-bound traffic falls, at a minimum,
within the legacy category of "information access" Both the Commission and incumbent LECs have agreedthat
the access provided to ISPs satisfies the definition of information access.
17

Joint Explanatory Statement of the Committee of Conference, S, Conf. Rep. No. 230, 104th Cong., 2d Session at
123 (February 1, 1996).

78

United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 196, 229.
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traffic destined for an information service provider.7 Under the consent decree, "information
access" was purchased by "information service providers" and was defined as "the provision of
specialized exchange telecommunications services . . . in connection with the origination,
termination, transmission, switching, forwarding or routing of telecommunications traffic to or
from the facilities of a provider of information services."80 We conclude that this definition of
"information access" was meant to include all access traffic that was routed by a LEC "to or
from" providers of information services, of which ISPs are a subset81 The record in this
proceeding also supports our interpretation.82 When Congress passed the 1996 Act, it adopted
new terminology. The term "information access" is not, therefore, part of the new statutory
framework. Because the legacy term "information access" in section 251(g) encompasses ISPbound traffic, however, this traffic is excepted from the scope of the "telecommunications" subject
to reciprocal compensation under section 251(b)(5).
45.
We recognize, as noted earlier, that based on the rationale of the Declaratory
Ruling, the court indicated that the question whether this traffic was "local or interstate" was
critical to a determination of whether ISP-bound traffic should be subject to reciprocal
compensation. We believe that the court's assessment was a result of our statement in
79

See Letter from Gary L. Phillips, SBC, to Jon Nuechterlein, Deputy General Counsel, FCC, at 9 (Dec. 14,
2000)(stating that section 251(g) applies by its very terms to "information access").
80

United States v AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 196, 229.

81

This finding is consistent with our past statements on the issue. In the Non-Accounting Safeguards Order, we
found that the access that LECs provide to enhanced service providers, including ISPs, constitutes "information
access" as the MFJ defines that term. Implementation of the Non-Accounting Safeguards of Sections 271 and 272
of the Communications Act, CC Docket No. 96-149, First Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, 11 FCC Red 21905, 22024 & n.621 (1996). Although we subsequently overruled our statement in
that order that ISPs do not also purchase "exchange access" under section 3(16), we have not altered our finding
that the access provided to enhanced service providers (including ISPs) \s "information access." Advanced
Services Remand Order, 15 FCC Red at 404-05.
82

See, e.g., Letter from Gary L. Phillips, SBC, to Jon Nuechterlein, Deputy General Counsel, FCC, at 9 (Dec. 14,
2000). Some have argued that "information access" includes only certain specialized functions unique to the needs
of enhanced service providers and does not include basic telecommunications links used to provide enhanced
service providers with access to the LEC network. See, e.g, Brief of WorldCom, Inc., D.C. Circuit No. 00-1002,
etal, filed Oct. 3, 2000, at 16 n.lZ The MFJ definition of information-access, however, includes the
telecommunications links used for the "origination, termination, [and] femsmission" of information services, and
"where necessary, the provision of network signalling" and other functions. Unitea^States v AT&T, 552 F. Supp.
at 229 (emphasis added). Others have argued that the "information access" definition engrafts a geographic
limitation that renders this service category a subset of telephone exchange service. See Letter from Richard
Rindler, Swindler, Berlin, to Magaiie Roman Salas, Secretary, FCC, at3 (Apr. 12,3001). We reject^hat strained
interpretation. Although it is true that "information access" is necessarSy initiated *1n an exchange area," the MFJ
definition states that the service is provided "in connection with the origination, termination, transmission,
switching, forwarding or routing of telecommunications traffic to or from the facilities of a provider of information
services" United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 229 (emphasis added)^ Significantly, the definition does not
further require that the transmission, once handed over to the information service provider, terminate within the
same exchange area in which the information service provider first received the access traffic.
83

Bell Atlantic, 206 F.3d at 5.
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paragraph nine of the Declaratory Ruling that "when two carriers collaborate to complete a local
call, the originating carrier is compensated by its end user and the terminating carrier is entitled to
reciprocal compensation pursuant to section 251(b)(5) of the Act." We were mistaken to have
characterized the issue in that manner, rather than properly (and more naturally) interpreting the
scope of "telecommunications" within section 251(b)(5) as being limited by section 251(g). By
indicating that all "local calls/' however defined, would be subject to reciprocal compensation
obligations under the Act, we overlooked the interplay between these two inter-related provisions
of section 251 — subsections (b) and (g). Further, we created unnecessary ambiguity for
ourselves, and the court, because the statute does not define the term "local call," and thus that
term could be interpreted as meaning either traffic subject to local rates or traffic that is
jurisdictionally intrastate. In the context of ISP-bound traffic, as the court observed, our use of
the term "local" created a tension that undermined the prior order because the ESP exemption
permitted ISPs to purchase access through local business tariffs, yet the jurisdictional nature of
this traffic has long been recognized as interstate.
46.
For similar reasons, we modify our analysis and conclusion in the Local
Competition Order. There we held that "[tjransport and termination of local traffic for
purposes of reciprocal compensation are governed by sections 251(b)(5) and 251(d)(2)." We
now hold that the telecommunications subject to those provisions are all such telecommunications
not excluded by section 251(g). In the Local Competition Order, as in the subsequent
Declaratory Ruling, use of the phrase "local traffic" created unnecessary ambiguities, and we
correct that mistake here.
47.
We note that the exchange of traffic between LECs and commercial mobile radio
service (CMRS) providers is subject to a slightly different analysis. In the Local Competition
Order, the Commission noted its jurisdiction to regulate LEC-CMRS interconnection under
section 332 of the Act87 but decided, at its option, to apply sections 251 and 252 to LEC-CMRS
interconnection.88 At that time, the Commission declined to delineate the precise contours of or
the relationship between its jurisdiction over LEC-CMRS interconnection under sections 251 and
332,89 but it made clear that it was not rejecting section 332 as an independent basis for
jurisdiction.90 The Commission went on to conclude that section 251(b)(5) obligations extend to
traffic transmitted between LECs and CMRS providers, because the latter are telecommunications

Declaratory Ruling, 14 FCC Red at 3695 (emphasis added).
This is the compensation mechanism chosen by the ISPs. S^note 105, infra.
86

Local Competition Order, 11 FCC Red at 1033-34.

87

47 ULS.G § 332; Local Competition Order, 11 FCC Red at 16005-06.

*8 Local Competition Order, i 1 FCC Red at 16095-06; see also Iowa Utils Bd v. FCC, 120 FJd at 800 n. 21
(finding that the Commission had jurisdiction under section 332 to issue rules regarding LEC-CMRS
interconnection, including reciprocal compensation rules).
We seek comment on these issues in the NPRM.
90

Local Competition Order, 11 FCC Red at 16005.
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carriers.91 The Commission also held that reciprocal compensation, rather than interstate or
intrastate access charges, applies to LEC-CMRS traffic that originates and terminates within the
same Major Trading Area (MTA).92 In so holding, the Commission expressly relied on its
"authority under section 251(g) to preserve the current interstate access charge regime" to ensure
that interstate access charges would be assessed only for traffic "currently subject to interstate
access charges,"93 although the Commission's section 332 jurisdiction could serve as an
alternative basis to reach this result. Thus the analysis we adopt in this Order, that section 251(g)
limits the scope of section 251(b)(5), does not affect either the application of the latter section to
LEC-CMRS interconnection or our jurisdiction over LEC-CMRS interconnection under section
332.
4.

Section 251(i) Preserves the Commission's Authority to Regulate
Interstate Access Services

48.
Congress also included a "savings provision" - subpart (i) - in section 251, which
provides that "[njothing in this section shall be construed to limit or otherwise affect the
Commission's authority under section 201." Under section 201, the Commission has the
authority to regulate the interstate access services that LECs provide to connect end-users with
IXCs or information service providers to originate and terminate calls that travel across state
lines.
49.
We conclude that subpart (i) provides additional support for our finding that
Congress has granted us the authority on a going-forward basis to establish a compensation
regime for ISP-bound traffic. When read as a whole, the most natural reading of section 251 is
as follows: subsection (b) sets forth reciprocal compensation requirements for the transport and
termination of "telecommunications"; subsection (g) excludes certain access services (including
ISP-bound traffic) f om that requirement; and subsection (i) ensures that, on a gomg-forward
basis, the Commission has the authority to establish pricing for, and otherwise to regulate,
interstate access services
50.
When viewed in the overall context of section 251, subsections (g) and (i) serve
compatible, but different, purposes. Subsection (g) preserves rules and regulations that existed at
the time Congress passed the 1996 Act, and thus functions primarily as a "backward-looking"
provision (although it does grant the Commission the authority to supersede existing regulations).
In contrast, we interpret section 25 l(i) to be a "forward-looking" provision. Thus, subsection (i)
expressly affirms the Commission's role in an evolving telecommunications marketplace, in which
Congress anticipates that the Commission will continue to develop appropriate pricing and
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Id at 16016
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Id at 16016-17.
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M a t 16017.
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47U.SC§251(i).
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See also Letter from Gary L. Phillips, SBC, to Jon Nuechteriein, Deputy General Counsel, FCC, at 8 (Dec. 14,
2000)
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compensation mechanisms for traffic that falls within the purview of section 201. This reading of
section 251 is consistent with the notion that section 251 generally broadens the Commission's
96

duties, particularly in the pricing context.
51.
We expect that, as new network architectures emerge, the nature of
telecommunications traffic will continue to evolve. As we have already observed, since Congress
passed the 1996 Act, customer usage patterns have changed dramatically; carriers are sending
traffic over networks in new and different formats; and manufacturers are adding creative features
and developing innovative network architectures. Although we cannot anticipate the direction
that new technology will take us, we do expect the dramatic pace of change to continue.
Congress clearly did not expect the dynamic, digital broadband driven telecommunications
marketplace to be hindered by rules premised on legacy networks and technological assumptions
that are no longer valid. Section 25 l(i), together with section 201, equips the Commission with
the tools to ensure that the regulatory environment keeps pace with innovation.
5.

ISP-Bound Traffic Fails Within the Purview of the Commission's
Section 201 Authority

52.
Having found that ISP-bound traffic is excluded from section 251(b)(5) by section
251(g), we find that the Commission has the authority pursuant to section 201 to establish rules
governing intercarrier compensation for such traffic. Under section 201, the Commission has long
exercised its jurisdictional authority to regulate the interstate access services that LECs provide
to connect callers with IXCs or ISPs to originate or terminate calls that travel across state lines.
Access services to ISPs for Internet-bound traffic are no exception. The Commission has held,
and the Eighth Circuit has recently concurred, that traffic bound for information service providers
(including Internet access traffic) often has an interstate component Indeed, that court
observed that, although some traffic destined for information service providers (including ISPs)
may be intrastate, the interstate and intrastate components cannot be reliably separated. Thus,
ISP traffic is properly classified as interstate, and it falls under the Commission's section 201
jurisdiction.100
53.
In its opinion remanding this proceeding, the court appeared to acknowledge that
the end-to-end analysis was appropriate for determining the scope of the Commission's
jurisdiction under section 20 L, stating that "[tjhere is no dispute that the Commission has
For example, section 251 has expanded upon our historic functions by providing us with the authority to set the
framework for pricing xules applicable to unbundled network elements, purchased under interconnection
agreements.
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Southwestern Bell Tel Co v FCC, 153 F3d 523, 543 (8* Cir. 1998) (affirming the jurisdictionaliy mixed
nature of ISP-bound traffic).

" See, e.g., Louisiana PSC v FCQ, 416 U.S. 355,375 n.4
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See Letter from John W. Kure, Qwest, to Magalie Roman Salas, Secretary, FCC (Dec. 8, 20Q0)(attaching A
Legal Roadmapfor Implementing a Bill and Keep Rule for All Wireline Traffic? at 10-11 )(Qwes( Roadmap).
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historically been justified in relying on this method when determining whether a particular
communication is jurisdictional^ interstate." The court nevertheless found that we had not
supplied a logical nexus between the jurisdictional end-to-end analysis (which delineates the
contours of our section 201 authority) and our interpretation of the scope of section 251(b)(5).
In that regard, the court appeared not to question the Commission's longstanding assertion of
jurisdiction over ESP traffic, of which Internet-bound traffic is a subset. It did, however,
unambiguously question whether, for purposes of interpreting section 251(b)(5), the jurisdictional
end-to-end analysis was dispositive. Accordingly, the court explained its basis for remand as
follows: "Because the Commission has not supplied a real explanation for its decision to treat
end-to-end analysis as controlling [in interpreting the scope of section 251(b)(5)]... we must
vacate the ruling and remand the case."
54.
As explained above, we no longer construe section 251(b)(5) using the dichotomy
set forth in the Declaratory Ruling between "local" traffic and interstate traffic. Rather, we have
clarified that the proper analysis hinges on section 251(g), which limits the reach of the reciprocal
compensation regime mandated in section 251(b). Thus our discussion no longer centers on the
jurisdictional inquiry set forth in the underlying order. Nonetheless, we take this opportunity to
respond to questions raised by the court regarding the differences between ISP-bound traffic
(which we have always held to be predominantly interstate for jurisdictional purposes) and
intrastate calls to "communications-intensive business end userfs],"104 such as travel agencies and
pizza parlors.
55.
Contrary to the arguments made by some IXCs, the Commission has been
consistent in its jurisdictional treatment of ISP-bound traffic. For compensation purposes, in
order to create a regulatory environment that will allow new and innovative services to flourish,
the Commission has exempted enhanced service providers (including ISPs) from paying for
interstate access service at the usage-based rates charged to IXCs. The ESP exemption was
and remains an affirmative exercise of federal regulatory authority over interstate access service
under section 201, and, in affirming pricing under that exemption, the D.C.J^ircuit expressly

Bell Atlantic, 206 F3d at 5; see Qwest Roadmap at 4.
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The D.C. Circuit itself has long recognized that ESPs use interstate access See, e g, NARUC v FCC, 731 F.2d
at 1136.
103

Bell Atlantic, 206 F.3d. at 8.

104

Bell Atlantic, 206 F.3d at J.

,os

As xvotedr the Commission has permitted ESPs to pay local business line rates from intrastate tariffs for ILECprovided access service, In lieu of interstate carrier access charges. See, e.g., MTS/WATS Market Structure Order,
97 FCC 2d at 715; ESP Exemption Order, 3 FCC Red at 2635 n.8, 2637 n.53. ESPs also pay the federal subscriber
lines charges associated with those business lines and, where appropriate, the federal special access surcharge.
The subscriber line charge (SLC) recovers a portion of the cost of a subscriber's line that is allocated, pursuant to
jurisdictional separations, to the interstate jurisdiction. See 47 C.F.R. § 69.152 (defining SLC); 47 CF.R. Part 36
(jurisdictional separations). The special access surcharge recovers for use of the local exchange when private
line/PBX owners "circumvent the conventional long-distance network and yet achieve interstate connections
beyond those envisioned1>y the private line service." NARUC v. FCC, 737 F.2d at 1138. See 47 CF.R, § 69.U5.
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recognized that ESPs use interstate access service. Moreover, notwithstanding the ESP
exemption, the Commission has always permitted enhanced service providers, including ISPs, to
purchase their interstate access out of interstate tariffs — thus underscoring the Commission's
consistent view that the link LECs provide to connect subscribers with ESPs is an interstate
107

access service.
56.
We do not believe that the court's decision to remand the Declaratory Ruling
reflects a finding that such traffic constitutes two calls, rather than a single end-to-end call, for
jurisdictional purposes. The court expressly acknowledged that "the end-to-end analysis applied
by the Commission here is one that it has traditionally used to determine whether a call is within
its interstate jurisdiction." The court also said that M[t]here is no dispute that the Commission
has historically been justified in relying on this method when determining whether a particular
communication is jurisdictional^ interstate/1 And the court appeared to suggest, at least for
the sake of argument, that the Commission had not misapplied that analysis as a jurisdictional
matter in finding that ISP-bound traffic was interstate. We do recognize, however, that the
court was concerned by how one would categorize this traffic under our prior interpretation of
section 251(b)(5), which focused on whether or not ISP-bound calls were "local." That inquiry
arguably implicated the compensation mechanism for the traffic (which included a local
component), as well as the meaning of the term "termination" in the specific context of section
251(b); but neither of these issues is germane to our assertion ofjurisdiction here under our
section 201 authority,
57.
For jurisdictional purposes, the Commission views LEC-provided access to
enhanced services providers, including ISPs, on the basis of the end points of the communication,
rather than intermediate points of switching or exchanges between carriers (or other providers).

With judicial approval, the Commission initially adopted this access service pricing policy in order to avoid rate
shock to afledglingenhanced services industry. NARUC v FCC, 737 F 2d at 1136-37. In the decision affirming
this pricing policy, the court expressly recognized that ESPs use interstate access service. Id at 1136 (enhanced
service providers "may, at times, heavily use exchange access"). The Commission recently decided to retain this
policy, largely because it found that it made little sense to mandate, for the first time, the application of existing
non-cost-based interstate access rates to enhanced services just as the Commission was reforming the access charge
regime to eliminate implicit subsidies and to move such charges toward competitive levels. Access Charge Reform
Order, 12 FCC Red at 16133, affd, Southwestern Bell Telephone Co , 153 F3d at 541-42.
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See, eg, MIS/WATS Market Structure Order, 97 FCC 2d at711-12, 722; Filing and Review of Open Network
Architecture Plans, CC Docket No. 88-2, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 4 FCC Rd 1, 141 (1988), aff'd,
California v FCC, 4 F.3d 1505 (9th Cie 1993) (ONA Plans Order); GTE Telephone Operating Cos , CC Docket
No. 98-79, Memorandum Opinion and^rder, 13 FCC Red 22466 (1998).
m

Bell Atlantic, 206 F.3d at 3.
Id at 5.

See, eg, id at 6,7 (accepting, arguendo, that ISP-bound traffic is like IXC-bound trafficTorjurisdictional
purposes)
See, eg, BellSouth MemoryCall, 7 FCC Red at 1620 (voicemail is interstate because "there is a continuous
path of communications across state line between the caller and the voice mail service"); ONA Plans Order, 4 FCC
(continued....)
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Thus, in the ONA Plans Order, the Commission emphasized that "when an enhanced service is
interstate (that is, when it involves communications or transmissions between points in different
states on an end-to-end basis), the underlying basic services are subject to [our jurisdiction]."
Consistent with that view, when end-to-end communications involving enhanced service providers
cross state lines, the Commission has categorized the link that the LEC provides to connect the
end-user with an enhanced service provider as interstate access service.
Internet service
providers are a class of ESPs. Accordingly, the LEC-provided link between an end-user and an
ISP is properly characterized as interstate access.
58.
Most Internet-bound traffic traveling between a LEC's subscriber and an ISP is
indisputably interstate in nature when viewed on an end-to-end basis. Users on the Internet are
interacting with a global network of connected computers. The consumer contracts with an ISP
to provide access to the Internet. Typically, when the customer wishes to interact with a person,
content, or computer, the customer's computer calls a number provided by the ISP that is
assigned to an ISP modem bank. The ISP modem answers the call (the familiar squelch of
computers handshaking). The user initiates a communication over the Internet by transmitting a
command. In the case of the web, the user requests a webpage. This request may be sent to the
computer that hosts the webpage. In real time, the web host may request that different pieces of
that webpage, which can be stored on different servers across the Internet, be sent, also in real
time, to the user. For example, on a sports page, only the format of the webpage may be stored at
the host computer in Chicago. The advertisement may come from a computer in California (and it
may be a different advertisement each time the page is requested), the sports scores may come
from a computer in New York City, and a part of the webpage that measures Internet traffic and
records the user's visit may involve a computer in Virginia. If the user decides to buy something
from this webpage, say a sports jersey, the user clicks on the purchase page and may be
transferred to a secure web server in Maryland for the transaction. A single web address
frequently results in the return of information from multiple computers in various locations

(Continued from previous page)
Red at 141 (an enhanced service is subject to FCC authority if it is interstate, 'that Is, when it involves
communications or transmissions between points in different states on an end-to-end basis")
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ONA Plans Order, 4 FCC Red at 141; see also id, Memorandum Opinion and Order on Reconsideration, 5
FCC Red 3084,3088-89 (1990), affd, California v FCC, 4 F.3d 1505 (9th Cir. 1993)(rejecting claim that basic
service elements, consisting of features and functions provided by telephone company's local switch for benefit of
enhanced service providers and others, are separate intrastate offerings^ven when used in connection with end-toend transmissions).
u

* See, eg, MTS/WA TS Market Structure Order, 97 FCC 2d at 7 IT ("fa]mong the variety of users of access
service are ... enhanced service providers"); Amendment of Part 69 oMie Commission's Rules Relating to
Enhanced Service Providers, CC Docket No. 87-215, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 2 FCC Red 4305, 4305,
4306 (1987) (noting that enhanced service providers use "exchange access service"); ESP Exemption Order, 3 FCC,
Red at 2631 (referring to "certain classes of exchange access users, including enhanced service providers")1 {4

See, e g, Access Charge Reform Order, 12 FCC Red at 16131-32; GTE Telephone OperatingCos, 13 FCC Red
at 22478. Cf Bell Atlantic, 206 F.3d at 4,6-7.
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globally. These different pieces of the webpage will be sent to the user over different network
paths and assembled on the user's display
59.
The "communication" taking place is between the dial-up customer and the global
computer network of web content, e-mail authors, game room participants, databases, or bulletin
board contributors. Consumers would be perplexed to learn regulators believe they are
communicating with ISP modems, rather than the buddies on their e-mail lists. The proper focus
for identifying a communication needs to be the user interacting with a desired webpage, friend,
game, or chat room, not on the increasingly mystifying technical and mechanical activity in the
middle that makes the communication possible.116 ISPs, in most cases, provide services that
permit the dial-up Internet user to communicate directly with some distant site or party (other
than the ISP) that the caller has specified.
60.
ISP service is analogous, though not identical, to long distance calling service. An
AT&T long distance customer contracts with AT&T to facilitate communications to out-of-state
locations. The customer uses the local network to reach AT&T's facilities (its point of presence).
By dialing "I" and an area code, the customer is in essence addressing his call to an out of state
party and is instructing his LEC to deliver the call to his long distance carrier, and instructing the
long distance carrier to pick up and carry that call to his intended destination. The caller on the
other end will pick up the phone and respond to the caller. The communication will be between
these two end-users. This analogy is not meant to prove that ISP service is identical to long
distance service, but is used merely to bolster, by analogy, the reasonableness of not
characterizing an ISP as the destination of a call, but as a facilitator of communication.
61.
Moreover, as the local exchange carriers have correctly observed, the technical
configurations for establishing dial-up Internet connections are quite similar to certain network
configurations employed to initiate more traditional long-distance calls. In most cases, an ISPs
customer first dials a seven-digit number to connect to the ISP server before connecting to a
website. Long-distance service irr some network configurations is initiated in a substantially
similar manner. In particular, under "Feature Group A" access, the caller first dials a seven-digit
number to reach the IXC, and then dials a password and the called party's area code and number
to complete the call. Notwithstanding this dialing sequence, the service the LEC provides is
considered interstate access service, not a separate local call. Internet calls operate in a similar
manner: after reaching the ISPs server by dialing a seven-dfgit number, the caller selects a
website (which is identified by a 12-digit Internet address, but which often is, in effect, "speed
dialed" by clickingm, icon) and the ISP connects the caller to the selected website. Such calling
Of course, the Internet provides applications other than the World Wide Web, such as e-maii, games, chat sites,
or streaming media, which have different technical characteristics but all of which involve computers m multiple
locations, often across state and national boundaries.
See Qwest Roadmap at 4-5, 9-Id
117

See, eg, Verizon Remand Reply at 9 (Internet traffic is indistinguishable from Feature Group A access
service)
See Local Competition Order, 11 FCC Red at 15935 n. 2091 (describing "Feature Group A" access service); see
also MClTelecomm Corp v FCC, 566 F.2d 365, 367 n.3 (D.C. Ch\ f977), cert denied, 434 U.S. 1040 (1978).
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should yield the same jurisdictional result as the analogous calls to IXCs using "Feature Group A"
access.
62.
Commission precedent also rejects the two-call theory in the context of calls
involving enhanced services. In BellSouth MemoryCall, the Commission preempted a state
commission order that had prohibited BellSouth from expanding its voice mail service - an
enhanced service — beyond its existing customers.119 In doing so, it rejected claims by the state
that the Commission lacked jurisdiction to preempt because, allegedly, out-of-state calls to the
voice mail service really constituted two calls: an interstate call from the out-of-state caller to the
telephone company switch that routes the call to the intended recipient's location, and a separate
intrastate call that forwards the communication from the switch to the voice mail apparatus in the
event that the called party did not answer.120 The Commission explained that, whether a basic
telecommunications service is at issue, or whether an enhanced service rides on the telephone
company's telecommunications service, the Commission's jurisdiction does not end at the local
switchboard, but continues to the ultimate destination of the call.121
63.
The Internet communication is not analogous to traditional telephone exchange
services. Local calls set up communication between two parties that reside in the same local
calling area. Prior to the introduction of local competition, that call would never leave the
network of the incumbent LEC As other carriers were permitted to enter the local market, a call
might cross two or more carriers' networks simply because the two parties to the communication
subscribed to two different local carriers. The two parties intending to communicate, however,
remained squarely in the same local calling area. An Internet communication is not simply a local
call from a consumer to a machine that is lopsided, that is, a local call where one party does most
of the calling, or most of the talking. ISPs are service providers that technically modify and
translate communication, so that their customers will be able to interact with computers across the
122
global Internet
64.
The court in Bell Atlantic noted that FCC litigation counsel had differentiated ISPbound traffic from ordinary long-distance calls by stating that the former "is really like a call to a
local business" — such as a pizza^ielivery firm, a travel reservation agency, a credit card
verification firm, or a taxicab company — "that then uses the telephone to order wares to meet the
need."123 We find, however, thatthis citation to a former litigation position does not require us to
alter our analysis. First, the Commission itself has never analogized ISP-bound traffic in the
manner cited in the agency's briefin Southwestern Bell. Indeed, in the particular order that the
1,9

BellSouth MemoryCalh 7 FCC Rcdat 1619.

120

Id at 1620.

m

Id at 1621.
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It is important to note that a dial-upxall to an ISP will not even be required when broadband services arrive.
Those connections will be always on and there will be no phone call in any traditional sense. Indeed, the only
initiating event will be the end-user interacting with other Internet content or usersr Thus, increasingly, notions of
two calls become meaningless.
m

Bell Atlantic, 206 F.3d at 8 (citing K C Brief at 76, Southwestern BelTv. FCC, 153 P.3d 523).
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Commission was defending in Southwestern Bell, the Commission distinguished ISP-bound traffic
from other access traffic on other grounds — e.g., call direction and call holding times — which
have no arguable bearing on whether the traffic is one interstate call (as the Commission has
always held) or two separate calls (one of which allegedly is intrastate) as some parties have
contended. Second, the cited portion of the Commission's brief was not addressing jurisdiction at
all. Rather, the brief was responding to a claim that the ESP exemption discriminated against
IXCs and in favor of ISPs. Finally, in the very case in which litigation counsel made the cited
analogy, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the Commission's consistent view that ISP-bound traffic is, as
a jurisdictional matter, predominantly interstate. In any event, to the extent that our prior
briefs could be read to conceptualize the nature of ISP service as local, akin to intense users of
local service, we now embrace a different conceptualization that we believe more accurately
reflects the nature of ISP service.
65.
For the foregoing reasons, consistent with our longstanding precedent, we find
that we continue to have jurisdiction under section 201, as preserved by section 251(i), to provide
a compensation mechanism for ISP-bound traffic.
C.

Efficient Intercarrier Compensation Rates and Rate Structures

66.
Carriers currently recover the costs of call transport and termination through some
combination of carrier access charges, reciprocal compensation, and end-user charges, depending
upon the applicable regulatory regime. Having concluded that ISP-bound traffic is not subject to
the reciprocal compensation obligations of section 251(b)(5), we must now determine, pursuant
to our section 201 authority, what compensation mechanism is appropriate when carriers
collaborate to deliver calls to ISPs. In the companion NPRM, we consider the desirability of
adopting a uniform intercarrier compensation mechanism, applicable to all traffic exchanged
among telecommunications carriers, and, in that context, we intend to examine the merits of a bill
and keep regime for all types of traffic, including ISP-bound traffic. In the meantime, however,
we must adopt an interim intercarrier compensation rule to govern the exchange of ISP-bound
traffic, pending the outcome of the NPRM. In particular, we must decide whether to impose (i) a
"calling-party's-network-pays" (CPNP) regime, like reciprocal compensation, in which the calling
party's network pays the network serving the ISP; (ii) a bill and keep regime in which all
networks recover costs from their end-user customers and are obligated to deliver calls that
originate on the networks of interconnecting carriers; or (iii) some otherxost recovery
mechanism. As set forth more fully below, our immediate goal in adopting an interim
compensation mechanism is to address the market distortions created^y the prevailing intercarrier
compensation regime, even as we evaluate in a parallel proceeding what longer-term intercarrier
compensation mechanisms are appropriate for this and other types of traffic.

Access Charge Reform Order, 12 FC6 Red at 16133-34.
See FCC Brief at 75-76, Southwestern Bell v'FCC, 153 F.3d 523.
Southwestern Bell v FCC, 153 F.3d at 534.
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CPNP Regimes Have Distorted the Development of Competitive
Markets

67.
For the reasons detailed below, we believe that a bill and keep approach to
recovering the costs of delivering ISP-bound traffic is likely to be more economically efficient
than recovering these costs from originating carriers. In particular, requiring carriers to recover
the costs of delivering traffic to ISP customers directly from those customers is likely to send
appropriate market signals and substantially eliminate existing opportunities for regulatory
arbitrage. As noted above, we consider issues related to the broader application of bill and keep
as an intercarrier compensation regime in conjunction with the NPRMthat we are adopting
concurrently with this Order. In this Order, however, we adopt an interim compensation
mechanism for the delivery of ISP-bound traffic that addresses the regulatory arbitrage
opportunities present in the existing carrier-to-carrier payments by limiting carriers' opportunity
to recover costs from other carriers and requiring them to recover a greater share of their costs
from their ISP customers.
68.
In most states, reciprocal compensation governs the exchange of ISP-bound traffic
between local carriers.127 Reciprocal compensation is a CPNP regime in which the originating
carrier pays an interconnecting carrier for "transport and termination," i.e., for transport from the
networks' point of interconnection and for any tandem and end-office switching.128 The central
problem with any CPNP regime is that carriers recover their costs not only from their end-user
customers, but also from other carriers}19 Because intercarrier compensation rates do not reflect
the degree to which the carrier can recover costs from its end-users, payments from other carriers
may enable a carrier to offer service to its customers at rates that bear little relationship to its
actual costs, thereby gaining an advantage over its competitors. Carriers thus have the incentive
to seek out customers, including but not limited to ISPs, with high volumes of incoming traffic
that will generate high reciprocal compensation payments.130 To the extent that carriers offer
these customers below cost retail rates subsidized by intercarrier compensation, these customers
do not receive accurate price signals. Moreover, because the originating LEC typically charges its
customers averaged rates, the originating end-user receives inaccurate price signals as the costs
associated with the intercarrier payments are recovered through rates averaged across all of the
originating carrier's end-users. Thus no subscriber faces a price that fully reflects the intercarrier
127

In the Declaratory Ruling, we stated that, pending adoption of a federal rule governing intercarrier
compensation for ISP-bound traffic, state commissions would determine whether reciprocal compensation was due
for such traffic. Declaratory Ruling, 14 FCC Red at 3706. Since that time, most, though not all, states have
ordered the payment of reciprocal compensation for ISP-bound traffic.
128

47 CF.R.§ 51.703(a).

129

Recovery from other carriers is premised on the economic assumption that the carrier whose customer
originates the call has "caused" the transport and termination costs associated with thatcall, and the originating
carrier should, therefore, reimburse the interconnecting carrier for "transport and termination." The companion
NPRM evaluates the validity of that assumption and tentatively concludes that it is an incorrect premise.
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Cf Local Competition Order, 11 FCC Red at 16043 (symmetrical termination payments to paging providers
based on ILECs' costs "might create uneconomic incentives for paging providers to generate traffic simply in order
to receive termination compensation").
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payments. An ISP subscriber with extensive Internet usage may, for example, cause her LEC to
incur substantial reciprocal compensation obligations to the LEC that serves her ISP, but that
subscriber receives no price signals reflecting those costs because they are spread over all of her
LECs customers.
69.
The resulting market distortions are most apparent in the case of ISP-bound traffic
due primarily to the one-way nature of this traffic, and to the tremendous growth in dial-up
Internet access since passage of the 1996 Act Competitive carriers, regardless of the nature of
their customer base, exchange traffic with the incumbent LECs at rates based on the incumbents'
costs.I3! To the extent the traffic exchange is roughly balanced, as is typically the case when
LECs exchange voice traffic, it matters little if rates reflect costs because payments in one
direction are largely offset by payments in the other direction. The rapid growth in dial-up
Internet use, however, created the opportunity to serve customers with large volumes of
exclusively incoming traffic. And, for the reasons discussed above, the reciprocal compensation
regime created an incentive to target those customers with little regard to the costs of serving
them - because a carrier would be able to collect some or all of those costs from other carriers
that would themselves be unable to flow these costs through to their own customers in a costcausative manner.
70.
The record is replete with evidence that reciprocal compensation provides
enormous incentive for CLECs to target ISP customers. The four largest ILECs indicate that
CLECs, on average, terminate eighteen times more traffic than they originate, resulting in annual
CLEC reciprocal compensation billings of approximately two billion dollars, ninety percent of
which is for ISP-bound traffic.132 Verizon states that it sends CLECs, on average, twenty-one
times more traffic than it receives, and some CLECs receive more than forty times more traffic
than they originate.133 Although there may be sound business reasons for a CLECs decision to
serve a particular niche market, the record strongly suggests that CLECs target ISPs in large part
because of the availability of reciprocal compensation payments.134 Indeed, some ISPs even seek
to become CLECs in order to share in the reciprocal compensation windfall, and, for a small
47 C.F.R. § 51.705 (an incumbent LECs rates for transport and termination shall be established on the basis of
the forward-looking economic costs of such offerings); 47 C.F.R. § 51.711 (subject to certain exceptions, rates for
transport and termination shall be symmetrical and equal to those that the incumbent LEC assesses upon other
carriers for the same services).
Letter from Robert T. Blau, BellSouth, to Magalie Roman SalasT Secretary, FCC (November 6, 2000); see also
Verizon Remand Comments^at 2 (Verizon will be billed more than one billion dollars in 2000 for Internet-bound
calls); Letter from Richard J. Metzger, Focal, to Deena Shetler, Legal Advisor to Commissioner Gloria Tristani,
FCC (Jan. 11,2001 )(ILECSJ3wed $1.98 billion in reciprocal compensation to CLECs in 2000).
Verizon Remand Comments at 11,21. Verizon also cites extreme cases of CLECs that terminate in excess of
eight thousand times more£=affic than they originate. Id at 21. See also Letter from Robert T. Blau, BellSouth;
Melissa Newman, Qwest; Priscilla Hill-Ardoin, SBC; and Susanne Guyer, Verizon, to Dorothy Attwood, Chief, Common Carrier Bureau, FGC (Nov. 9,2000).
4

See, e g, Verizon Remand Comments at 15 (citing case of CLEC offer of free long distance service to dial-up
Internet customers, an offer it did not extend to its customers that accessed the Internet via cable modem or DSL
service); SBC Remand Comments at 45 (citing examples of CLEC offering free service to ISPs that collocated in
its switching centers and CLECs offering to share reciprocal compensation revenues with ISPs).
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number of entities, this revenue stream provided an inducement to fraudulent schemes to generate
dial-up minutes.135
7L
For these reasons, we believe that the application of a CPNP regime, such as
reciprocal compensation, to ISP-bound traffic undermines the operation of competitive
markets. ISPs do not receive accurate price signals from carriers that compete, not on the basis
of the quality and efficiency of the services they provide, but on the basis of their ability to shift
costs to other carriers. Efficient prices result when carriers offer the lowest possible rates based
on the costs of the service they provide to ISPs, not when they can price their services without
regard to cost. We are concerned that viable, long-term competition among efficient providers of
local exchange and exchange access services cannot be sustained where the intercarrier
compensation regime does not reward efficiency and may produce retail rates that do not reflect
the costs of the services provided. As we explain in greater detail in the companion NPRM, we
believe that a compensation regime, such as bill and keep, that requires carriers to recover more
of their costsfromend-users may avoid these problems.
72.
We acknowledge that we did not always hold this view. In the Local Competition
Order, the Commission concluded that state commissions may impose bill and keep arrangements
for traffic subject to section 251(b)(5) only when the flow of traffic between interconnected
carriers is roughly balanced and is expected to remain so.137 The Commission reasoned that "billand-keep arrangements are not economically efficient because they distort carriers' incentives,
encouraging them to overuse competing carriers' termination facilities by seeking customers that
primarily originate traffic."138 The concerns about the opportunity for cost recovery and
economic efficiency are not present, however, to the extent that traffic between carriers is
balanced and payments from one carrier will be offset by payments from the other carrier. In
these circumstances, the Commission found that bill and keep arrangements may minimize
administrative burdens and transaction costs.139
73.
Since that time, we have observed the development of competition in the local
exchange market, and we now believe that the Commission's concerns about economic
inefficiencies associated with bill and keep missed the mark, particularly as applied to ISP-bound
traffic. The Commission appears to have assumed,^ least implicitly, that the calling party was
the sole cost causer of the call, and it may have overstated any incentives that a bill and keep
regime creates to target customers that primarily originate traffic. A carrier must provide
originating switching functions and must recover the costs of those functions from the originating
end-user, not from other carriers. Originating traffic thus lacks the same opportunity for costshifting that reciprocal compensation provides witturespect to serving customers with
See, e.g, Verizon Remand Comments at 17-18,
136

The NPRMihzt we adopt in conjunction-with this Order seeks comment on the degree to which a modified
CPNP regime might address these concerns.
nl

Local Competition Order, 11 FCC Red at 16054-55; see also 47 C.F.R. § 5 1.713(b).
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Local Competition Order, 11 FCC Red at 16055 (emphases added).
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Id at 16055.
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disproportionately incoming traffic. Indeed, it has become apparent that the obligation to pay
reciprocal compensation to interconnecting carriers may give rise to uneconomic incentives. As
the current controversy about ISP-bound traffic demonstrates, reciprocal compensation
encourages carriers to overuse competing carriers' origination facilities by seeking customers that
receive high volumes of traffic.
74.
We believe that a bill and keep regime for ISP-bound traffic may eliminate these
incentives and concomitant opportunity for regulatory arbitrage by forcing carriers to look only to
their ISP customers, rather than to other carriers, for cost recovery. As a result, the rates paid by
ISPs and, consequently, their customers should better reflect the costs of services to which they
subscribe. Potential subscribers should receive more accurate price signals, and the market should
reward efficient providers.140 Although we do not reach any firm conclusions about bill and keep
as a permanent mechanism for this or any other traffic, our evaluation of the record evidence to
date strongly suggests that bill and keep is likely to provide a viable solution to the market
distortions caused by the application of reciprocal compensation to ISP-bound traffic. We take
that observation into account, below, as we fashion an interim compensation mechanism for this
traffic.
75.
Bill and keep also may address the problem regulators face in setting intercarrier
compensation rates that correlate to the costs carriers incur to carry traffic that originates on other
networks. The record suggests that market distortions appear to have been exacerbated by the
prevalence of excessively high reciprocal compensation rates. Many CLECs argue that the
current traffic imbalances between CLECs and ILECs are the product of greediness on the part of
ILECs that insisted on above-cost reciprocal compensation rates in the course of negotiating or
arbitrating initial interconnection agreements.141 CLECs argue that, because these rates were
artificially high, they naturally responded by seeking customers with large volumes of incoming
traffic. If the parties or regulatory bodies merely set cost-based rates and rate structures, they
argue, arbitrage opportunities and the resulting windfalls would disappear.'42 They note that
reciprocal compensation rates have fallen dramatically as initial agreements expire and the parties
negotiate new agreements.143
76.
We do not believe that the solution to the current problem is as simple as the
CLECs suggest.144 We seek comment in the accompanying NPRMon the potential for a modified
We also note that bill and keep arrangements are common among entities providing Internet backbone services,
where the larger carriers engage in so-called "peering" arrangements.
Time Warner Remand Comments at 15-16.
Time Warner Remand Commeats at!6. Some parties suggest that a bifurcated rate structure (a call set-up
charge and a minute of use charge) would ensure appropriate cost recovery. See Sprint Remand Comments at 2-4.
We seek comment on this approach in the NPRM.
See infra note J58.
We note that many CLECs expressed the same view following adoption of the Declaratory Ruling in 1999, yet
the problems persist. See, e.g., Cox Reply Comments at 6 (If termination "rates are too high, this is entirely at the
ILECs behest, and should be remedied in the next round of negotiations.").
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CPNP regime, such as the CLECs advocate, to solve some of the problems we identify here. We
are convinced, however, that intercarrier payments for ISP-bound traffic have created severe
market distortions. Although it would be premature to institute a full bill and keep regime before
resolving the questions presented in the NPRM,l4S in seeking to remedy an exigent market
problem, we cannot ignore the evidence we have accumulated to date that suggests that a bill and
keep regime has very fundamental advantages over a CPNP regime for ISP-bound traffic.
Contrary to the view espoused by CLECs, we are concerned that the market distortions caused by
applying a CPNP regime to ISP-bound traffic cannot be cured by regulators or carriers simply
attempting to "get the rate right/' A few examples may illustrate the vexing problems regulators
face. Reciprocal compensation rates have been determined on the basis of the ILEC's average
costs of transport and termination. These rates do not, therefore, reflect the costs incurred by any
particular carrier for providing service to a particular customer. This encourages carriers to target
customers that are, on average, less costly to serve, and reap a reciprocal compensation windfall.
Conversely, new entrants lack incentive to serve customers that are, on average, more costly to
serve, even if the new entrant is the most efficient provider. It is not evident that this problem can
be remedied by setting reciprocal compensation rates on the basis of the costs of carrier serving
the called party (or, in the case of ISP-bound traffic, the CLEC that serves the ISP).146 Apart
from our reluctance to require new entrants to perform cost studies, it is entirely impracticable, if
not impossible, for regulators to set different intercarrier compensation rates for each individual
carrier, and those rates still might fail to reflect a carrier's costs as, for example, the nature of its
customer base evolves. Furthermore, most states have adopted per minute reciprocal
compensation rate structures. It is unlikely that any minute-of-use rate that is based on average
costs and depends upon demand projections will reflect the costs of any given carrier to serve any
particular customer. To the extent that transport and termination costs are capacity-driven,
moreover, virtually any minute-of-use rate will overestimate the cost of handling an additional call
whenever a carrier is operating below peak capacity.147 Regulators and carriers have long
struggled with problems associated with peak-load pricing.148 Finally, and most important, the
fundamental problem with application of reciprocal compensation to ISP-bound traffic is that the
intercarrier payments fail altogether to account for a carrier's opportunity to recover costs from
its ISP customers. Modifications to intercarrier rate levels or rate structures suggested by CLECs
do not address carriers' ability to shift costs from their own customers onto other carriers and
their customers.
145

A number of questions must be resolved before we are prepared to implement fully a bill and keep regime where
most costs are recovered from end-users. (We say most, not all, costs are recovered from end-users because a bill
and keep regime may include intercarrier charges for transport betweert networks.) These questions include, for
example, the allocation of transport costs between interconnecting carriers and the effect on retail prices of
adopting a bill and keep regime that is not limited to ISP-bound traffic. We seek comment on these and other
issues in the accompanying intercanlei^MPRM
146

Cf. Verizon Remand Reply Comments at 14-15.

147

The problenrof putting a per minute priceiag, in the form of intercarrier payments, where no per minute cost
exists is exacerbated in the case of local exchange carriers that, in most cases, recover costs from their end-users on
a flat-rated basis.
,4S

See, e.g., Local Competition Order, 11 FCC Red at 16028-29.
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Intercarrier Compensation for ISP-bound Traffic

77.
We believe that a hybrid mechanism that establishes relatively low per minute
rates, with a cap on the total volume of traffic entitled to such compensation, is the most
appropriate interim approach over the near term to resolve the problems associated with the
current intercarrier compensation regime for ISP-bound traffic. Our primary goal at this time is to
address the market distortions under the current intercarrier compensation regimes for ISP-bound
traffic. At the same time, we believe it prudent to avoid a "flash cut" to a new compensation
regime that would upset the legitimate business expectations of carriers and their customers.
Subsequent to the Commission's Declaratory Rulings many states have required the payment of
reciprocal compensation for ISP-bound traffic, and CLECs may have entered into contracts with
vendors or with their ISP customers that reflect the expectation that the CLECs would continue
to receive reciprocal compensation revenue. We believe it appropriate, in tailoring an interim
compensation mechanism, to take those expectations into account while simultaneously
establishing rates that will produce more accurate price signals and substantially reduce current
market distortions. Therefore, pending our consideration of broader intercarrier compensation
issues in the NPRM, we impose an interim intercarrier compensation regime for ISP-bound traffic
that serves to limit, if not end, the opportunity for regulatory arbitrage, while avoiding a marketdisruptive "flash cut" to a pure bill and keep regime. The interim regime we establish here will
govern intercarrier compensation for ISP-bound traffic until we have resolved the issues raised in
the intercarrier compensation NPRM.
78.
Beginning on the effective date of this Order, and continuing for six months,
intercarrier compensation for ISP-bound traffic will be capped at a rate of $.00l5/minute-of-use
(mou). Starting in the seventh month, and continuing for eighteen months, the rate will be capped
at $.00i0/mou. Starting in the twenty-fifth month, and continuing through the thirty-sixth month
or until further Commission action (whichever is later), the rate will be capped at $.0007/mou. In
addition to the rate caps, we will impose a cap on total ISP-bound minutes for which a LEC may
receive this compensation. For the year 2001, a LEC may receive compensation, pursuant to a
particular interconnection agreement, for ISP-bound minutes up to a ceiling equal to, on an
annualized basis, the number of ISP-bound minutes for which that LEC was entitled to
compensation under that agreement during the first quarter of 2001, plus a ten percent growth
factor. For 2002, a LEC may receive compensation, pursuant to a particular interconnection
agreement, for ISP-bound minutes up to a ceiling equal to the minutes for which it was entitled to
compensation under that agreement in 2001, plus another ten percent growth factor. In 2003, a
LEC may receive compensation, pursuant to a particular interconnection agreement, forTSPbound minutes up to a ceiling equal to the 2002 ceiling applicable to that agreement149
79.
We understand that some carriers are unable to identify ISP-bound traffic. In
order to limit disputes and avoid costly efforts to identify this traffic, we adopt a rebuttable
presumption that traffic delivered to a carrier, pursuant to a particular contract, that exceeds a 3:1
ratio of terminating to originatfng-traffic is ISP-bound traffic that is subject to the compensation
This interim regime affects only the intercarrier compensation \i.e.t the rates) applicable to the delivery of ISPbound traffic. It does not alter carriers^other obligations under our Part 5t rates, 47 C.F.R. Part 51, or existing
interconnection agreements, such as obligations to transport traffic to points of interconnection.
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mechanism set forth in this Order Using a rebuttable presumption in this context is consistent
with the approach that numerous states have adopted to identify ISP-bound traffic or
"convergent" traffic (including ISP traffic) that is subject to a lower reciprocal compensation rate.
150
A carrier may rebut the presumption, for example, by demonstrating to the appropriate state
commission that traffic above the 3:1 ratio is in fact local traffic delivered to non-ISP customers.
In that case, the state commission will order payment of the state-approved or state-arbitrated
reciprocal compensation rates for that traffic. Conversely, if a carrier can demonstrate to the state
commission that traffic it delivers to another carrier is ISP-bound traffic, even though it does not
exceed the 3:1 ratio, the state commission will relieve the originating carrier of reciprocal
compensation payments for that traffic, which is subject instead to the compensation regime set
forth in this Order. During the pendency of any such proceedings, LECs remain obligated to pay
the presumptive rates (reciprocal compensation rates for traffic below a 3:1 ratio, the rates set
forth in this Order for traffic above the ratio), subject to true-up upon the conclusion of state
commission proceedings.
80.
We acknowledge that carriers incur costs in delivering traffic to ISPs, and it may
be that in some instances those costs exceed the rate caps we adopt here. To the extent a LECs
costs of transporting and terminating this traffic exceed the applicable rate caps, however, it may
recover those amounts from its own end-users.151 We also clarify that, because the rates set forth
above are caps on intercarrier compensation, they have no effect to the extent that states have
ordered LECs to exchange ISP-bound traffic either at rates below the caps we adopt here or on a

150

See Texas Public Utility Commission, Docket No. 21982, Proceeding to Examine Reciprocal Compensation
Pursuant to Section 252 of the Federal Telecommunications Act of 1996, at 36 (July 12, 2000)(applying a blended
tandem switching rate to traffic up to a 3:1 (terminating to originating) ratio; traffic above that ratio is presumed to
be convergent traffic and is compensated at the end office rate unless the terminating carrier can prove tandem
functionality); New York Public Service Commission, Op.No. 99-10, Proceeding on Motion of the Commission to
Reexamine Reciprocal compensation, Opinion and Order, at 59-60 (Aug. 26, 1999) (traffic above a 3:1 ratio is
presume&to be convergent traffic and is compensated at the end office rate unless the terminating carrier can
demonstrate "that [the terminating] network and service are such as to warrant tandem-rate compensation");
Massachusetts Dept of Telecommunications and Energy, DXE. 97-116-C, at 28-29 n.31 (May 19, 1999)
(requiringreciprocal compensation for traffic that does not exceed a 2:1 (terminating to originating) ratio as a
proxy to distinguish ISP-bound traffic from voice traffic; carriers may rebut that presumption).
,SI

We note that CLEC end-user recovery is generally not regulated. As non-dominant carriers, CLECs can charge
their entNisers what the market will bear. Access Charge Reform, CC Docket No. 96-262, Sixth Report and
OrdeT, 15-FCC Red 12962, 13005 (2000) (CALLS Or<ter)("Competitive LECs are not regulated by the Commission
and arewt restricted in the same manner as price caps LECs in how they recover their costs.")- Accordingly, we
permit CCECs to recover any additional costs of serving ISPs from their ISP customers. ILEC end-user charges,
however^are generally regulated by the Commission, in the case of interstate charges, or by state commissions, for
intrastatejeharges. Pursuant to the ESP exemption, ILECs will continue to serve their ISP customers out of
intrastate4>usiness tariffs that are subject to state regulation. As the Commission said in 1997, if ILECs feel that
these rates are so low as to preclude cost recovery, they should seek relief from their state commissions. Access
Charge Reform Order, 12 FCC Red at 16134 ("To the extent that some intrastate rate structures fail to compensate
incumbent LECs adequately for providing service to customers with ~high volumes of Incoming calls, incumbent
LECs may address their concerns to state regulators." (emphasis added)).
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bill and keep basis (or otherwise have not required payment of compensation for this traffic).1S2
The rate caps are designed to provide a transition toward bill and keep or such other cost
recovery mechanism that the Commission may adopt to minimize uneconomic incentives, and no
such transition is necessary for carriers already exchanging traffic at rates below the caps.
Moreover, those state commissions have concluded that, at least in their states, LECs receive
adequate compensation from their own end-users for the transport and termination of ISP-bound
traffic and need not rely on intercarrier compensation.
81.
Finally, a different rule applies in the case where carriers are not exchanging traffic
pursuant to interconnection agreements prior to adoption of this Order (where, for example, a
new carrier enters the market or an existing carrier expands into a market it previously had not
served). In such a case, as of the effective date of this Order, carriers shall exchange ISP-bound
traffic on a bill-and-keep basis during this interim period We adopt this rule for several reasons.
First, our goal here is to address and curtail a pressing problem that has created opportunities for
regulatory arbitrage and distorted the operation of competitive markets. In so doing, we seek to
confine these market problems to the maximum extent while seeking an appropriate long-term
resolution in the proceeding initiated by the companion NPRM. Allowing carriers in the interim
to expand into new markets using the very intercarrier compensation mechanisms that have led to
the existing problems would exacerbate the market problems we seek to ameliorate. For this
reason, we believe that a standstill on any expansion of the old compensation regime into new
markets is the more appropriate interim answer.153 Second, unlike those carriers that are presently
serving ISP customers under existing interconnection agreements, carriers entering new markets
to serve ISPs have not acted in reliance on reciprocal compensation revenues and thus have no
need of a transition during which to make adjustments to their prior business plans.
82.
The interim compensation regime we establish here applies as carriers re-negotiate
expired or expiring interconnection agreements. It does not alter existing contractual obligations,
except to the extent that parties are entitled to invoke contractual change-of-law provisions. This
Order does not preempt any state commission decision regarding compensation for ISP-bound
traffic for the period prior to the effective date of the interim regime we adopt here. Because we
now exercise our authority under section 201 to determine the appropriate intercarrier
compensatiotrfor ISP-bound traffic, however^state commissions will no longer have authority to
address this issue. For this same reason, as of the date this Order is published in the Federal
Register, carriers may no longer invoke section 252(i) to opt into an existing interconnection
agreement with regard to the rates paid for the exchange of ISP-bound traffic.154 Section 252(i)
Thus, if a state has ordered ail LECs to exchange^rSP-bound traffic on a bill and keep basis, or if a state has
ordered bill andieep for ISP-bound traffic in a particular arbitration, those LECs subject to the state order would
continue to exchange ISP-bound traffic on a bill andteeepbasis.
153

See AmericamPubhc Communications Council v~fCC, 215 F.3d 51 (D.C Cir. 2000)("Where existing
methodology or research in a new area of regulation is deficient, the agency necessarily enjoys broad~discretion to
attempt tojbrmulate a solution to the best of its ability on the basis of available information.").
47 U.S.C. § 252(i) (requiring LECs to "make available any interconnection, service, or network element
provided under an agreement approved under this section" to "any other requesting telecommunications carrier").
This Order will become effective 30 days after publication in the Federal Register. We find there is good cause
under 5 U.S.C § 553(d)(3), however, to prohibit carriers from invoking section 252(1) with respect to rates paid for
(continued....)
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applies only to agreements arbitrated or approved by state commissions pursuant to section 252;
it has no application in the context of an intercarrier compensation regime set by this Commission
pursuant to section 20 L155
83.
This interim regime satisfies the twin goals of compensating LECs for the costs of
delivering ISP-bound traffic while limiting regulatory arbitrage. The interim compensation regime,
as a whole, begins a transition toward what we have tentatively concluded, in the companion
NPRM, to be a more rational cost recovery mechanism under which LECs recover more of their
costs from their own customers. This compensation mechanism is fully consistent with the
manner in which the Commission has directed incumbent LECs to recover the costs of serving
ESPs, including ISPs.156 The three-year transition we adopt here ensures that carriers have
sufficient time to re-order their business plans and customer relationships, should they so choose,
in light of our tentative conclusions in the companion NPRM that bill and keep is the appropriate
long-term intercarrier compensation regime. It also affords the Commission adequate time to
consider comprehensive reform of all intercarrier compensation regimes in the NPRM and any
resulting rulemaking proceedings. Both the rate caps and the volume limitations reflect our view
that LECs should begin to formulate business plans that reflect decreased reliance on revenues
from intercarrier compensation, given the trend toward substantially lower rates and the strong
possibility that the NPRM may result in the adoption of a full bill and keep regime for ISP-bound
traffic,
84.
We acknowledge that there is no exact science to setting rate caps to limit carriers'
ability to draw revenue from other carriers, rather than from their own end-users. Our adoption
of the caps here is based on a number of considerations. First, rates that produce meaningful
reductions in intercarrier payments for ISP-bound traffic must be at least as low as rates in
existing interconnection agreements. Second, although we make no finding here^ regarding the
actual costs incurred in the delivery of ISP-bound traffic, there is evidence in the record to
suggest that technological developments are reducing the costs incurred by carriers in handling all
sorts of traffic, including ISP-bound traffic.1S7 Third, although the process has proceeded too
(Continued from previous page)
the exchange of ISP-bound traffic upon publication ofthis Order in the Federal Register, in order to prevent
carriers from exercising opt in rights during the-thirty days after Federal Register publication. To permit a carrier
to opt into a reciprocal compensation rate higher than the caps we impose here during that window would seriously
undermine our effort to curtail regulatory arbitrage anttto begin a transition from dependence orr intercarrier
compensation and toward greater reliance on end-user recovery.
155

In any event, our rule implementing sectiort^52(i)^quires incumbent LECs to make available "[individual
interconnection, service, or network element arrangements" to requesting telecommunications carriers only "for a
reasonable period of time." 47 C.F.R. § 51.809(c). We conclude that any "reasonable period of time" for making
available rates applicable to the exchange of ISP^bound1 traffic expires upon the Commission's adeptioa in this
Order of an intercarrier compensation mechanism for ISP-bound traffic.
156

Access Charge Reform Order, 12 FCC Red at 16B3-34.

157

See, e.g., Letter from David J. Hostetter, SBC, to Magalie Roman Salas, Secretary, FCC~(Feb. 14,2001),
AttachmenF(citing September 2000 Morgan Stanley Dean Witter report that discusses utilization of lower cost
switch technology); Donny Jackson, "One GiantrLeap for Telecom Kind?," Telephony, Feb. 12,2001, at 38
(discussing cost savings associated with replacing circuit switches with packet switches); Letter from Gary L.
Phillips, SBC, to Magalie Roman Salas, Secretary, FCC (Feb. 16,2001) (attaching press release from Focal
(continued....)
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slowly to address the market distortions discussed above, we note that negotiated reciprocal
compensation rates continue to decline as ILECs and CLECs negotiate new interconnection
agreements. Finally, CLECs have been on notice since the 1999 Declaratory Ruling that it might
be unwise to rely on the continued receipt of reciprocal compensation for ISP-bound traffic, thus
many have begun the process of weaning themselves from these revenues.
85.
The rate caps adopted herein reflect all these considerations. The caps we have
selected approximate the downward trend in intercarrier compensation rates reflected m recently
negotiated interconnection agreements. In these agreements, carriers have agreed to rates, like
those we adopt here, that decline each year of a three-year contract term, and at least one
agreement reflects different rates for balanced and unbalanced traffic.158 For example, the initial
rate cap of $.0015/mou approximates the rates applicable this year in agreements Level 3 has
negotiated with Verizon and SBC.159 The $.0010/mou rate that applies during most of the threeyear interim period reflects a proposal by ALTS, the trade association representing CLECs, for a
transition plan pursuant to which intercarrier compensation payments for ISP-bound traffic would
decline to $.0010/mou.160 Similarly, the $.0007/mou rate reflects the average rate applicable in
2002 under Level 3's agreement with SBC.161 We conclude, therefore, that the rate caps
constitute a reasonable transition toward the recovery of costs from end-users.
86.
We impose an overall cap on ISP-bound minutes for which compensation is due in
order to ensure that growth in dial-up Internet access does not undermine our efforts to limit
(Continued from previous page)
Communications announcing planned deployment of next-generation switching technology "at a fraction of the
cost of traditional equipment"); see also infra para, 93.
The Commission takes notice of the following interconnection agreements: (1) Level 3 Communications and
SBC Communications (effective through May 2003): This 13-state agreement has two sets of rates. For balanced
traffic, the rate is $.0032/mou. For traffic that is out of balance by a ratio exceeding 3:1, the rate starts at
$.0018/mou, declining to a weighted average rate of $.0007/mou by June 1, 2002. See PR Newswire, WL
PRWIRE 07:00:00 (Jan. 17,2001); Letter from John T. Nakahata, Harris, Wiltshire 8c Grannis, to Magalie Roman
Salas, Secretary, FCC, Attachment (Jan. 19,2001). (2) ICG Communications and BellSouth (retroactively
effective to Jan. 1,2000): This agreement provides for rates to decline over three years, from $0.002/mou to
$0.00175/mou to $0.0015/mou. See Communications Dariy, 2000 WL 4694709 (Mar. 15,2000). 0 ) KMC
Telecom and BellSouth: This agreement provides for a rate of $0.002/mou in 2000, $0.00175/mou in 2001,
$0.0015/mou in 2002. See Business Wire, WL 5/18/00 BWIRE 12:50:000 (May 18, 2000). (4) Level 3
Communications and Verizon (formerly Bell Atlantic) (effective Oct. 14, 1999): This agreement governs all of the
former Bell Atlantic/NYNEX states. The applicable rate declines over the term of the agreement from $.003/mou
in 1999 to rates in 2001 of $.0015/mou for balanced traffic and $.0012/mou where the traffic imbalance exceeds a
10:1 ratio^ See Letter from Joseph J. Mulieri, Bell Atlantic, to Magalie Roman Salas, Secretary, FCC (Nov. 22,
1999)(attaching agreement); see also Letter from John T. Nakahata, Harris, Wiltshire & Grannis,-ts Magalie
Roman Saias, Secretary, FCC, at 2 (Jan. 4, 2001)(reciprocal compensation-rate in most recent Levet3 - Verizon
agreement is now $.0012/mou in all states except New York, where the rate is $.0015/mou).
159

In the Level 3 - SBC agreement, the applicable rate is $.00l8/mou for traffic that exceeds a 3:1 *atio; in the
Level 3 - Verizon agreement, the applicable rate is $.0015/mou for balanced traffic and $.0012/mott for traffic that
exceeds a 10:1 ratio. See supra note 158.
m

See Letter from Jonathan Askin, ALTS, to Magalie Roman Salas, Secretary, FCC, at 3 (Dec. 19r2000).
See supra note 158.
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intercarrier compensation for this traffic and to begin, subject to the conclusion of the NPRM
proceedings, a smooth transition toward a bill and keep regime. A ten percent growth cap, for
the first two years, seems reasonable in light of CLEC projections that the growth of dial-up
Internet minutes will fall in the range of seven to ten percent per year.162 We are unpersuaded by
the ILECs' projections that dial-up minutes will grow in the range of forty percent per year,163 but
adoption of a cap on growth largely moots this debate. If CLECs have projected growth in the
range often percent, then limiting intercarrier compensation at that level should not disrupt their
customer relationships or their business planning. Nothing in this Order prevents any carrier from
serving or indeed expanding service to ISPs, so long as they recover the costs of additional
minutes from their ISP customers. The caps merely ensure that growth in minutes above the caps
is based on a given carrier's ability to provide efficient and quality service to ISPs, rather than on
a carrier's desire to reap an intercarrier compensation windfall.
87.
We are not persuaded by arguments proffered by CLECs that requiring them to
recover more of their costs from their ISP customers will render it impossible for CLECs
profitably to serve ISPs or will lead to higher rates for Internet access.164 First, as noted above,
this compensation mechanism is fully consistent with the manner in which this Commission has
directed ILECs to recover the costs of serving ISPs.165 Moreover, the evidence in the record does
not demonstrate that CLECs cannot compete for ISP customers in the growing number of states
that have adopted bill and keep for ISP-bound traffic or that the cost of Internet access has
increased in those states. Second, next-generation switching and other technological
developments appear to be contributing to a decline in the costs of serving ISPs (and other
customers).'66 Third, if reciprocal compensation merely enabled CLECs to recover the costs of
serving ISPs, CLECs should be indifferent between serving ISPs and other customers. Instead,
CLECs have not contradicted ILEC assertions that more than ninety percent of CLEC reciprocal
compensation billings are for ISP-bound traffic,167 suggesting that there may be a considerable
margin between current reciprocal compensation rates and the actual costs of transport and
See, e.g., Letter from Jonathan Askin, ALTS, to Magalie Roman Salas, Secretary, FCC (Dec. 18,2000)
(offering evidence that dial-up traffic per household will grow only 7%/year from 1998 to 2003 and that dial-up
household penetration will decline between 2000 and 2003); Letter from Jonathan Askin, ALTS, to Magalie
Roman Salas, Secretary, FCC (Jan. 9,2001)(citing, inter alia, Merrill Lynch estimate of 7% annual increased
Internet usage per user between 1999 and 2003, and PricewaterhouseCoopers' study suggesting that Internet usage
per user declined from 1999 to 2000).
163

See, e.g., Letter from Robert T. Blau, BellSouth, to Dorothy Attwood, Chief, Common Carrier Bureau, FCC
(Dec. 22,2000) (forecasting 42% annual growth in total Internet access minutes between 2000 and 2003); but see
Dan Beyers, "Internet Use Slipped Late Last Year;' Washingtonpost.com, Feb. 22,2001, at E10 (noting decline in
average time spent online in 2000).
164

Seet e g., Time Warner Remand Comments at 4-5; Centennial Remand Comments at 2,6-7.
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Access Charge Reform Order, 12 FCC Red at 16134; MTS/WATS Market Structure Order, 97 FCC 2d at 72072L
166

See infra para. 93

167

See Letter from Robert T. Blau, BellSouth, et a£, taDorothy Attwood, Chief, Common Carrier Bureau, FCC, at
4 (Nov. 3, 2000); SBC Remand Comments at 42, 51, 57.
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termination.168 Finally, there is reason to believe that our failure to act, rather than the actions we
take here, would lead to higher rates for Internet access, as ILECs seek to recover their reciprocal
compensation liability, which they incur on a minute-of-use basis, from their customers who call
ISPs.169 Alternatively, ILECs might recover these costs from all of their local customers,
including those who do not call ISPs.170 There is no public policy rationale to support a subsidy
running from all users of basic telephone service to those end-users who employ dial-up Internet
access.171
88.
We also are not convinced by the claim of CLECs that limiting intercarrier
compensation for ISP-bound traffic will result in a windfall for the incumbent LECs.172 The
CLECs argue that the incumbents' local rates are set to recover the costs of originating and
terminating calls and that the ILECs avoid termination costs when their end-users call ISP
customers served by CLECs. The record does not establish that ILECs necessarily avoid costs
when they deliver calls to CLECs,173 and CLECs have not demonstrated that ILEC end-user rates
are designed to recover from the originating end-user the costs of delivering calls to ISPs. The
ILECs point out that, in response to their complaints about the costs associated with delivering
traffic to ISPs, the Commission has directed them to seek permission from state regulators to
raise the rates they charge the ISPs, an implicit acknowledgement that ILECs may not recover all
of their costs from the originating end-user.174

We do not suggest that it costs CLECs less to serve ISPs than other types of customers. New switching
technologies make it less costly to serve all customers. If, however, costs are lower than prevailing reciprocal
compensation rates, then CLECs are likely to target customers, such as ISPs, with predominantly incoming traffic,
in order to maximize the resulting profit.
See, e g, Verizon Remand Comments at 16.
no

id

Most CLECs assert that they compete with ILECs on service, not price, and that the rates=they charge to ISPs
are comparable to the ILEC rates for the same services. See, e.g., Time Warner Remand Comments at 5. We
acknowledge, however, that any CLECs that use reciprocal compensation payments to offer below cost service to
ISPs may be unable to continue that practice under the compensation regime we adopt here; We reiterate that we
see no public policy reason to maintain a subsidy running from ILEC end-users to ISPs and^heir customers.
See, e.g, Letter from Robert W. McCausiand, Allegiance Telecom; Kelsi Reeves, Time Warner Telecom;
Richard J. Metzger, Focal, R. Gerard Salemme, XO Communications; and Heather B. Gold^ntermedia; to
Dorothy Attwood, Chief, Common Carrier Bureau, FCC, at 6 (Oct 20,2000).
See, eg, SBC Remand Reply Comments at 31-32 (explaining how an ILEC may incur additional switching
and transport costs when its end-user customer calls an ISP served by a CLEC).
174

See Access Charge Reform Order, 12 FCC Red at 16134; see also MTS/WATS Market Structure Order, 97 FCC
2d at 721 (the local business 4ine rate paid by ISPs subsumes switching costs). Moreover, most states have adopted
price cap regulation of local rates, in which case rates do not necessarily correlate to cost in-the manner the CLECs
suggest See "Price Caps Standard Form of Telco Regulation in 70% of States," Communications Daily, 1999 WL
7580319 (Sept. 8, 1999).
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Relationship to Section 251(b)(5)

89.
It would be unwise as a policy matter, and patently unfair, to allow incumbent
LECs to benefit from reduced intercarrier compensation rates for ISP-bound traffic, with respect
to which they are net payors, while permitting them to exchange traffic at state reciprocal
compensation rates, which are much higher than the caps we adopt here, when the traffic
imbalance is reversed. Because we are concerned about the superior bargaining power of
incumbent LECs, we will not allow them to "pick and choose" intercarrier compensation regimes,
depending on the nature of the traffic exchanged with another carrier. The rate caps for ISPbound traffic that we adopt here apply, therefore, only if an incumbent LEC offers to exchange all
traffic subject to section 251(b)(5) at the same rate. Thus, if the applicable rate cap is
$.0010/mou, the ILEC must offer to exchange section 251(b)(5) traffic at that same rate.
Similarly, if an ILEC wishes to continue to exchange ISP-bound traffic on a bill and keep basis in
a state that has ordered bill and keep, it must offer to exchange all section 251(b)(5) traffic on a
bill and keep basis.178 For those incumbent LECs that choose not to offer to exchange section
251(b)(5) traffic subject to the same rate caps we adopt for ISP-bound traffic, we order them to
exchange ISP-bound traffic at the state-approved or state-arbitrated reciprocal compensation
rates reflected in their contracts.179 This "mirroring" rule ensures that incumbent LECs will pay
the same rates for ISP-bound traffic that they receive for section 251(b)(5) traffic.
90.
This is the correct policy result because we see no reason to impose different rates
for ISP-bound and voice traffic. The record developed in response to the Intercarrier
Compensation NPRM and the Public Notice fails to establish any inherent differences between the
costs on any one network of delivering a voice call to a local end-user and a data call to an ISP.
The four largest incumbent LECs - SBC, BellSouth, Verizon, and Qwest - estimate that they owed over $2
billion in reciprocal compensation for ISP-bound traffic in 2000. See, e g, Letter from Robert T Biau, BellSouth^
to Dorothy Attwood, Chief, Common Carrier Bureau, FCC (Jan. 16, 2001)
176

More calls are made from wireless phones to wireline phones than vice-versa. The ILECs, therefore, are net
recipients of reciprocal compensation from wireless carriers,
177

Pursuant to the analysis we adopt above, section 251(b)(5) applies to telecommunications traffic between a LEC
and a telecommunications carrier other than a CMRS provider that is not interstate or intrastate access traffic
delivered to an IXC or an information service provider, and to telecommunications traffic between a LEC and a
CMRS provider that originates and terminates within the same MTA. See supra § I V.B.
178

If, however, a state has ordered bill and keep for ISP-bound traffic only with respect to a particular
interconnection agreement, as opposed to state-wide, we do not require the incumbent LEC to offer to exchange all
section 251(b)(5) traffic on a bill and keep basis. This limitation is necessary so that an incumbent is not required
to deliver :all section 251(b)(5) in a state on a bill and keep basis even though it continues to pay compensation for
most ISP-bound traffic in that state. See, e g.t Letter from John W. Kure, Qwest, to Magalie Roman Salas,
Secretary, FCC (April 2,2001)(ciring, for example, Washington state, where 16% of ISP-bound traffic is subject to
bill and keep). In those states, the rate caps we adopt here will apply to ISP-bound traffic that is not subject to bill
and keep under me^particuiar interconnection agreement if the incumbent LEC offers to exchange all section
251(b)(5) traffic subject to those rate caps.
179

ILECs may make this election on a state-ov-state basis.

180

Many Gomraenters argue that there is, m fact, no difference between the cost and network functions involved in
terminating ISP-bound calls and the cost and functions involved in terminating other calls to users of the public
(continued....)
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Assuming the two calls have otherwise identical characteristics (e.g., duration and time of day), a
LEC generally will incur the same costs when delivering a call to a local end-user as it does
delivering a call to an ISP.
We therefore are unwilling to take any action that results in the
establishment of separate intercarrier compensation rates, terms, and conditions for local voice
and ISP-bound traffic.182 To the extent that the record indicates that per minute reciprocal
compensation rate levels and rate structures produce inefficient results, we conclude that the
problems lie with this recovery mechanism in general and are not limited to any particular type of
traffic.
91.
We are not persuaded by commenters' claims that the rates for delivery of ISPbound traffic and local voice traffic should differ because delivering a data call to an ISP is
inherently less costly than delivering a voice call to a local end-user. In an attached declaration to
Verizon's comments, William Taylor argues that reciprocal compensation rates may reflect
switching costs associated with both originating and terminating functions, despite the fact that
ISP traffic generally flows in only one direction.183 If correct, however, this observation suggests
a need to develop rates or rate structures for the transport and termination of all traffic that
exclude costs associated solely with originating switching.
Mr. Taylor similarly argues that
ISP-bound calls generally are longer in duration than voice calls, and that a per-minute rate
structure applied to calls of longer duration will spread the fixed costs of these calls over more
minutes, resulting in lower per-minute costs, and possible over recovery of the fixed costs
incurred.
Any possibility of over recovery associated with calls (to ISPs or otherwise) of
longer than average duration can be eliminated through adoption of rate structures that provide
(Continued from previous page)
switched telephone network. See, eg, AOL Comments at 10-12 ("there is absolutely no technical distinction, and
therefore no cost differences, between the way an incumbent LEC network handles ISP-destined traffic and the way
it handles other traffic within the reciprocal compensation framework."); AT&T Comments at 10-11 ("[TJhere is
no economic justification for subjecting voice and data traffic to different compensation rules." "ILECs have not
demonstrated, and cannot demonstrate, that the costs of transporting-and terminating data traffic differ
categorically from the costs of transporting and terminating ordinary voice traffic,"); Choice One Comments at &
{"[CJosts do not vary significantly based on whether data or voice traffic is being transmitted."); Corecomm Reply
at 2 ^network functions are identical whether a carrier is providing service to an ISP or any other end-user); Cox
Comments at 7 & Exhibit 2, Statement of Gerald W. Brock at 2 ("None of the distinctions between ISP calls and'
average calls relate to a cost difference for handling the calls."); MediaOne Comments at 4 (LECs incur the same
cosfe for terminating calls to an ISP as they do for terminating any other local calls); Time Warner Comments at 9
("[A}U LECs perform the same functions when transporting and delivering calls to ISP end-users as they do when
transporting and delivering calls to other end-users. When LECs perform the same functions, they incur the same
costs."); Letter from Donald F. Shepheard, Time Warner Telecom, to Dorothy Attwood, Chief, Common Carrier
Bureau, FCC (Feb. 28, 2001)(disputing claim that CLEC switching costs are as low as the ILECs argue).
m

£ee, e.g., Cox Comments at Exhibits, Statement ofOeraid W. Brock at 2.

£fee, eg, Intermedia Comments at 3-4 (arguing-that the rates for transport and termination of ISP-bound traffic
must be identical to the rates established for the transport and termination of local traffic).
183

See Verizon Remand Comments, Deelaration_of WiUiam E. Taylor at 14, 17.

184

See Time Warner Remand Reply Comments, Exhibit I, Declaration of Don J. Wood at 14. See also Letter from
John W. Kure, Qwest, to Magalie Roman Salas, Secretary, FCC, Attachment at 7-8 (Oct. 26,2000).
185

See Verizon Remand Comments, Declaration of William E. Taylor at 14-15.
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for recovery of per-call costs on a per-call basis, and minute-of-use costs on a minute-of-use
10/

basis. We also are not convinced that ISP-bound calls have a lower load distribution (/ e ,
number and duration of calls in the busy hour as a percent of total traffic), and that these calls
187

therefore impose lower additional costs on a network. It is not clear from the record that there
is any "basis to speculate that the busy hour for calls to ISPs will be different than the CLEC
switch busy hour," especially when the busy hour is determined by the flow of both voice and
data traffic.
92.
Nor does the record demonstrate that CLECs and ILECs incur different costs in
delivering traffic that would justify disparate treatment of ISP-bound traffic and local voice traffic
under section 251(b)(5). Ameritech maintains that it costs CLECs less to deliver ISP-bound
traffic than it costs incumbent LECs to deliver local traffic because CLECs can reduce
too

I Oft

transmission costs by locating their switches close to ISPs. The proximity of the ISP or other
end-user to the delivering carrier's switch, however, is irrelevant to reciprocal compensation
rates. The Commission concluded in the Local Competition Order that the non-traffic sensitive
cost of the local loop is not an "additional" cost of terminating traffic that a LEC is entitled to
recover through reciprocal compensation.
93.
SBC argues that CLECs should not be entitled to symmetrical reciprocal
compensation rates for the delivery of ISP-bound traffic, because CLECs do not provide end
office switching functionality to their ISP customers and therefore do not incur the same costs
that ILECs incur when delivering local voice traffic. Specifically, SBC claims that the switching
functionality that CLECs provide to ISPs is more like a trunk-to-trunk connection than the
switching functionality normally provided at end offices.192 SBC also claims that CLECs are able
to reduce the costs of delivering ISP-bound traffic by using new, less expensive switches that do
not perform the functions necessary for both the origination and delivery of two-way voice
traffic.193 Similarly, GTE asserts that new technologies and system architectures make it possible
for some CLECs to reduce costs by entirely avoiding circuit-switching on calls "to selected

186

See Time Warner Remand Reply Comments, Exhibit 1, Declaration of Don J. Wood at 10-11. Time Warner
also disputes that the "average duration of calls to ISPsJias been accurately measured to date." Id, at 11.
187

See Verizon Remand Comments, Declaration of William E. Taylor at 17-18.

188

See Time Warner Remand ReplyComments, Exhibit 1, Declaration of Don JL Wood at 14-15.

189

See Letter from Gary L. Phillips^meritech, to Magalie Roman Salas, Secretary, FCC, Attachment at 5 (Sept
14, 1999) See also SBC Remand Comments at 32-33 {referring to Global NAPS Comments, Exhibit 1 Statement
of Fred Goldstein at 6, which describes CLEC reduction ^f loop costs through collocation); Letter from Melissa
Newman, U S West, to Magalie Roman Salas, Secretary, FCC, Attachment at 8 (Dec. 2, 1999).
190

See Time Warner Remand Reply-Comments, Exhibit 1, Declaration of Don J. Wood at 25.

191

See Local Competition Order, 11 FCC Red at 16025.

192

SBC Remand Comments at 33.

193

SBC Remand Comments at 33-34 (referring, inter alia, ^"managed modem** switches).
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telephone numbers."194 CLECs respond, however, that they are in fact using the same circuit
switching technology used by ILECs to terminate the vast portion of Internet traffic.
In any
event, it is not evident from any of the comments in the record that the apparent efficiencies
associated with new system architectures apply exclusively to data traffic, and not to voice traffic
as well. ILECs and CLECs alike are free to deploy new technologies that provide more efficient
solutions to the delivery of certain types of traffic, and these more efficient technologies will,
over time, be reflected in cost-based reciprocal compensation rates. The overall record in this
proceeding does not lead us to conclude that any system architectures or technologies widely used
by LECs result in material differences between the cost of delivering ISP-bound traffic and the
cost of delivering local voice traffic, and we see no reason, therefore, to distinguish between voice
and ISP traffic with respect to intercarrier compensation.
94.
Some CLECs take this argument one step further. Whatever the merits of bill and
keep or other reforms to intercarrier compensation, they say, any such reform should be
undertaken only in the context of a comprehensive review of all intercarrier compensation
regimes, including the interstate access charge regime. First, we reject the notion that it is
inappropriate to remedy some troubling aspects of intercarrier compensation until we are ready to
solve all such problems. In the most recent of our access charge reform orders, we recognized
that it is "preferable and more reasonable to take several steps in the right direction, even if
incomplete, than to remain frozen" pending "a perfect, ultimate solution." Moreover, it may
GTE Comments at 7-8 (noting the existence of SS7 bypass devices that can avoid circuit switching and arguing
that competitive LEC networks are far less complex and utilize fewer switches than incumbent LEC networks);
GTE Reply Comments at 16 (compensating competitive LECs based on an incumbent LECs costs inflates the
revenue that competitive LECs receive), Letter from W. Scott Randolph, GTEr to Magalie Roman Salas, Secretary,
FCC, Attachment (Dec. 8, 1999 (new generation traffic architectures may use SS7 Gateways instead of more
expensive circuit-switched technology).
195

See, e.g., Letter from John D. Windhausen, Jr., ALTS, and H. Russell Frisby, Jr., CompTel, to Kyte Dixon,
Legal Advisor, Chairman Michael Powell, FCC, at 4-5 (March 16, 2001)(Focal is testing two softswitches, but as
of now all ISP-bound traffic terminated by Focal uses traditional circuit switches; Allegiance Telecom has a single
Softswitch in its network; Advanced Telecom Group, Inc. is in the testing phase of Softswitch deployment; PacWest Telecomm, Inc., does not have any softswitches in its network; e.spire uses only circuit switches to terminate
ISP-bound traffic^Time Warner Remand Reply Comments, Exhibit I, Declaration of Don J. Wood at 27 (Time
Warner is "deploying fully functional end office switches"); Letter from Donald F. Shepheard, Time Warner, to
Dorothy Attwood, Chief, Common Carrier Bureau, FCC, at 3 (February 28, 200l)(Time Warner "does not provide
managed modem services." Like the ILECs, Time Warner "has an extensive network of circuit switched
technology" and_has only just begun to deploy softswitches); Letter from Teresa Marrero, AT&T, to Magalie
Roman Salas.-Secretary, FCC, at I (April 11, 2001)(" Virtually all of AT&T's ISP-bound traffic is today terminated
using full circuit switches.").
196

See Time Warner Remand Reply Comments, Exhibit I, Declaration of Don J. Wood at 28; see also Letter from
Donald F. Shepheard, Time Warner, to Dorothy Attwood, Chief, Common Carrier Bureau, FCC, at 3 (Feb. 28,
2001 X"if Softswitch technology will lower carriers' costs, then all carriers, including the ILECs[,] will have
incentive to deployithem"); Letter from John D. Windhausen, Jr., ALTS, and H. Russell Frisby, Jr., CompTel, to
Dorothy Attwood, Cbief, Common Carrier Bureau, FCC, at 4 (February 16,2001 )(same).
197

See, e.g, Letter-from Karen L. Gulick, Harris, Wiltshire & Grannis, to Magalie Roman Salas, Secretary, FCC,
at 1 (Dec. 22,2000).
198

See CALLS Order, 15 FCC Red at 12974.
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make sense to begin reform by rationalizing intercarrier compensation between competing
providers of telecommunications services, to encourage efficient entry and the development of
robust competition, rather than waiting to complete reform of the interstate access charge regime
that applies to incumbent LECs, which was created in a monopoly environment for quite different
purposes. Second, the interim compensation scheme we adopt here is fully consistent with the
course the Commission has pursued with respect to access charge reform. A primary feature of
the CALLS Order is the phased elimination of the PICC and CCL, two intercarrier payments
we found to be inefficient, in favor of greater recovery from end-users through an increased SLC,
an end-user charge. Finally, like the CALLS Order, the interim regime we adopt here "provides
relative certainty in the marketplace" pending further Commission action, thereby allowing
carriers to develop business plans, attract capital, and make intelligent investments.
D.

Conclusion

95.
In this Order, we strive to balance the need to rationalize an intercarrier
compensation scheme that has hindered the development of efficient competition in the local
exchange and exchange access markets with the need to provide a fair and reasonable transition
for CLECs that have come to depend on intercarrier compensation revenues. We believe that the
interim compensation regime we adopt herein responds to both concerns. The regime should
reduce carriers' reliance on carrier-to-carrier payments as they recover more of their costs from
end-users, while avoiding a "flash cut" to bill and keep which might upset legitimate business
expectations. The interim regime also provides certainty to the industry during the time that the
Commission considers broader reform of intercarrier compensation mechanisms in the NPRM
proceeding. Finally, we hope this Order brings an end to the legal contusion resulting from the
Commission's historical treatment of ISP-bound traffic, for purposes ofjurisdiction and
compensation, and the statutory obligations and classifications adopted by Congress in 1996 to
promote the development of competition for all telecommunications services. We believe the
analysis set forth above amply responds to the court's mandate that we explain how our
conclusions regarding ISP-bound traffic fit within the governing statute.

199

The PICC, or presubscribed interexchange carrier charge, and the CCLC, carrier common line charge, are
charges levied by incumbent LECs upon IXCs to recover portions otthe interstate-allocated cost of subscriber
loops. See 47 CF;R. §§ 69J53, 69.154.
200

CALLS Order, 15 FCC Red at 12975 (permitting a greater proportion of the local loop costs of primary
residential and single-line business customers to be recovered through the SLC).

201

CALLS Order, IS FCC Red at 12977 (The CALLS proposal is aimed to " bring lower rates and less confiision
to consumers; and create a more rational interstate rate structure. This, in turn, will support more efficient
competition, more certainty for the industry, and permit more rational investment decisions.").
202

Bell Atlantic, 2TS FJd at 8.
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PROCEDURAL MATTERS

Final Regulatory Flexibility Analysis

96.
As required by the Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA), an Initial Regulatory
Flexibility Analysis (IRFA) was incorporated in the Declaratory Ruling andNPRM. The
Commission sought and received written comments on the IRFA. The Final Regulatory
Flexibility Analysis (FRFA) in this Order on Remand and Report and Order conforms to the RFA,
as amended. To the extent that any statement contained in this FRFA is perceived as creating
ambiguity with respect to our rules, or statements made in preceding sections of this Order on
Remand and Report and Order, the rules and statements set forth in those preceding sections shall
be controlling.
1.

Need for, and Objectives of, this Order on Remand and Report and
Order

97.
In the Declaratory Ruling, we found that we did not have an adequate record
upon which to adopt a rule regarding intercarrier compensation for ISP-bound traffic, but we
indicated that adoption of a rule would serve the public interest. We sought comment on two
alternative proposals, and stated that we might issue new rules or alter existing rules in light of the
207

comments received. Prior to the release of a decision, the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit vacated certain provisions of the Declaratory Ruling and remanded the matter
to the Commission.
98.
This Order on Remand and Report and Order addresses the concerns of various
parties to this proceeding and responds to the court's remand. The Commission exercises
jurisdiction over ISP-bound traffic pursuant to section 201, and establishes a three-year interim
intercarrier compensation mechanism for the exchange of ISP-bound traffic that applies if
incumbent LECs offer to exchange section 251 (b)(5) traffic at the same rates. During this interim
period, intercarrier compensation for ISP-bound trafficzis subject to arrate cap that declines over
the three-year period, from $.00I5/mou to $.0007/moik The Commission also imposes a cap on
the total ISP-bound minutes for which a LEC may receive this compensation under a particular
interconnection agreement equal to, on an annualized Tmsis, the number of ISP-bound minutes for
which that LEC was entitled to receive compensation during the first quarter of 2001, increased
ZUJ

See 5 LLS.C. § 603.

204

Declaratory Ruling, 14 FCC Red at 3710-13.

205

See 5 U.S.C. § 604. The Regulatory Flexibility Act, 5 U.S.C. § 601 el seq., was amended by the "Small
Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996" (SBREFA), which was^nacted as Title II of the Contract
With America Advancement Act of 1996, Pub.L. No. 104-121, HO Stat. 847 (19%) (CWAAA).

106

Declaratory Ruling and Intercarrier Compensation NPRM, U FCC Red at 3707.
Declaratory Ruling and Intercarrier Compensation NPRM, H FCC Red at 3741.

208

See Bell Atlantic, 206 F.3d 1.
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by ten percent in each of the first two years of the transition. If an incumbent LEC does not offer
to exchange all section 251(b)(5) traffic subject to the rate caps set forth herein, the exchange of
ISP-bound traffic will be governed by the reciprocal compensation rates approved or arbitrated by
state commissions.
2.

Summary of Significant Issues Raised by the Public Comments in
Response to the IRFA

99.
The Office of Advocacy, U.S. Small Business Administration (Office of Advocacy)
submitted two filings in response to the IRFA. In thesefilings,the Office of Advocacy raises
significant issues regarding our description, in the IRFA, of small entities to which our rules will
apply, and the discussion of significant alternatives considered and rejected. Specifically, the
Office of Advocacy argues that the Commission has failed accurately to identify all small entities
affected by the rulemaking by refusing to characterize small incumbent local exchange carriers
(LECs), and failing to identify small ISPs, as small entities. We note that, in the IRFA, we
stated that we excluded small incumbent LECs from the definitions of "small entity" and "small
business concern" because such companies are either dominant in their field of operations or are
not independently owned and operated. We also stated, however, that we would nonetheless,
out of an abundance of caution, include small incumbent LECs in the IRFA, and did so. " Small
incumbent LECs and other relevant small entities are included in our present analysis as described
below.
100. The Office of Advocacy also states that Internet service providers (ISPs) are
directly affected by our actions, and therefore should be included in our regulatory flexibility
analysis. We find, however, that rates charged to ISPs are only indirectly affected by our actions.
We have, nonetheless, briefly discussed the effect on ISPs in the primary text of this Order."
101. Last, the Office of Advocacy also argues that the Commission has failed to
adequately address significant alternatives that accomplish our stated objective and minimize any
significant economic impact on small entities. We note that, in the IRFA, we described the
nature and effect of our proposed actions, and encouraged small entities to comment (including
giving comment on possible alternatives). We also specifically sought-comment on the two
alternative proposals for implementing intercarrier compensation-oner that resolved intercarrier_
compensation pursuant to the negotiation and arbitration process set forth in Section 252, and
209

Office of Advocacy, U.S. Small Business Administration ex parte, May 27, 1999; Office of Advocacy, U.S.
Small Business Administration ex parte, June 14, 1999.

2,0

Office of Advocacy, U.S. Small Business Administration ex parte, May 27, 1999, at 1-3; Office of Advocacyr
U.S. Small Business Administration ex parte, June 14, 1999, at 2-3.

211

Declaratory Ruling and Intercarrier Compensation NPRM, 14 FCC Red at 3744.

2<2

Declaratory Ruling and Intercarrier Compensation NPRM, 14 FCC Red at 3713.

2,3

See supra paras. 87-88.

214

Office of Advocacy, U.S. Small Business Administration ex parte, June 14, 1999, at 3.
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another that would have had us adopt a set of federal rules to govern such intercarrier
compensation. We believe, therefore, that small entities had a sufficient opportunity to
comment on alternative proposals.
102. NTCA also filed comments, not directly in response to the IRFA, urging the
Commission to fulfill its obligation to consider small telephone companies. Some commenters
also raised the issue of small entity concerns over increasing Internet traffic and the use of
Extended Area Service (EAS) arrangements.
We are especially sensitive to the needs of rural
and small LECs that handle ISP-bound traffic, but we find that the costs that LECs incur in
originating this traffic extends beyond the scope of the present proceeding and should not dictate
the appropriate approach to compensation for delivery of ISP-bound traffic,
3.

Description and Estimate of the Number of Small Entities to Which
Rules Will Apply

103. The rules we are adopting apply to local exchange carriers. To estimate the
number of small entities that would be affected by this economic impact, we first consider the
statutory definition of "small entity'1 under the RFA. The RFA generally defines "small entity" as
having the same meaning as the term "small business," "small organization," and "small
governmental jurisdiction." In addition, the term "small business" has the same meaning as the
term "small business concern" under the Small Business Act, unless the Commission has
developed one or more definitions that are appropriate to its activities. Under the Small
Business Act, a "small business concern" is one that: (1) is independently owned and operated; (2)
is not dominant in itsfieldof operation; and (3) meets any additional criteria established by the
SBA. 2 The SBA has defined a small business for Standard Industrial Classification (SIC)
categories 4812 (Radiotelephone Communications) and 4813 (Telephone Communications,
Except Radiotelephone) to be small entities when they have no more than 1,500 employees. "
104. The most reliable source of information regarding the total numbers of certain
common carrier and related providers nationwide, as well as the numbers of commercial wireless
entities, appears to be data the Commission publishes annually in its Carrier Locator report,
derived from filings made in connection with the Telecommunications Relay Service (TRS).
2,5

Declaratory Ruling [IRFA], 14 FCC Red at 3711 (para. 39); see also Declaratory Ruling, 14 FCC Red at 370708 (paras. 30-31).
NTCA Comments at vi, 15.
See, e g, ICORE Comments at 1-7; IURC Comments at 7; Richmond Telephone Company Comments at 1-8.
2,8

5U.S.C.§60t<6).
5 U.S.C. § 601(3) (incorporating by reference the definition of "small business concern" in 5 ILS.C. § 632).

220

15 U.S.C. § 632.

221

I3C.F.R.§ 121.201.

222

FCC, Carrier Locator: Interstate Service Providers, Figure I (Jan. 2000) (Carrier Locator).
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According to data in the most recent report, there are 4,144 interstate carriers. These carriers
include, inter alia, incumbent local exchange carriers, competitive local exchange carriers,
competitive access providers, interexchange carriers, other wireline carriers and service providers
(including shared-tenant service providers and private carriers), operator service providers, pay
telephone operators, providers of telephone toll service, wireless carriers and services providers,
and resellers.
105. We have included small incumbent local exchange carriers (LECs) in this
regulatoryflexibilityanalysis. As noted above, a "small business" under the RFA is one that, inter
alia, meets the pertinent small business size standard (e.g., a telephone communications business
having 1,500 or fewer employees), and "is not dominant in its field of operation." The SBAs
Office of Advocacy contends that, for RFA purposes, small incumbent LECs are not dominant in
their field of operation because any such dominance is not "national" in scope. We have
therefore included small incumbent LECs in this regulatoryflexibilityanalysis, although we
emphasize that this action has no effect on the Commission's analyses and determinations in
other, non-RFA contexts.
106. Total Number of Telephone Companies Affected. The United States Bureau of
the Census (the Census Bureau) reports that, at the end of 1992, there were 3,497 firms engaged
in providing telephone services, as defined therein, for at least one year. This number contains
a variety of different categories of carriers, including local exchange carriers, interexchange
carriers, competitive access providers, cellular carriers, mobile service carriers, operator service
providers, pay telephone operators, PCS providers, covered SMR providers, and resellers. It
seems certain that some of those 3,497 telephone service firms may not qualify as small entities or
small incumbent LECs because they are not "independently owned and operated." For
example, a PCS provider that is affiliated with an interexchange carrier having more than 1,500
employees would not meet the definition of a small business. It seems reasonable to conclude,
therefore, that fewer than 3,497 telephone service firms are small entity telephone servicefirmsor
small incumbent LECs that may be affected by the decisions and rule changes adopted in this
proceeding.
Carrier Locator at Fig. 1.
224

5U.S.C§601(3).
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Office of Advocacy, U.S. Small Business Administration ex parte, May 27, 1999, at 1-3; Office of Advocacy,
U.S. Small Business Administration ex parte, June 14, 1999, at 2-3. The Small Business Act contains a definition
of "small business concern," which the RFA incorporates into its own definition of "small business/' See 15
U.S.C § 632(a) (Smal lousiness Act); 5 U.S.C. § 601(3) (RFA). SB A regulations interpret "small business
concern" to include the eoncept of dominance on a national basis. 13 C.F.R. § 121.102(b). Since 1996, out of an
abundance of caution^ the Commission has included small incumbent LECs in its regulatory flexibility analyses.
See, e g, Implementation: of the Local Competition Provisions of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, CC
Docket 96-98, First Report and Order, I I FCC Red 15499, 16144-45 (1996).
226

United States Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, 1992 Census of Transportation,
Communications, and Utilities: Establishment and Firm Size, at Firm Size 1-123 (1995) (1992 Census),
227

15 U.S.C. § 632(a)(1).

52

Federal Communications Commission

FCC 01-131

107. Wireline Carriers and Service Providers, The SBA has developed a definition of
small entities for telephone communications companies other than radiotelephone companies. The
Census Bureau reports that there were 2,321 such telephone companies in operation for at least
one year at the end of 1992. According to the SBA's definition, a small business telephone
company other than a radiotelephone company is one employing no more than 1,500 persons.
All but 26 of the 2,321 non-radiotelephone companies listed by the Census Bureau were reported
to have fewer than 1,000 employees. Thus, even if all 26 of those companies had more than 1,500
employees, there would still be 2,295 non-radiotelephone companies that might qualify as small
entities or small incumbent LECs. Although it seems certain that some of these carriers are not
independently owned and operated, we are unable at this time to estimate with greater precision
the number of wireline carriers and service providers that would qualify as small business
concerns under the SBAfs definition. Consequently, we estimate that there are fewer than 2,295
small entity telephone communications companies other than radiotelephone companies that may
be affected by the decisions and rule changes adopted in this proceeding.
108. Local Exchange Carriers, Interexchange Carriers, Competitive Access Providers,
Operator Service Providers, and Resellers. Neither the Commission nor the SBA has developed
a definition particular to small LECs, interexchange carriers (IXCs), competitive access providers
(CAPs), operator service providers (OSPs), or resellers. The closest applicable definition for these
carrier-types under the SBA rules is for telephone communications companies other than
radiotelephone (wireless) companies. According to our most recent TRS data, there are 1,348
incumbent LECs and 212 CAPs and competitive LECs.2 l Although it seems certain that some of
these carriers are not independently owned and operated, or have more than 1,500 employees, we
are unable at this time to estimate with greater precision the number of these carriers that would
qualify as small business concerns under the SBA's definition. Consequently, we estimate that
there are fewer than 1,348 incumbent LECs and fewer than 212 CAPs and competitive LECs that
may be affected by the decisions and rule changes adopted in this proceeding.
4.

Description of Projected Reporting, Recordkeeping, and Other
Compliance Requirements

109. The rule we are adopting imposes direct compliance requirements on
interconnected incumbent and competitive LECs, including small LECs. In order to comply with
this rule, these entities will be required to exchange their ISP-bound traffic subject to the rules we
are adopting above.

1992 Census at Firm Size 1-123.
229

J3-C.F.R. § 121.201, Standard Industrial Classification (SrC) Code 4813.

230

13 C.F.R. § 121.201, SIC Code 4813.
Carrier Locator at Fig. 1.
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Steps Taken to Minimize Significant Economic Impact on Small
Entities, and Significant Alternatives Considered

110. In the Declaratory Ruling and Intercarrier Compensation NPRM the Commission
proposed various approaches to intercarrier compensation for ISP-bound traffic.
During the
course of this proceeding the Commission considered and rejected several alternatives.233 None of
the significant alternatives considered would appear to succeed as much as our present rule in
balancing our desire to minimize any significant economic impact on relevant small entities, with
our desire to deal with the undesirable incentives created under the current reciprocal
compensation regime that governs the exchange of ISP-bound traffic in most instances. We also
find that for small ILECs and CLECs the administrative burdens and transaction costs of
intercarrier compensation will be minimized to the extent that LECs begin a transition toward
recovery of costs from end-users, rather than other carriers.
111. Although a longer transition period was considered by the Commission, it was
rejected because a three-year period was considered sufficient to accomplish our policy objectives
with respect to all LECs.234 Differing compliance requirements for small LECs or exemption from
all or part of this rule is inconsistent with our policy goal of addressing the market distortions
attributable to the prevailing intercarrier compensation mechanism for ISP-bound traffic and
beginning a smooth transition to bill-and-keep.
Report to Congress: The Commission will send a copy of this Order on Remand and Report and
Order, including this FRF A, in a report to be sent to Congress pursuant to the Congressional
Review Act. In addition, the Commission will send a copy of this O'rder on Remand and
Report and Order, including the FRFA, to the Chief Counsel for Advocacy of the Small Business
Administration. A. copy of this Order on Remand and Report and Order and FRFA (or summaries
thereof) will also be published in the Federal Register.
VI.

ORDERING CLAUSES

112. Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED, pursuant to Sections 1, 4(i) and 0), 201 -209, 251,
252, 332, and 403 of the Communications Act, as amended, 47 U.S.C. §§ 151, 154(i), 1540),
201-209, 251, 252, 332, and 403, and Section 553 of Title 5, United States Code, 5 U.S.C §
553, that this Order on Remand and Report and Order and revisions to Part 51 of the
Commission's rules, 47 C.F.R. Part 51, ARE ADOPTED. This Order on Remand and Report
and Order and the rule revisions adopted herein will be effective 30 days after publication in the
Federal Register except that, for good cause shown, as set forth in paragraph 82 of this Order, the
232

Declaratory Ruling, 14 FCC Red at 3707-10.

233

See supra paras. 67-76 (rejecting application of a reciprocal compensation mechanism to ISP-bound traffic).

234

We note, however, that the interim regime we adopt here governs for 36 months or until further action by the
Commission, whichever is longer.
235

5 U.S.C. § 801(a)(1)(A).
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See 5 U.S.C. § 604(b).
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provision of this Order prohibiting carriers from invoking section 252(i) of the Act to opt into an
existing interconnection agreement as it applies to rates paid for the exchange of ISP-bound traffic
will be effective immediately upon publication of this Order in the Federal Register,
113. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Commission's Consumer Information
Bureau, Reference Information Center, SHALL SEND a copy of this Order on Remand and
Report and Order, including the Final Regulatory Flexibility Analysis, to the Chief Counsel for
Advocacy of the Small Business Administration.
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION

Magalie Roman Salas
Secretary

«

Federal Communications Commission

FCC 01 131

Appendix A
List of Commenters in CC Docket Nos. 96-98, 99-68
Comments Filed in Response to the June 23, 2000 Public Notice
Advanced TelCom Group, Inc.; e.spire Communications, Inc.; Intermedia Communications, Inc.;
KMC Telecom, Inc.; Nextlink Communications, Inc.; The Competitive Telecommunications
Association
Alliance for Public Technology
Association of Communications Enterprises
Association for Local Telecommunications Services
AT&T Corp. (AT&T)
BellSouth Corporation
Cablevision Lightpath, Inc.
California State and California Public Utilities Commission
Centennial Communications Corp. (Centennial)
Florida Public Service Commission
Focal Communications Corporation, Allegiance Telecom, Inc., and Adelphia Business Solutions,
Inc.
General Services Administration
Global NAPs, Inc.
ICG Telecom Group, Inc.
Keep America Connected; National Association of the Deaf; National Association of
Development Organizations; National Black Chamber of Commerce; New York Institute of
Technology; Ocean of Know; Telecommunications for the Deaf, Inc.; United States Hispanic
Chamber of Commerce
Massachusetts Department of Telecommunications & Energy
Missouri Public Service Commission
National Consumers League
National Exchange Carrier Association, Inc.
New York Department of Public Service
Pac-West Telecomm, Inc.
Pennsylvania Office of Consumer Advocate
Prism Communications Services, Inc.
Qwest Corporation
RCN Telecom Services, Inc. and Connect Communications Corporation
RNK, Inc.
Rural Independent Competitive Alliance
SBC Communications, Inc. (SBC)
Sprint Corporation (Sprint)
Texas Public Utility Commission
Time Warner Telecom Inc. (Time Warner)
United States Telecom Association
Verizon Communications (Verizon)
Western Telephone Integrated Communications, Inc.
WorldCom, Inc.
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Reply Comments Filed in Response to the June 23, 2000 Public Notice
Adelphia Business Solutions, Inc.; Allegiance TeleCom, Inc., Focal Communications Corporation,
and RCN Telcom Services, Inc.
AT&T Corp.
BellSouth Corporation
Cablevision Lightpath, Inc.
Cincinnati Bell Telephone Company
Commercial Internet Exchange Association
Converscent Communications, LLC
Covad Communication Company
Duckenfield, Pace
e.spire Communications, Inc., Intermedia Communications Inc., KMC Telecom, Inc.,
NEXTLINK Communications, Inc., The Association for Local Telecommunications Services,
and The Competitive Telecommunications Association
General Services Administration
Global NAPs, Inc.
ICG Telecom Group, Inc.
Keep America Connected; National Association of Development Organizations; National Black
Chamber of Commerce; New York Institute of Technology; United States Hispanic Chamber
of Commerce
Pac-West Telecomm, Inc.
Prism Communications Services, Inc.
Qwest Corporation
Riter, Josephine
SBC Communications, Inc. (SBC)
Sprint Corporation
Time Warner Telecom Inc. (Time Warner)
US Internet Industry Association
United States Telecom Association
Verizon Communications (Verizon)
Western Telephone Integrated Communications, Inc.
WorldCom, Inc.
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Comments Filed in Response to the February 26, 1999 Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
Airtouch Paging
America Online, Inc. (AOL)
Ameritech
Association for Local Telecommunications Services
AT&T Corp. (AT&T)
Baldwin, Jesse
Bardsley, June
Bell Atlantic Corporation
BellSouth Corporation
Cablevision Lightpath, Inc.
California Public Utilities Commission
Choice One Communications (Choice One)
Cincinnati Bell Telephone Company
Commercial Internet eXchange Association
Competitive Telecommunications Association )
Corecomm Limited
Cox Communications, Inc. (Cox)
CT Cube, Inc. & Leaco Rural Telephone Cooperative, Inc.
CTSI, Inc.
Florida Public Service Commission
Focal Communications Corporation
Frontier Corporation
General Communication, Inc.
General Services Administration
Global N APs Inc.
GST Telecom, Inc.
GTE Services Corporation (GTE)
GVNW Consulting, Inc.
Hamilton, T)wight
ICG Communications
ICORE, Inc.
Indiana Ufility Regulatory Commission
Informatkai Technology Association of America
Intermedia, Communications Inc. (Intermedia)
Keep America Connected; Federation offlfapanic Organizations of the Baltimore Metropolitan
Area,Tnc; Latin American Women and Supporters; League of United Latin American
Citizens; Massachusetts Assistive Technology Partnership; National Association of
Commissions for Women; National ifesociation of Development Organizations; National
Hispanic Council on Aging; New York Institute of Technology; Resources for Independent
Living; Telecommunications Advocacy Project; The Child Health Foundation; The National
Trust for the Development of African American Men; United Homeowners Association;
United Seniors Health Cooperative
KMC Telecom Inc.
Lewis, Shawn
Lloyd, Kimberly, D.
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MCI WorldCom, Inc.
MediaOne Group (Media One)
Miner, George
Missouri Public Service Commission
National Telephone Cooperative Association
New York State Department of Public Service
Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission
Personal Communications Industry Assoc.
Public Utility Commission of Texas
Prism Communications Services, Inc.
RCN Telecom Services, Inc.
Reinking, Jerome C.
Richmond Telephone Company
RNK Inc.
SBC Communications
Schaefer, Karl W.
Sefton, Tim
Shook, Ofelia E.
Sprint Corporation
John Staurulakis, Inc.
Telecommunications Resellers Association
Telephone Association of New England
Thomas, William J.
Time Warner Telecom Inc. (Time Warner)
United States Telephone Association
Verio Inc.
Vermont Public Service Board
Virgin Islands Telephone Corporation
Wisconsin State Telecommunications Association
Reply Comments Filed in Response to the February 26, 1999 Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
Airtouch Paging
Ameritech
Association for Local Telecommunications Services
AT&T Corp.
Bell Atlantic Corporation
BellSouth Corporation and BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc.
Competitive Telecommunications Association
Corecomm Limited (CoreComm)
Cox Communications, Inc. (Cox)
Focal Communications Corporation
General Services Administration
Global NAPs Inc.
GST Telecom Inc.
GTE Services Corporation (GTE)
GVNW Consulting, Inc.
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ICG Communications, Inc
Illinois Commerce Commission
Intermedia Communications Inc.
KMC Telecom Inc.
MCI WorldCom, Inc.
National Exchange Carrier Association, Inc.
National Telephone Cooperative Association
Network Plus, Inc.
New York State Department of Public Services
Pac-West Telecomm., Inc.
Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission
Personal Communications Industry Association
Prism Communications Services, Inc.
Public Service Commission of Wisconsin
RCN Telecom Services
RNK Telecom
SBC Communications, Inc.
Sprint Corporation
Supra Telecommunications & Information Systems, Inc.
TDS Telecommunications Corporation
Time Warner Telecom
United States Telephone Association
US West Communications, Inc.
Verio Inc.
Virgin Islands Telephone Corporation
Wyoming Public Service Commission
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Appendix B - Final Rules
AMENDMENTS TO THE CODE OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS
Part 51, Subpart H, of Title 47 of the Code of Federal Regulations (C.F.R.) is amended as
follows:
1. The title of part 51, Subpart H, is revised to read as follows:
Subpart H—Reciprocal Compensation for Transport and Termination of
Telecommunications Traffic
2. Section 51.701(b) is revised to read as follows:
(a) § 51.701 Scope of transport and termination pricing rules,
*****

(b) Telecommunications traffic. For purposes of this subpart, telecommunications traffic means:
(1) Telecommunications traffic exchanged between a LEC and a telecommunications carrier other
than a CMRS provider, except for telecommunications traffic that is interstate or intrastate
exchange access, information access, or exchange services for such access (see FCC 01-131,
paras. 34, 36, 39, 42-43); or
(2) Telecommunications traffic exchanged between a LEC and a CMRS provider that, at the
beginning of the call, originates and terminates within the same Major Trading Area, as
defined in § 24.202(a) of this chapter.
3. Sections 51.701(a), 51.701(c) through (e), 5J.703, 51.705, 51.707, 51.709, 51.711, 51.713,
51.715, and 51.717 are each amended by striking "local" before "telecommunications traffic" each
place such word appears.
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SEPARATE STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN MICHAEL K. POWELL
Re;

Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in the Telecommunications Act of
1996; Intercarrier Compensation for ISP-Bound Traffic (CC Docket Nos. 96-98, 99-68)

In this Order, we re-affirm our prior conclusion that telecommunications traffic delivered
to Internet service providers (ISPs) is subject to our jurisdiction under section 201 of the Act.
Thus, we reject arguments that section 251(b)(5) applies to this traffic. I firmly believe that this
Order is supported by reasonable interpretations of statutory provisions that read together are
ambiguous and, absent a reconciling interpretation, conflicting.
I also support the fact that this Order, for the first time, establishes a transition mechanism
that will gradually wean competitive carriers from heavy reliance on the excessive reciprocal
compensation charges that incumbents have been forced to pay these competitors for carrying
traffic from the incumbent to the ISP. This transition mechanism was carefully crafted to balance
the competing interests of incumbent and competitive telephone companies and other parties, so
as not to undermine the Acfs goal of promoting efficient local telephone competition.
I write separately only to emphasize a few points:
As an initial matter, I respectfully disagree with the objections to our conclusion that
section 251(g) "carves out" certain categories of services that, in the absence of that provision,
would likely be subject to the requirements of section 251(b)(5).1 Section 251(b)(5)'s language
first appears to be far-reaching, in that it would seem to apply, by its express terms, to all
"telecommunications."2 There is apparently no dispute, however, that at least one category of the
LEC-provided telecommunications services enumerated in section 251(g) (namely, "exchange
access") is not subject to section 251(b)(5), despite the broad language of this provision. Indeed,
the Bell Atlantic Court appears to have endorsed that conclusion.3 The question then arises
whether the other categories of traffic that are enumerated in section 251(g) (including,
"information access") should also be exempted from the application of section 251(b)(5). We
answer this question in the affirmative, and no justification (compelling or otherwise) has been
offered for why only one service - exchange access - should be afforded disparate treatment in
the construction of section 251(g). I would note, moreover, that on the only other occasion in

To be more precise, section 251(g) refers to certain categories of service provided byJLECs to ISPs and
interexchange carriers. 47 U.S.C. § 251(g). In this statement, I use a short-hand reference to the "categories of
services" enumerated infection 251(g).
2

47 U.S.C. § 251(b)(5).

3r

See cf. Bell Ail Tel Cos. v, FCC, 206 F.3d 1' 4 (D.C. Cir. 2000) ("Although [section] 251(b)(5) purports to
extend reciprocal compensation to all 'telecommunications,1 the Commission has construed the reciprocal
compensation requirement as limited to local traffic"). The Court then went on to conclude that the Commission
had not provided an adequate explanation of why LECs that carry traffic to ISPs are providing "'exchange access/ _
rather than 'telephone exchange service.'" Id at 9. The Court does not appear to have questioned anywhere in its
opinion the notion that the scope of the reciprocal compensation requirement does not extend to certain categories
of LEC-provided services, including "exchange access."
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which the Commission directly addressed the question whether section 251(g) serves as such a
"carve-out," the Commission concluded, as we do here, that it does perform that function.4
Nor do Ifindthe position we adopt here irreconcilable with our decision in the Advanced
Services Remand Order? In discussing the term ''information access" in that Order, we were not
addressing the question whether section 251(g) exempts certain categories of traffic provided by
LECs to ISPs and interexchange carriers from the other requirements of section 251. Rather, we
addressed only the relationship between "information access" and the categories of "exchange
access" and "telephone exchange service." Specifically, we "decline[d] to find that information
access services are a separate category of services, distinct from, and mutually exclusive with,
telephone exchange and exchange access services."6 But under the reading of section 251(g) put
forth in this Order, the question whether information access is distinct from these other services is
irrelevant Because information access is specifically enumerated in section 251(g), it is not
subject to the requirements of section 251(b)(5), whether or not that category of service overlaps
with, or is distinct from, telephone exchange service or exchange access.
Similarly, I reject the suggestion that section 251(g) only preserves the MFJ requirements.
The language of section 251(g) specifically refers to "each local exchange carrier," not just to the
Bell Operating Companies.7 Section 251(g) also expressly refers to any "regulation, order, or
policy of the Commission."8 Such clauses support the reading of section 251(g) that we adopt
today.9
Finally, I disagree that section 251(g) cannot be construed to exempt certain categories of
traffic from the requirements of section 251(b)(5), simply because the former provision does not
include the words "exclude" or "reciprocal compensation" or "telecommunications."10 As I have
said, our reading that the categories of LEC-provided services enumerated in subsection (g) are
exempted from reciprocal compensation arises from our duty to give effect to both section 251(g)
Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Interconnection
Between Local Exchange Carriers and Commercial Mobile Radio Service Providers. CC Dkt. Nos. 96-98, 95-185,
First Report and Order, 11 FCC Red 15499 (1996), % 1034.
Deployment of Wireline Services Offering Advanced Telecommunications Capability, CC Dkt. Nos. 98-147 et
al., Order on Remand, 15 FCC Red 385 (1999) {Advanced Services Remand Order)) see also WorldCom, Inc v
FCC, No. 00-1002 (D.C Cir. filed Apr. 20, 2001) {fuming Advanced Services Remand Order on one of the
alternative grounds proffered by the Commission).
6

Advanced Services Remand Order, \5 FCC Red at 406, f 46.

7

47U.S.C.§251(g).

Had thejanguage of section 251(g) been limited to the Bell Companies or to court orders and consent decrees,
for example, perhaps one could construct an argument that Congress meant to limit the^cope of section 251 (g) to
the MFJ requirements.
Section 251(b)(5) states that all LECs must "establish reciprocal compensation arrangements for the transport
and termination o£telecommunications " 47 U.S.C. § 251(g) (emphasis added).
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and section 251(b)(5) I also would point out that section 251(g) does include a specific reference
to "receipt of compensation," just as the services enumerated in that section (e.g., exchange
access, information access) undeniably involve telecommunications.n
In closing, I would only reiterate that the statutory provisions at issue here are ambiguous
and, absent a reconciling interpretation, conflicting. Thus, the Commission has struggled long and
hard in an effort to give as full a meaning as possible to each of the provisions in a manner we
conclude is consistent with the statutory purpose. It would not be overstating matters to
acknowledge that these issues are highly complex, disputed and elusive, and that what we decide
here will have enormous impact on the development of new technologies and the economy more
broadly. It is for their relentless efforts to wrestle with (and now resolve) these issues that I am
deeply grateful to my colleagues and our able staff.

^
As the Order suggests, Section 251(g) enumerates "exchange access," "information access" and "exchange
services for such access." 47 U.S C § 251(g). For purposes of subsection (g), all of these services are provided by
LBCs to "interexchange carriers and information service providers." These three categories undeniably involve
telecommunications "Information access" was defined in the MFJ as "the provision of specialized exchange
^telecommunications services" to information service providers. United States v AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131,196, 229
^D.D.C. 1982). The term "exchange service" as used in section 251(g): is not defined in the Act or in the MFJ.
Hather, the term "exchange service" is used in the MFJ as part of the definition of tire term "exchange access,"
^which the MFJ defines as "the provision of exchange services for the purposes of originating or terminating
interexchange telecommunications "" UnitedStates v AT&T, F. Supp. at 228. Thus, the term "exchange service"
appears to mean, in context, the provision of services in connection with interexchange communications.
Consistent with that, in section 251(g), the terni is used as part of the longer phrase "exchange services for such
fexchange] access to interexchange carriers and Fnfoanatioa service providers." All of this indicates that the term
Exchange service" is closely related to the provision of exchange access and information access, and that all three
involve telecommunications.
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DISSENTING STATEMENT OF
COMMISSIONER HAROLD FURCHTGOTT-ROTH
Re:

Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in the Telecommunications Act of
1996 and Inter-Carrier Compensation for ISP-Bound Traffic, Order on Remand and
Report and Order, CC Docket Nos. 96-98, 99-68.

To some observers, the Telecommunications Act of 1996 ("1996 Act"), in general, and
sections 251 and 252 (47 U.S.C. §§ 251 and 252), in particular, have become unnecessary
inconveniences. The poster child for those who proclaim the 1996 Act's failure is reciprocal
compensation. It has led to large billings - some paid, some unpaid - among telecommunications
carriers. These billings have not shrunk, in large part because the Commission's interpretation of
the pick-and-choose provision of the Act (47 U.S.C. § 252(i)) has led to unstable contracts, with
perverse incentives for renegotiation.
Reciprocal compensation is an obscure and tedious topic. It is not, however, a topic that
Congress overlooked. To the contrary, in describing reciprocal compensation arrangements in
sections 251 and 252, Congress went into greater detail than it did for almost any other
commercial relationship between carriers covered in the 1996 Act. Among other things, Congress
mandated that reciprocal compensation arrangements would be:
(1) made by contract; (2) under State supervision; (3) at rates to be negotiated or arbitrated; and
(4) would utilize a bill-and-keep plan only on a case-by-case basis under specific statutory
conditions. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 251(b)(5), 252(a), 252(b), 252(d)(2).
Faced with these statutory mandates, how should the large billings for reciprocal
compensation be addressed? Renegotiating contracts would be the simple market solution, only
made precarious by our pick-and-choose rules. Another solution would be to seek review of
reciprocal compensation agreements by iState commissions. Other solutions would be for this
Commission to change its pick-and-choose rules or to issue guidelines for State commission
decisions {see AT&T Corp v. Iowa Utilities Bd, 525 U.S. 366, 385 (1999)).
Each of these solutions, of course, would reflect at least a modicum of respect for States,
their lawmakers, their regulators, federal law, and the Congress that enacted the 1996 Act. Each
would also be consistent with, and respectful of, the prior ruling on reciprocal compensation by
the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit See Bell Atlantic Tel Cos, v. FCC, 206 F.3d 1 (D.C.
Cir. 2000).
There is, however, one solution that is not respectful of other governmental institutions.
It is a solution that places under exclusive federal jurisdiction broad expanses of
telecommunications. It is a solution that does not directly solve the problem at hand. It is a
solution that can be reached only through a twisted interpretation of (he law and a vitiation of
economic reasoning and general common sense. That solution is nationwide price regulation.
That is the regrettable solution the Commission has adopted.
The Commission's decision has troad consequences for the future of telecommunications
regulation. In holding that essentially all packetized communications fall within federal
jurisdiction, the Commission has dramatically diminished the States' role going forward, as such
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communications are fast becoming the dominant mode. Whatever the merits of this reallocation
of authority, it is a reallocation that properly should be made only by Congress. It certainly
should not be made, as here, by a self-serving federal agency acting unilaterally.
There is doubtlessly underway a publicity campaign by the proponents of today's action.
It will spin nationwide mandatory price regulation as "deregulation." It will spin the abandonment
of States and contracts as "good government."
The media might be spun by this campaign. The public might be spun. But it will be far
more difficult to convince the courts that the current action is lawful.
A Flawed Order From Flawed Decisionmaking
Today's order is the product of a flawed decisionmaking process that occurs all too
frequently in this agency. It goes like this. First, the Commission settles on a desired outcome,
based on what it thinks is good "policy" and without giving a thought to whether that outcome is
legally supportable. It then slaps together a statutory analysis. The result is an order like this one,
inconsistent with the Commission's precedent and fraught with legal difficulties.
In March 2000, the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit vacated the Commission's
conclusion that section 251(b)(5) does not apply to calls made to Internet service providers
("ISPs"). See Bell Atlantic, 206 F.3d at 9. The court ruled that, among other things, the
Commission had not provided a "satisfactory explanation why LECs that terminate calls to ISPs
are not properly seen as 'terminating . . . local telecommunications traffic,' and why such traffic is
'exchange access' rather than 'telephone exchange service.'" Id.
The Commission has taken more than a year to respond to the court's remand decision.
My colleagues some time ago decided on their general objective — asserting section 201(b)
jurisdiction over ISP-bound traffic and permitting incumbent carriers to ramp down the payments
that they make^to competitive ones. The delay in producing an order is attributable to the
difficulty the Commission has had in putting together a legal analysis to support this result, which
is at odds with-the agency's own precedent as well as the plain language of the statute.
Today, ^he Commission rules, once again, that section 251(b)(5) does not apply to ISPbound traffic, fa a set of convoluted arguments that sidestep the court's objections to its previous
order, the Commission now says that ISP-bound traffic is "information access," which, the
Commission asserts, is excluded "from the universe of'telecommunications' referred to in section
251(h)(5)" (Order %% 23, 30) -despite the Commission's recent conclusion in another context
that "information access" is not a separate category of service exempt from the requirements of
section 251. Seer Deployment of Wireline Services Offering Advanced Telecommunications
Capability, Order on Remand, 15 FCC Red 385, ff 46-49 (1999) <?Advanced Services Remand
Order").
The result will be another round of litigation, and, in all likelihood, this issue will be back
at the agency ifr another couple of years. In the meantime, the uncertainty that has clouded the
issue of compensation for ISP-bound traffic for the last five years will continue. The Commission
would act far more responsibly if it simply recognized that ISP-bound traffic comes within section
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251(b)(5). To be sure, this conclusion would mean that the Commission could not impose on
these communications any rule that it makes up, as the agency believes it is permitted to do under
section 201(b). Rather, the Commission would be forced to work within the confines of sections
251(b)(5) and 252(d)(2), which, among other things, grant authority to State commissions to
decide on "just and reasonable" rates for reciprocal compensation. 47 U.S.C. § 252(d)(2). But
the Commission surely could issue "rules to guide the state-commission judgments" regarding
reciprocal compensation (Iowa Utilities Bd, 525 U.S. at 385) and perhaps could even put in place
the same compensation scheme it orders here. At the same time, the confusion that this order will
add to the agency's already bewildering precedent on Internet-related issues would be avoided.
The Commission's Previous Order and
the Court's Remand Decision
To see how far the Commission has come in its attempt to assert section 201(b)
jurisdiction over ISP-bound traffic, let us briefly review the court's decision on the Commission's
previous order, which receives little attention in the order released today. In its previous order,
issued in February 1999, the Commission focused on the jurisdictional nature of ISP-bound
traffic. See Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in the Telecommunications Act
of 1996; Inter-Carrier Compensation for ISP-Bound Traffic, Declaratory Ruling, 14 FCC Red
3689 (1999) ^Reciprocal Compensation Declaratory Ruling"), Applying an "end-to-end"
analysis, the agency concluded that calls to ISPs do not terminate at the ISP's local server, but
instead continue to the "ultimate destination or destinations, specifically at a[n] Internet website
that is often located in another state." Id. % 12. Based on this jurisdictional analysis, the
Commission ruled that a substantial portion of calls to ISPs are jurisdictional!/ interstate, and it
described ISP-bound traffic as interstate "access service." Id. f^[ 17, 18. The Commission
reasoned that, since reciprocal compensation is required only for the transport and termination of
local traffic, section 251(b)(5)'s obligations did not apply to ISP-bound calls. See id. %% 7, 26.
1.

The Court Asked the-Commission Why ISPs Are Not Like Other Local
Businesses

The court vacated the Commission's decision. It held that, regardless of the jurisdictional
issue, the Commission had not persuasively distinguished ISPs from other businesses that use
communications services to provide goods or services to their customers. See Bell Atlantic, 206
F.3d at 1, In the court's view, the Commission had Biled to explain why "an ISP is not, for
purposes of reciprocal compensation, 'simply a communications-intensive business end user
selling a product to other consumer and business enSusers.'" Id. (citation omitted).
2.

The Court Asked the-Commission^Vhy Calls Do Not Terminate at ISPs

The court also questioned the£ommission's conclusion that a call to an ISP did not
"terminate" at the ISP. "[T]he mere feet that the ISP originates further telecommunications does
riot imply that the original telecommunication does not 'terminate5 at the ISP." Id The court
concluded that, "[hjowever sound the^end-to-end analysis may be for jurisdictional purposes," the
Commission had failed to explain why treating these "linked telecommunications as continuous
works for purposes of reciprocal compensation." Id.
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The Court Asked the Commission How Its Treatment of ISP-Bound Traffic
Is Consistent with Its Treatment of Enhanced Service Providers

The court also wondered whether the Commission's treatment of ISP-bound traffic was
consistent with the approach it applies to enhanced service providers ("ESPs"), which include
ISPs. See id at 7-8. The Commission has long exempted ESPs from the access charge system,
effectively treating them as end-users of local service rather than long-distance carriers. The court
observed that this agency, in the Eighth Circuit access charge litigation, had taken the position
"that a call to an information service provider is really like a call to a local business that then uses
the telephone to order wares to meet the need." Id at 8. The court rejected as "not very
compelling" the Commission's argument that the ESP exemption is consistent with the
understanding that ESPs use interstate access services. Id
4.

The Court Asked the Commission Whether ISP-Bound Traffic is "Exchange
Access" or "Telephone Exchange Service"

Finally, the court rejected the Commission's suggestion that ISPs are "users of access
service." Id. The court noted that the statute creates two statutory categories - "telephone
exchange service" and "exchange access" - and observed that on appeal, the Commission had
conceded that these categories occupied the field. Id. If the Commission had meant to say that
ISPs are users of "exchange access," wrote the court, it had "not provided a satisfactory
explanation why this is the case." Id
The Commission's Latest Order
Today, the Commission fails to answer any of the court's questions. Recognizing that it
could not reach the desired result within the framework it used previously, the Commission offers
up a completely new analysis, under which it is irrelevant whether ISP-bound traffic is "local"
rather than "long-distance" or "telephone exchange service" rather than "exchange access."
In today's order, the Commission concludes that section 251(b)(5) is not limited to local
traffic as it had previously maintained, but instead applies to all "telecommunications" traffic
except the categories specifically enumerated in section 251(g). See Order ^ 32, 34. The
Commission concludes that ISP-bound traffic falls within one of these categories - "information
access" - and is therefore exempt from section 251(b)£5). See id. \ 42. The agency wraps up
with a determination that ISP-bound traffic is interstate, and it thus has jurisdiction under section
201(b) to regulate compensation for the exchange offSP-bound traffic. See id. %% 52-65.
The Commission's latest attempt to solve the reciprocal compensation puzzle is no more
successful than were its earlier efforts. As discussed below, its determination that ISP-bound
traffic is "information access" and, hence, exempt from section 254^b)(5) is inconsistent with stillwarm Commission precedent. Moreover, its interpretation of secfion 251(g) cannot be reconciled
with the statute's plain language.
i . Today's decision is a complete reversal ofAe Commission's recent decision in the
Advanced Services Remand Order. In that order, the Commission rejected an argument that
xDSL traffic is exempt from the unbundling obligations of section 251(c)(3) as "information
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access." Among other things, the Commission found meritless the argument that section 251(g)
exempts "information access" traffic from other requirements of section 251. Id % 47. Rather,
the Commission explained, "this provision is merely a continuation of the equal access and
nondiscrimination provisions of the Consent Decree until superseded by subsequent regulations of
the Commission/5 Id. According to the Commission, section 251(g) "is a transitional
enforcement mechanism that obligates the incumbent LECs to continue to abide by equal access
and nondiscriminatory interconnection requirements of the MFJ." Id. The Commission thus
concluded that section 251(g) was not intended to exempt xDSL traffic from section 25 Fs other
provisions. See id. %% 47-49.
In addition, the Commission rejected the contention that "information access" is a
statutory category distinct from "telephone exchange service" and "exchange access." See id.
f 46.1 It pointed out that "'information access' is not a defined term under the Act, and is crossreferenced in only two transitional provisions." Id % 47. It ultimately concluded that nothing in
the Act suggests that "information access" is a category of services mutually exclusive with
exchange access or telephone exchange service. See id. 1f 48.
The Commission further determined that ISP-bound traffic is properly classified as
"exchange access." See id % 35. It noted that exchange access refers to "access to telephone
exchange services or facilities for the purpose of originating or terminating communications that
travel outside an exchange." Id % 15. Applying this definition, and citing the Reciprocal
Compensation Declaratory Ruling, the Commission reasoned that the service provided by the
local exchange carrier to an ISP is ordinarily exchange access service, "because it enables the ISP
to transport the communication initiated by the end-user subscriber located in one exchange to its
ultimate destination in another exchange, using both the services of the local exchange carrier and
in the typical case the telephone toll service of the telecommunications carrier responsible for the
interexchange transport." Id. ^ 35.
The Advanced Services Remand Order was appealed to the D.C. Circuit. See WorldCom,
2001 WL 395344. The Commission argued to the court in February that the term "information
access" is merely "a holdover term from the MFJ, which the 1996 Act supersedes." WorldCom,
Inc. v. FCCy Brief for Respondents at 50 (D.C. Cir. No. 00-1002). Its brief also emphasized that
section 251(g) was "designed simply to establish a transition from the MFJ's equal access and
nondiscrimination provisions . . . to the new obligations set out in the statute." Id.
Today, just two months after it made those arguments to the D.C. Circuit, the
Commission reverses itself. It now says that section 251(g) exempts certain categories of traffic,
including "information access," entirely from the requirements of section 251(b)(5) and thatiiSPbound traffic is "information access." See Order flf 32, 34, 42. The Commission provides nary a
word to explain this reversal.
Of course, the Commission's conclusions in the Advanced Services Reniand Order that
This aspect of the Advanced Services Remand Order was remanded to the Commission by the D.C. Circuit
because of its reliance on the vacated Reciprocal Compensation Declaratory Ruling. See WorldCom, Inc. v FCC,
No. 00-1062,2001 WL 395344, *5-*6 (D.C. Cir. Apr 20, 2001).
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ISP-bound traffic is "exchange access" and that the term "information access" has no relevance
under the 1996 Act were themselves reversals of earlier Commission positions. In the NonAccounting Safeguards Order,2 the Commission concluded, relying in part on a purported
distinction between "exchange access" and "information access," that ISPs "do not use exchange
access as it is defined by the Act" Id. % 248. In that order, the Commission was faced with
determining the scope of section 272(e)(2), which states that a Bell operating company ["BOC"]
"shall not provide any facilities, services, or information regarding its provision of exchange
access to [a BOC affiliate] unless such facilities, services, or information are made available to
other providers of interLATA services in that market on the same terms and conditions." 47
U.S.C. § 272(e)(2). The Commission rejected the argument that BOCs are required to provide
exchange access to ISPs, reasoning that ISPs do not use exchange access. See Non-Accounting
Safeguards Order % 248. In making that decision, the Commission relied on the language of the
statute as well as the MFJ's use of the term "information access." See id. % 248 & n. 621. As the
Commission explained, its "conclusion that ISPs do not use exchange access is consistent with the
MFJ, which recognized a difference between 'exchange access' and 'information access.'" Id. \
248n.62L
Thus, in reversing itself yet again, the Commission here follows a time-honored tradition.
When it is expedient to say that ISPs use "exchange access" and that there is no such thing as
"information access," that is what the Commission says. See Advanced Service Remand Order ^
46-48. When it is convenient to say that ISPs use the local network like local businesses, then the
Commission adopts that approach. See Access Charge Reform, First Report and Order, 12 FCC
Red 15982, f 345 (1997), And, today, when it helps to write that ISPs use "information access,"
then that is what the Commission writes. The only conclusion that one can soundly draw from
these decisions is that the Commission is willing to make up whatever law it can dream up to suit
the situation at hand.
Nevertheless^ there is one legal proposition that the Commission has, until now,
consistently followed - a fact that is particularly noteworthy given the churn in the Commission's
other legal principles. The Commission has consistently held that section 251(g) serves only to
"preservejj the LECs* existing equal access obligations, originally imposed by the MFJ."
Operator Communications, Inc.f D/B/A Oncor Communications, Memorandum Opinion and
Order, 14 FCC Red 12506, \ 2 n.5 (1999).3 Today's order ignores this precedent and transforms
2

Implementation of the Non-Accounting Safeguards Of Sections 271 and 272 of the Communications Act of 1934,
as Amended, First Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 11 FCC Red 21905 0 996)
^Non-Accounting Safeguards Order"').
3

See also, e.g, Application for Review and Petition for Reconsideration or Clarification of Declaratory Ruling
Regarding US West Petitions To Consolidate Latas in Minnesota and Arizona, Memorandum Opinion and Order,
14 FCC Red 14392, \ 17(1999) ("In section 251(g), Congress delegated to the Commission sole authority to
administer the 'equal access and nondiscriminatory interconnection restrictions and obligations' that applied under
the AT&T Consent Decree."); AT&T Corporation, etaL, Complainants, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 13
FCC Red 21438, f 5 (1998) ("Separately, section 251(g) requires the BOCs, both pre- and^ost-entiy, to treat all
interexchange carriers in accordance with their preexisting equal access and nondiscrimination obligations, and
thereby neutralize the potential anticompetitive impact they could have on the4ong distance market until such time
as the Commission finds it reasonable to revise or eliminate those obligations.").
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section 251(g) into a categorical exemption for certain traffic from section 251(b)(5). It is this
transformation - much more than the shell game played with "information access5' and "exchange
access" - that is most offensive in today's decision.
2. The Commission's claim that section 251(g) "excludes several enumerated categories
of traffic from the universe of'telecommunications' referred to in section 251(b)(5)" (Order % 23)
stretches the meaning of section 251(g) past the breaking point Among other things, that
provision does not even mention "excluding]," "telecommunications," "section 251(b)(5)," or
"reciprocal compensation."
Section 251(g), which is entitled, "Continued enforcement of exchange access and
interconnection requirements," states in relevant part:
On and after February 8, 1996, each local exchange carrier, to the extent that it
provides wireline services, shall provide exchange access, information access, and
exchange services for such access to interexchange carriers and information service
providers in accordance with the same equal access and nondiscriminatory
interconnection restrictions and obligations (including receipt of compensation)
that apply to such carrier on the date immediately preceding February 8, 1996
under any court order, consent decree, or regulation, order, or policy of the
Commission, until such restrictions and obligations are explicitly superseded by
regulations prescribed by the Commission after February 8, 1996.
47 U.S.C.§ 251(g).
As an initial matter, it is plain from reading this language that section 251(g) has
absolutely no application to the vast majority of local exchange carriers, including those most
affected by today's order. The provision states that "each local exchange carrier . . . shall provide
[the enumerated services]... in accordance with the same equal access and nondiscriminatory
interconnection restrictions and obligations . . . that apply to such carrier on the date immediately
preceding February 8, 1996" Id. (emphasis added). If a carrier was not providing service on
February 7, 1996, no restrictions or obligations applied to "such carrier" on that date, and section
251(g) would appear to have no impact on that carrier. The Commission has thus repeatedly
stated that section 251(g) applies to "Bell Operating Companies" and is intended to incorporate
aspects of the MFJ. Applications For Consent To The Transfer Of Control Of Licenses And
Section 214 Authorizations From Tele-Communications, Inc., Transferor To AT&T Corp.,
Transferee., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 14 FCC Red 3160, % 53 (1999); see also cases
cited supra note 3. Accordingly, by its express terms, section 251(g) says nothing about the
obligations of most CLECs serving ISPs, which are the primary focus of the Commission's order.
Moreover, it is inconceivable that section 251(g)'s preservation of pre-1996 Act "equal
access and nondiscriminatory interconnection restrictions and obligations" is intended to displace
section 251 (b)(5)'s explicit compensatioa scheme for local carriers transporting and terminating
each other's traffic. Prior to passage of the 1996 Act, there were no rules governing
compensation for such services, whether or not an ISP was involved It seems unlikely, at best,
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that Congress intended the absence of a compensation scheme to preempt a provision explicitly
providing for such compensation/ At the very least, one would think Congress would use
language more explicit than that seized upon by the Commission in section 251(g).
Finally, if, as the Commission maintains, section 251(g) "excludes several enumerated
categories of traffic from the universe of'telecommunications' referred to in section 251(b)(5)"
(Order ^f 23), why does section 251(g) not also exclude this traffic from the "universe of
'telecommunications'" referred to in the rest of section 251, or, indeed, in the entire 1996 Act?
As noted, section 251(g) nowhere mentions "reciprocal compensation" or even "section 251." In
fact, there appears to be no limiting principle. It would thus seem that, under the Commission's
interpretation, the traffic referred to in section 251(g) is exempt from far more than reciprocal
compensation - a consequence the Commission is sure to regret. See, e.g., Implementation of the
Local Competition Provisions in the Telecommunications Act of 1996; Interconnection Between
Local Exchange Carriers and Commercial Mobile Radio Service Providers, First Report and
Order 11 FCC Red 15499, % 356 (1996) (concluding that "exchange access" provided to IXCs is
subject to the unbundling requirements of section 251(c)(3)).
* * *

The end result of today's decision is clear. There will be continued litigation over the
status of ISP-bound traffic, prolonging the uncertainty that has plagued this issue for years. At
the same time, the Commission will be forced to reverse itself yet again, as soon as it dislikes the
implication of treating ISP-bound traffic as "information access" or reading section 251(g) as a
categorical exemption from other requirements of the 1996 Act. The Commission could, and
should, have avoided these consequences by applying its original analysis in the manner sought by
the court.

4

The case of IXC traffic is thus completely different There was a compensation scheme in effect for such traffic
prior to enactment of the 1996 Act - the access charge regime Because reciprocal compensation and the access
charge regime could not both apply to the same traffic, the Commission could reasonably conclude that the access
charge regime should trump thereciprocal compensation provision of section 251(bX5). See Competitive «•
Telecommunications Ass'n v FCC, 117 FJd 1068, 1072-73 (8th Cir. 1997). Here, there is no pre-1996 Act "
compensation scheme to conflictwith reciprocal compensation. As the Commission has stated, **the Commission
has never applied eitherthe ESP exemption or its rules regarding the joint provision of access to the situation
where two carriers collaborate fo deliver traffic to an ISP." Reciprocal Compensation Declaratory Riding ^ 26.
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